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IV. SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 
I. STATISTICAL SUMMARY 
This survey covers the period of March 1972 through July 1973,1 during 
which time the Iowa supreme court filed a total of 141 reported opinions2 
in criminal cases. 3 In the 140 cases with decisions on the merits, 4 the supreme 
court affirmed the lower court 69.5 percent of the time and upheld the State's 
appellate claim 70.2 percent of the time. Nine of every ten decisions were 
1. For earlier surveys, see Dunahoo, Survey of Iowa Criminal Law, 21 DRAKE 
L. REv. 488 (1972) (covering Jan. 1970-Feb. 1972) and Yeager, Survey of Iowa Criminal 
Law, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 118 (1970) (covering the year 1969). 
2. These opinions may be found in volumes 195-209 of the Northwestern Reports, 
Second Series. Because of the supreme court's division into two five-justice panels effec-
tive October 1972, the number of criminal law opinions recently has increased significantly. 
The average number thereof per month has been: 7.4 (January 1970-February 1972), 
10.1 (March 1972-July 1973), and 11.0 (October 1972-July 1973). The supreme court 
has sat en bane in 16 of the 99 reported criminal law cases decided after September 1972. 
3. Twelve postconviction relief petitions and two habeas corpus petitions, while 
triggering civil proceedings, are included in this survey total of 141 cases because of 
their raising of criminal law issues in these particular cases. 
Not included elsewhere in this survey (or in the statistics) are the topics of extradi-
tion and forfeiture, both of which are civil proceedings which directly relate to criminal 
matters in some cases. 
For recent developments concerning extradition, see Hughes v. Waters, 204 N.W.2d 
599 (Iowa 1973) and Hill v. Houck, 195 N.W.2d 692 (Iowa 1972). 
For recent developments concerning forfeiture proceedings, see Robinson v. Hanra-
han, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972); McReynolds v. Municipal Court, 207 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1973); 
State v. One Certain Conveyance, 207 N.W.2d 547 (Iowa 1973); and State v. Kaufman, 
201 N.W.2d 722 (Iowa 1972). 
4. One case was dismissed without a decision on the merits because the appeal was 
taken before a final judgment. See State v. Coughlin, 200 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1972) 
(trial court's order granting defendant's motion to set aside jury verdict of guilty is not a 
final judgment from which an appeal can be taken by the State; IowA R. Civ. P. 331 
is inapplicable to criminal cases). 
But see State v. Richmond, 207 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1973), Bruno v. Haugh, 206 
N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1973 ), Holland v. Brewer, 206 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1973 ), and Melka v. 
Houge, 206 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1973) (summary affirmance per curiam "AFFIRMED, see 
rule 348.1, Rules of Civil Procedure" in cases presenting no error and supreme court 
feels an opinion would have no precedential value). 
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unanimous, with the court experiencing an overall agreement rate of 96.2 per-
cent. 5 All but eight of the 141 survey cases were tried or heard on the district 
court level. 
5. 
a) DISPOSITIONS 
Affirmances 
(appeals) 
(certiorari) 
Reversals 
(appeals) 
(certiorari) 
Survey Period 
(3/72-7/73) 
(141 cases) 
1972-73 Term 
(9/72-7/73) 
(110 cases) 
98 
(97) 
(1) 
43 
(39) 
(4) 
Mfirmance rate 69.5% 
75 
(74) 
(1) 
35 
(32) 
(3) 
68.2% 
Reversal rate 30.5% 
(Note: The affirmance rate for the previous period of January 
1972 was 75.0 percent.) 
31.8% 
1970-February 
b) WINNING PARTIES 
State 
Defendant 
State's winning rate 
Defendant's winning rate 
(Note: The State's winning rate 
February 1972 was 76.9 percent.) 
c) VOTING PATTERNS 
9-0 Decisions 
8-0 Decisions 
7-0 Decisions 
5-0 Decisions 
8-1 Decisions 
7-1 Decisions 
4-1 Decisions 
7-2 Decisions 
6-2 Decisions 
6-3 Decisions 
5-4 Decisions 
for the 
99 
42 
-·····-····-··· 
70.2% 
29.8% 
previous 
32 
10 
2 
82 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
Agreement rate 96.2% 
Disagreement rate 3.8% 
period of 
77 
33 
-················ 
70.0% 
30.0% 
January 
12 
2 
2 
82 
2 
0 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
95.1% 
4.9% 
1970-
(Note: The justices' agreement rate for the previous period 
February 1972 was 92.6 percent.) 
of January 1970-
d) DISSENTING VOTES (Note: 
Justice Harris 
I ustice LeGrand 
Justice McCormick 
Justice Mason 
Chief Justice Moore 
Justice Rawlings 
Justice Rees 
Justice Reynoldson 
Justice Uhlenhopp 
All Justices did not participate in all 
3 3 
1 0 
6 6 
4 3 
3 3 
5 4 
3 3 
3 3 
7 7 
Total 35 32 
cases) 
For a comparable statistical summary for the period of January 1970-February 1972, see 
Dunahoo, Survey of Iowa Criminal Law, 21 DRAKE L REv. 488, 490-92 (1972). 
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Of the 126 convictions contested on their merits, the supreme court af-
firmed 91 (or 74.6 percent). Of the 35 convictions reversed, only 24 were 
remanded for new trial. 6 In other actions, the court upheld the sentence im-
posed in five cases but ordered resentencing in four others; affirmed (on a 
State's appeal solely to clarify the point of law) the granting of a directed ver-
dict; and upheld an order revoking probation. Finally, in three cases in which 
the respective defendants had not yet been tried, the court sustained a writ of 
certiorari challenging the overruling of one defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of speedy trial, reversed the overruling of another defendant's application 
for change of venue, and reversed the failure to overrule a third defendant's 
demurrer. 7 
A total of forty-eight reversible errors8 were committed in the forty-three 
6. Two of these cases were remanded for dismissal of the charges because of denial 
of speedy trial. See State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Iowa 1973) and State v. 
Hanysh, 208 N.W.2d 718 (Iowa 1973). The remaining nine cases were expressly or im-
pliedly remanded for entry of judgments of acquittal because of insufficiency of the evi-
dence for conviction. Three of these were reversed because of their resting on circum-
stantial evidence which at best raised suspicion as to the respective defendant's guilt. 
See State v. Jellema, 206 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1973), State v. Streit, 205 N.W.2d 742 
(Iowa 1973 ), and State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1973 ). Five other cases were 
reversed because of failure of proof of an essential element of the respective crime. 
See State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1973) (no competent evidence of defendant 
operating the vehicle in prosecution for O.M.V.U.I.); State v. Creighton, 201 N.W.2d 471 
(Iowa 1972) (no evidence introduced as to defendant operating the vehicle in O.M.V.U.I. 
case); State v. McGuire, 200 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1972) (no proof that defendant inten-
tionally simulated intoxication); State v. Hoffer, 197 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972) (no com-
petent proof of defendant's license still being suspended at the time he was arrested for 
driving while operator's license under suspension); and State v. Smith, 196 N.W.2d 439 
(Iowa 1972) (larceny in the nighttime requires proof that property was stolen from 
within a vessel, building, or vehicle and not from the outside of same). In the remaining 
case, both the wrong charge was brought and the wrong venue was set. See State v. Dur-
ham, 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972) (larceny is not committed when owner consents to 
defendant's taking of his property even though the consent is for purposes of apprehending 
defendant). As to whether Durham could be retried on the proper charge, see State v. 
Cook, 158 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1968) and State v. Folger, 204 Iowa 1296, 210 N.W. 580, 
582 (1926). 
7. Remanded for 
Affirmed 
On Appeal 
CONVICTIONS (91) 
by Court 4 
by Guilty Plea 18 
by Jury 69 
OTHER (7) 
Acquittal by jury 1 
Pretrial orders 0 
Probation revocation 1 
Sentencing s 
Reversed 
On Appeal 
(35) 
5 
1 
29 
(7) 
0 
3 
0 
4 
New Trial or 
Other Proceedings 
(24) 
4 
1 
19 
(6) 
2 
4 
TOTAL 98 42 30 
8. See also State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Iowa 1972) concerning success-
ful application of the harmless error rule, to wit: 
Consequently, the question posed is whether admission into evidence of the one 
item of hearsay instantly involved [i.e., defendant's tacit admission] compels a 
reversal of this case. We are satisfied it does not. . . • A review of the record 
fairly shrieks the guilt of this defendant. It is consequently inconceivable that 
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cases reversed by the supreme court, including three errors in one case!9 Of 
these, eleven of the errors occurred on rulings on pretrial matters, while thirty-
three errors were made during the trial, and the remaining four errors on sen-
tencing policy. The eleven errors made on pretrial matters consisted of: over-
rulings of motions to dismiss for lack of speedy trial in three cases;10 an over-
ruling of defendant's demand for a jury trial on a multi-count contempt 
charge;11 overrulings of defendant's motion to suppress illegally obtained evi-
dence in three cases;12 the overruling of defendant's application for change of 
venue;13 the acceptance of a guilty plea notwithstanding an improper colloquy;14 
the refusal to overrule defendant's demurrer;15 and the failure to sustain de-
fendant's demurrer and then to order an amendment to the county attorney's 
information.16 The thirty-three errors during trial included: the empanelling 
of a tainted jury panel;17 the State's improper admission of evidence of other 
crimes in two cases;18 a defective foundation for admission of the State's 
breath test evidence in an O.M.V.U.I. case;19 a prosecutor's improper comment 
admission of the hearsay here involved, mentioning neither names, dates nor 
places, could have possibly influenced the jury to reach an improper verdict. 
We therefore hold the admission of such hearsay was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
But see State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972) (harmless error not applied to 
improperly admitted evidence of another crime in a prosecution for vehicular man-
slaughter) and State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1973) (reversal of conviction be-
cause of admission of hearsay evidence where there was no competent evidence as to 
an essential element). See also State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1973) (harmless 
error inapplicable, as a matter of law, to admission of unconstitutionally-obtained confes-
sion) and State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Iowa 1972) (harmless error not proven 
here beyond a reasonable doubt since "error in instructing the jury is presumed to be 
prejudicial unless the contrary appears from a review of the whole case"). 
9. See State v. Smiley, 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972). 
10. See State v. Hanysh, 208 N.W.2d 718 (Iowa 1973), State v. Gorham, 206 
N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973 ), and Keever v. Bainter, 195 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1972), as 
discussed in text accompanying notes 514-39 infra. 
11. See Sarich v. Havercamp, 203 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 72-82 infra. 
12. See State v. Johnson, 203 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1972) (defective affidavit for a 
search warrant), as discussed in text accompanying note 485 infra. See also State v. 
Rowland, 202 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 
1972) (both involving improper foundation for breath test evidence in O.M.V.U.I. cases), 
as discussed in text accompanying notes 277-88 infra. 
13. See Pollard v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in 
text accompanying notes 504-09 infra. 
14. See State v. Clary, 203 N.W.2d 382 (Iowa 1973 ), as discussed in text accom-
panying note 542 infra. 
15. See State v. Vietor, 208 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1973) (burden of proof rests on 
defendant in accommodation hearing under Uniform Controlled Substances Act), as dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 99-108 infra. 
16. See State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973) (Iowa's obscenity statute is 
constitutional but scienter must be aileged in indictment and proved), as discussed in 
text accompanying notes 213-19 infra. 
17. See State v. Lunsford, 204 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1973), as discussed in text ac-
companying notes 577-80 infra. 
18. See State v. Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1972) (prosecution for statutory 
rape), as discussed in text accompanying notes 318-20 infra and State v. Davis, 196 
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972) (prosecution for vehicular manslaughter), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 194-97 infra. 
19. See State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accom-
panying notes 285-87 infra. 
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on defendant's refusal to take a breath test in another O.M.V.U.I. case;20 the 
admission of the State's evidence of defendant's bad character notwithstanding 
a proper foundation therefor;21 the exclusion of defendant's proferred evidence 
in three cases;22 improper limitation on defendant's examination of witnesses 
for equivocation and unresponsiveness;23 failure to declare mistrials in two 
cases;24 failure to direct the verdict in nine cas'es;25 and improper jury instruc-
tions in ten cases. 26 The four errors involving the sentencing process27 in-
cluded: the trial court's failure to exercise judicial discretion by sentencing de-
fendant according to a judicial district-wide sentencing policy of a twenty-day 
minimum jail sentence (subject to probation) notwithstanding the lack of a stat-
utory minimum;28 the trial court's entry of judgment and sentence ordering an 
indigent defendant to make immediate payment of the fine or to be imprisoned 
for default thereof;29 denial of postconviction relief to a defendant claiming 
20. See State v. Hall, 203 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1973 ), as discussed in text accom-
panying notes 282-84 infra. 
21. See State v. Sill, 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying 
notes 654-58 infra. 
22. See State v. McDaniel, 204 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1973) (evidence of statutory 
rape prosecutrix's other promiscuous acts admissible as to someone else besides defendant 
being her attacker), as discussed in text accompanying notes 321-22 infra. State v. 
Smiley, 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972) (improper exercise of judicial discretion to ex-
clude, as too remote, defendant's proferred evidence of heavy drinking earlier that 
evening by gang members who started the altercation, with defendant's assault-and-
battery conviction arising out of defendant's attempt to break up the fighting in his tav-
ern); as discussed in text accompanying notes 642-43 infra and State v. Johnson, 196 
N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1972) (evidence of restitution admissible in prosecution for false draw-
ing and uttering as to lack of intent to defraud), as discussed in text accompanying 
notes 135-38 infra. 
23. See State v. Smiley, 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text ac-
companying notes 5-97. 
24. See State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1973) (improper opening and clos-
ing arguments by prosecutor), as discussed in text accompanying notes 682-87 infra 
and State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1973) (illegally-obtained confession intro-
duced into evidence), as discussed in text accompanying notes 663-67 infra. 
25. See note 6 supra. 
26. See State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972) (collateral issues improperly 
interjected); State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972) (unconstitutional conclusive 
application of statutory presumption of intoxication); State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 
(Iowa 1973) (revision of test for giving of instruction on lesser included offense); State v. 
Hocker, 201 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1972) (improper exception under hunting by artificial light 
statute); State v. Hutton, ·207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973) (unconstitutional conclusi1•e 
application of statutory presumption of intoxication); State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d 
88 (Iowa 1973) (defective definition of reasonable doubt); State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 
862 (Iowa 1973) (improper to give instruction on aiding and abetting where no evi-
dentiary support that more than one person was involved); State v. Milliken, 204 N.W.2d 
594 (Iowa 1973) (improper emphasis on evidence adverse to defendant); State v. Sill, 
199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972) (diminished responsibility because of voluntary intoxication 
can vitiate specific intent and thus lead to acquittal); and State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225 
(Iowa 1972) (unconstitutional conclusive application of statutory presumption of intoxica-
tion). For a further discussion of each of the above, see part III, § B, subsec. 5 infra. 
27. See also State v. Milliken, 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973) (trial courts must 
avoid making improper reference in sentencing colloquy to court's inability to impose a 
jail sentence except if an indigent defendant could not pay the fine when, as here, the 
only possible penalties were imprisonment in the penitentiary or a fine or both but not 
imprisonment in the county jail). 
28. See State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973), as discussed in text accom-
panying notes 828-31 infra. 
29. See State v. Snyder, 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accom-
panying notes 823-24 infra. 
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his two sentences, under the peculiar circumstances, must only run concur-
rently rather than consecutively;30 and improper resentencing under the new 
Uniform Controlled Substances Act for a crime committed under the former 
Uniform Narcotics Act.31 
II. SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
A. General Principles 
Various general principles concerning substantive criminal law were dealt 
with during the survey period. These included: corroboration of an accom-
police's testimony, the scope of aiding and abetting, and the setting of venue in 
the proper county. 
1. Accomplice 
Various aspects of the law concerning corroboration of an accomplice's 
testimony32 were discussed during the survey period. Rep'eating the general 
rule that an accomplice is a witness who "could be charged with and convicted 
of the specific offense for which an accused is on tria/,"33 the court held in 
State v. Armstrong34 that the fact that the State's witness was defendant's ac-
complice in an earlier transaction in which they participated in a similar but 
separate offense does not ipso facto make him an accomplice in the instant 
offense. In State v. Houston, 35 the court held that when defendant claims 
that certain State's witnesses aided and abetted in the crime "the burden was 
upon [defendant] to so prove by a preponderance of the evidence,"36 rather 
than for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the State's witnesses 
were not defendant's accomplices. That the corroborative evidence can come 
from defendant himself was made clear in State v. Williams. 37 This may be 
by way of "his admissions, declarations, conduct, writings or other docu-
mentary evidence"38-but, of course, not through his tacit admissions. 39 
2. Aiding and Abetting 
Two survey cases illustrated diametrically-opposed appellate results on 
30. See Cleesen v. Brewer, 201 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 835-36 infra. 
31. See State v. Wiese, 201 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text ac.com-
panying notes 837-40 infra. 
32. See IowA CoDE § 782.5 (1973 ). 
33. State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 1972), quoting State v. Jen-
nings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1972). 
34. Id. 
35. 206 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1973). 
36. Id. at 689. 
37. 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973). 
38. Id. at 107. 
39. Id., citing State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 629-32 infra. 
62 Drake Law Review [Vol. 23 
the issue of sufficiency of evidence to convict on the theory of aiding and abet-
ting.4o 
The conviction for larceny in the nighttime was revers'ed in State v. 
Barnes,41 with the supreme court stating: "One cannot be convicted of crime 
upon a theory of aiding and abetting unless there is sufficient evidence to show 
he assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by 
active participation in it or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the 
time of its commission."42 Defendant and one Taylor had driven up to a gas 
station together and entered-with the announced purposes of Taylor to use 
the restroom and defendant to buy cigarettes. Coming into the office from 
outside to make change for defendant, the station attendant saw Taylor taking 
money from the station's money bag and defendant (with his back to Taylor) 
looking out the office door toward the attendant. Whereupon Taylor took 
flight, defendant remained there and requested his change. With defendant's 
stated purpose for his presence at the scene being lawful and there being no 
direct evidence that defendant saw or knew of the theft, the supreme court 
reversed the conviction because the circumstantial evidence was insufficient 
for the jury to find that he was acting as Taylor's lookout. The court said: 
"Even if we accept the State's claim defendant tried to protect Taylor after 
the theft, his conduct then would not be enough to prove his earlier com-
plicity .... "43 It added: "[S]ubsequent conduct is relevant only insofar 
as it tends to prove defendant's prior encouragement or participation. A de-
fendant may not be convicted as a principal on a theory of aiding and abetting 
for conduct which would only make him an accessory after the fact."44 
On the other hand, a conviction for false pretenses involving fraudulent 
insurance sales schemes was affirmed in State v. Buttolph.45 Concerning the 
requisite knowledge of the crime prior to its commission, the supreme court 
said that such knowledge "may be inferred from circumstances surrounding 
the act . . . . [P]articipation may be shown by 'presence, companionship, 
and conduct before and after the offense is committed.' "46 The court pointed 
out that the jury could find defendant fraudulently obtained insurance appli-
cation forms, regularly met with fellow fraudulent insurance salesmen to split 
the premiums, and wrongfully endorsed victim-clients' checks. Other evidence 
indicated a common plan or scheme to sell fraudulent policies, as well as use 
of fictitious names, by defendant and his "business associates." 
40. See generally IowA CoDE§ 688.1 (1973). 
41. 204 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1972). 
42. ld. at 828. 
43. ld. at 829. 
44. ld. at 828-29. 
45. 204 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1972). 
46. ld. at 825; accord State v. Youngbear, 203 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Iowa 1972) quoting 
State v. Myers, 158 N.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Iowa 1968): "Participation in criminal intent 
may be inferred from one's presence in and near the scene of the crime, and his conduct 
before and after the offense is committed." 
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3. Setting Venue 
In a rare instance of venue being set in the wrong county, the opinion in 
State v. Durham41 begins: "The wrong charge was brought against the de-
fendant in the wrong county."4 s While in Des Moines (Polk County), one 
Mr. Geesaman, a resident of Indianola (Warren County), agreed to a bizarre 
get-rich-quick scheme by which he would give $700 to a defendant, a resident 
of Des Moines, and be refunded $2000. Purportedly defendant was involved 
with the mafia and Geesaman, although cooling on the scheme but fearing for 
his and defendant's well being, reluctantly turned the $700 over to defendant 
merely as a loan. When defendant subsequently called Geesaman and said 
that both of them had been "ordered" to come up with another $1500, Geesa-
man went to the police. By arrangement with the authorities, Geesaman then 
went to defendant's home and told him that Geesaman had been unable to 
get the money. Defendant responded: "You know as well as I do what is 
going to happen. That is why I carry this" (presumably a gun). Geesaman 
then told defendant he could get the money elsewhere but that defendant 
would have to come to Geesaman's house (in Indianola) to get it. Defendant 
then went to Indianola and was given the $1500. "[T]his is the first of the 
events occurring in Warren County," the supreme court determined,49 without 
further discussion other than noting that the reason for the payoff being made 
in Indianola was to raise a charge in Warren County. 5° 
B. Specific Crimes 
1. Abortion 
The most celebrated recent development in substantive criminal law was 
the United States Supreme Court's voiding of state statutes (similar to Iowa 
Code section 701.1) which proscribe abortions during all states of pregnancy 
except when necessary to save the life of the mother. However, Roe v. Wade51 
further held that the expectant mother's right to an abortion is not absolute 
and she thus is not entitled to terminate her pregnancy "at whatever time, in 
whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses," but rather "at 
some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and 
prenatal life, become dominant. " 52 
47. 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972). 
48. ld. at 428. 
49. ld. at 429. 
50. The other three "venue-setting" decisions upheld the propriety of resorting to 
judicial notice in establishing venue. See State v. Creighton, 201 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa 
1972): "Venue was established by resorting to the helpful circumstantial evidence rule 
and the even more friendly principle that in deciding venue questions we may take judicial 
notice of the location of towns, geographical boundaries and certain designated places 
when shown to be within a certain distance of an established point;" accord State v. 
Hackett, 200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Hackett, 197 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1972). 
51. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973). 
52. ld. at 727-28. 
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The following guidelines for a constitutional state criminal abortion statute 
were set forth in Roe v. Wade: 
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first tri-
mester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the 
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. 
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first 
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the 
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways 
that are reasonably related to maternal health [e.g., qualifications 
of the person performing the abortion, licensure of that person, licens-
ing of the facility where abortion is performed]. 
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability [i.e., six months] the 
State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, 
may, if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe, abortion except 
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the pres-
ervation of the life or health of the mother. 
(d) The State may define the term "physician," ... to mean on:Iy 
a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any 
abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. 53 
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the s·ection in the challenged Texas 
statute exempting abortions "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother" 
was unconstitutionally restrictive meant that the Texas abortion statutes, "as a 
unit, must fall." The mother-saving exemption "cannot be stricken separately, 
for then the State is left with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no 
matter how medically urgent the case."54 A three-judge federal district court 
subsequently held in a declaratory judgment that "the Iowa abortion statute 
is unconstitutional and of no force and effect."55 
In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton,56 the Supreme Court declared 
several procedural features of Georgia's "modern" anti-abortion statute un-
constitutional. These included the following requirements as summarized in 
the opinion: "(1) that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals; (2) that the procedure be 
approved by the hospital staff abortion committee; and (3) that the perform-
ing physician's judgment be confirmed by the independent examinations of the 
patient by two other licensed physicians."57 Additionally, the statutory limita-
tion of abortions to "bona fide legal resident[s] of the State of Georgia"58 was 
voided. Also voided was the statutory provision limiting abortions except 
where: (1) the expectant mother's life would be endangered or her health 
seriously and permanently injured; (2) the fetus likely would be born with a 
serious mental or physical defect; or (3) the pregnancy resulted from forcible 
or statutory rape. 
53. ld. at 732-33. 
54. Id. at 733. 
55. Doe v. Turner, Civil No. 73-57-2 (S.D. Iowa, Aug. 3, 1973) (3 judge court). 
56. 93 S. Ct. 739 (1973 ). 
57. Id. at 747-48. 
58. Jd. at 753. 
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2. Arson 
In State v. Dunn,59 the court held that the State is not required in a 
prosecution for arson60 to prove that defendant's unlawful burning of another's 
personal property stemmed from defendant's personal hostility or revenge to-
wards the other person. To the contrary, the proof was that defendant was 
hired by the owner of a car to burn the car to enable the owner to collect 
the insurance proceeds. The court pointed out that, while arson requires 
willful and malicious burning, willfully means "purposely, deliberately, inten-
tionally"61 and that "the intentional doing of a 'wrongful act,' without justifi-
cation or lawful excuse, will permit an inference of a wicked state of mind, 
i.e., legal malice, as opposed to actual malic'e. " 62 
3. Assaults 
Iowa Code section 694.1, prescribing penalties for assault and for as-
sault and battery, was upheld in State v. Vick 63 against the contention that it 
was unconstitutionally vague for lack of statutory definition of these crimes. 
The supreme court utilized the familiar principle that common law elements 
are ascribed to crimes that are merely named but not defined in the Iowa 
Code. 
4. Breaking and Entering 
A conviction for breaking and entering64 was upheld in State v. Bone,65 
notwithstanding th'e fact that neither the owner nor the tenant of the broken-
into premises testified. "Want of consent by the owner or occupant to enter 
into his premises may be proved by circumstantial evidence,"66 the court 
noted. 67 
5. Burglary 
The suprerne court took the occasion in State v. Osborn68 to define night-
59. 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972). 
60. See IOWA CODE§ 707.3 (1973). 
61. 199 N.W.2d at 107. 
62. ld. at 108. 
63. 205 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1973). 
64. See IOWA CODE§ 708.8 (1973). 
65. 201 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1972). 
66. ld. at 82. 
67. See State v. Hougland, 197 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Iowa 1972): "'Breaking' means 
making_ an opening into a building by !respass and occurs '_Vhen a!l int~der remoyes or 
puts astde some part of the structure rehed en as an obstn1ct1on to mtn.1s10n. Opening an 
entrance door is a breaking." See also State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 1973 ), 
quoting State v. Jensen, 245 Iowa 1363, 1373, 66 N.W.2d 480, 485 (1954): "[P]roof of 
defendant's possession of recently stolen property when it is also shown that the larceny 
took place in connection with a burglary is sufficient to warrant a conviction of breaking 
and entering." Cf. State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798, 805 (Iowa 1972): "It is apparent 
the possession of property recently stolen in connection with a burglary is not an 'essen-
tial element' of the crime of burglary, even though the unexplained possession of recently 
stolen property may give rise to an inference of the guilt of the possessor of the crime of 
larceny." 
68. 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972). 
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time within the burglary statute. 69 "It is the general rule, in the absence of a 
statutory provision to the contrary, that the 'nighttime,' within the definition of 
burglary, is, as was held at common law, a period between sunset and sunrise 
during which there is not daylight enough by which to discern a man's face,'' 70 
the court pointed out. 71 
6. Contempt of Court 
a. Trial by Jury. Reversing Newby v. District Court,72 the Iowa su-
preme court held in Sarich v. Havercamp73 that trial courts can no longer per 
se deny a jury trial to defendants charged with contempt.74 Rather, the view 
was adopted therein that "the penalty involved, that is, the statutorily au-
thorized maximum penalty shall be the relevant criterion as the determination 
of a contemnor's right to a trial by jury, vis-a-vis the view the penalty actually 
imposed shall be determinative of the question." 75 Sarich had been charged 
with 28 counts of contempt of court for alleged violation of an injunction for-
bidding him from practicing dentistry. Thus facing the possibility of 14 years' 
imprisonment if convicted on all of these charges, 76 defendant demanded a 
jury trial, which was overruled. On trial to the court, he was convicted of five 
counts but was sentenced to only six months' imprisonment on these charges. 
However, the instant judgment also revoked defendant's probation on a 
previous six-month sentence and the sentence on the instant charge was made 
to run consecutively with the serving of the earlier sentence. Thus, the su-
preme court concluded that either the "potential penalty" or "imposed pen-
alty" criterion dictated vacating the judgment and remand for a trial by jury.77 
By implication the pivotal time period for determining the right to a jury 
trial was set at six months, in light of the reference in Sarich to Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 78 which affords a sixth ameadment right to trial by jury in State 
offenses carrying possible penalties ·exceeding six months' imprisonment unless 
the particular crime does not otherwise qualify as a petty offense, and to 
Baldwin v. New York,79 which held that a contemnor cannot be denied "the 
important right to trial by jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months' 
imprisonment."80 Because the maximum authorized imprisonment for con-
69. See IowA CoDE§ 708.1 (1973). 
70. 200 N.W.2d at 807, quoting State v. Dougherty, 186 Kan. 820, 821, 352 P.2d 
1031, 1032 (1960). 
71. See also note 63 supra. 
72. "This court has repeatedly held for more than a hundred years that a person 
may be punished for contempt without a jury trial." Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa 
1330, 1342, 147 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (1967). 
73. 203 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1972 ). 
74. See IowA CoDE§ 665.2 (1973) and IowA R. Crv. P. 330. 
75. 203 N.W.2d at 268. 
76. See IowA CoDE§ 665.4 (1973). 
77. 203 N.W.2d at 268. 
78. 391 u.s. 145 (1968). 
79. 399 u.s. 66 (1970). 
80. ld. at 72-73. 
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viction of one count of contempt under Iowa law is six months, 81 there is still 
no right to jury trial unless defendant is charged with more than one count. 82 
b. Violation of Injunction. In Sound Storm Enterprises, Inc. v. Keefe,83 
the Iowa supreme court upheld contempt convictions against promoters of a 
rock music festival. Their contumacious acts consisted of violation of a modi-
fied temporary injunction which enjoined them from: (1) violating health 
and safety regulations under Iowa Code sections 444.18 and 332.23 as well 
as state health department regulations, and (2) committing or encouraging the 
committing of any public offense. Specifically, the first offense consisted of 
failing to obtain the requisite permits as well as noncompliance with the health 
and safety regulations whereas the second offense was based upon violation 
of Code section 204.13 (keeping a place resorted to for illegal using of nar-
cotic drugs). 
These dictates of the decree did not come within the general rule that 
"equity cannot enjoin the commission of criminal offenses."84 Rather, as the 
supreme court explained: "[W]here as in this case a statutory enactment is 
regulatory in nature having for its primary purpose the promotion of public 
interest and welfare, then attendant criminality neither gives nor ousts juris-
diction in equity."S5 
Turning to the question of sufficiency of evidence to convict, the supreme 
court noted that "proof of contempt must be clear and satisfactory."86 Such 
was the case here, with the court finding that "nothing more than futile token 
or simulated efforts were made by petitioners to effect compliance with the 
terms, spirit and intent of the restraining writs."87 The "avalanche" was trig-
gered by petitioners having launched the arrangements for the festival "before 
requisite health, sanitation and safety permits were secured or essential facili-
ties arranged"88 and subsequently concluded these arrangements after an ad-
verse temporary restraining order. Discounting petitioners' claim they were 
unable to later stop the illegal activities (fostered by 20,000 persons con-
temporaneously swarming onto the scene), the court responded: "[P]etition-
ers created and brought on themselves the disability, if any, to comply with 
the aforesaid court orders." That is, "the situation did not change after is-
suance of the writs, but rather continued pursuant to petitioners' self-initiated 
premature plans and arrangements."89 Finally, upholding both corporate and 
individual criminal liability, the court said it is clear that "where, [as here], 
writs are directed to the corporation and to its officers, agents or employees, 
81. See IowA CoDE§ 665.4 (1973). 
82. Cf. State v. Fagan, 190 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1971) (right to jury trial on indictable 
misdemeanors). 
83. 209 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1973). 
84. ld. at 566. 
85. ld. 
86. ld. at 568. 
87. ld. 
88. ld. 
89. ld. 
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all are equally am'enable to punishment."90 
7. Controlled Substances/Drugs 
Several of the survey cases dealt with important issues of drug control. 91 
While most of these involved interpretations of Iowa's former Uniform Nar-
tocic Drug Act92 and its former stimulant or depressant drug act, 93 the principles 
stated therein appear to be applicable to Iowa's successor statute, the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act.94 
a. Exemptions for Lawful Use. The constitutionality of placing the bur-
den of proof on defendant to prove that he did not come within one of the 
exceptions of Iowa's former Uniform Narcotic Drug Act under which posses-
sion of narcotic drugs was not illegal was upheld in State v. Lynch.95 While 
that statute (like the controlled substances act)96 prohibited all possession of 
narcotic drugs except under certain enumerated circumstances, both statutes 
then expressly excuse the State from negating any exemption claimed by de-
fendant. Rejecting defendant's claim that the State "should have been com-
pelled to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not come 
within any of the exceptions instead of casting on him the burden to show 
he did,"91 the supreme court declared: 
If an exception is material in arriving at the definition of the crime, 
it is generally held the State has the burden of showing the excep-
tion does not apply because it is then one of the essential elements of 
the offense. However, where the exception merely furnishes an ex-
cuse for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, the duty de-
volves upon the defendant to bring himself within the exculpatory 
provision. 98 
b. Delivery I Sale. 
i. Accommodation offense. The constitutionality of the accommoda-
tion offense provision99 in Iowa's new controlled substances act was upheld 
in State v. Vietor10° against the principal contention that it improperly shifts 
the burden of proof to defendant. Essentially, this provision provides that fol-
lowing a conviction for delivery (or possession with intent to deliver), defend-
ant may move for, and the court shall grant, a pre-sentence accommodation 
hearing at which the burden is on defendant to prove (by clear and convincing 
90. Id. at 569. 
91. See generally Dunahoo, Iowa's Uniform Controlled Substances Act: A Coordi 
nated Approach to Drug Control, 21 DRAKE L. REv. 77 (1971). 
92. See IowA CoDE ch. 204 (1971) (since repealed). 
93. See IowA CoDE ch. 204A (1971) (since repealed). 
94. See IowA CoDE ch. 204 (1973 ). 
95. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972). 
96. See IowA CoDE§ 204.507 (1973). 
97. 197 N.W.2d at 190. 
98. ld.; accord Hom v. Haugh, 209 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1973). 
99. See IowA CoDE§ 204.410 (1973). 
100. 208 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1973) (en bane). 
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evidence) that his offense was intended merely "as an accommodation to an-
other individual and not with intent to profit thereby nor to induce the recipi-
ent . . . to become addicted . " If defendant carries his burden, then 
he shall be sentenced as if he had been convicted of simple possession (an 
indictable misdemeanor). 
In Vietor, the trial court made a pretrial ruling that the accommodation 
offense provision in actuality created a second type of delivery offense, that is, 
delivery as an accommodation to another. Accordingly, he further ruled that 
a felony conviction for delivery under section 204.401 requires the State to 
prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the delivery was made with 
intent to profit thereby or to induce the recipient to become addicted. So 
viewed, the trial court did not hold these sections totally void, the constitu-
tional infirmities being "cured" by his restructuring of the statute. 
On the State's pretrial certiorari proceeding, the supreme court reversed 
(by a 5-4 vote) and thus left sections 204.401 and 204.410 intact. This court 
concluded section 204.410 "establishes only a postconviction sentencing pro-
cedure by which the convicted person may, if he so desires, offer evidence in 
mitigation of sentence."101 Accordingly, this section "defines no crime [and] 
adds no essential elements to the crime defined in section 204.401 .... "102 
Meanwhile, section 204.401 was construed as creating "a separate and distinct 
crime without regard to the purpose or motive of the deliverer,"103 with all 
of the essential elements of the crime of delivery being contained therein.104 
Procedural aspects of the accommodation offense provision were dealt 
with in two other cases. In State v. Stil/,1°5 the court pointed out that the 
terminology of s'ection 204.410 "clearly indicates it is incumbent upon a con-
victed defendant to formally request a hearing before the court at the sentencing 
stage if he is to preserve error by reason of the trial court's failure to follow 
the provisions of this statute."106 Thus, defendant's appellate claim of exces-
sive sentence for failure to sentence under section 204.410 lacked merit since 
defendant had not moved for an accommodation hearing. Furthermore, the 
court held in State v. McGranahan101 that in an accommodation hearing the 
trial court "was not bound to accept defendant's testimony because it was not 
contradicted. "Hl8 
ii. Lesser included offense. It was held in State v. Habhab109 that pos-
session of marijuana was not a lesser included offense of the crime of sale of 
101. ld. at 898. 
102. /d. 
103. ld. 
104. In another case decided the same day, the supreme court summarily affirmed by 
the same 5-4 vote defendant's conviction for delivery and the trial court's subsequent 
finding that "defendant failed to prove his alleged ground (accommodation) for mitigation 
of punishment." State v. Thomas, 208 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1973) (en bane). 
105. 208 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa 1973). 
106. /d. at 894. 
107. 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973). 
108. ld. at 93. 
109. 209 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1973) (en bane). 
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marijuana under Iowa's former narcotic drugs act. "Sale" therein had the stat-
utory definition of "sale, barter, exchange, gift, or offer therefor,"110 and ac-
cordingly "[a] showing of possession ... was not required as an element of 
the offense."111 Conceding that the evidence in the instant case "show[s] a 
possession of the marijuana in connection with its sale," the supreme court 
nevertheless pointed out that "this does not in itself make possession an in-
cluded offense in the sale."112 In other words, the existence of such eviden-
tiary facts cannot supply an included offense "outside the elements of the ma-
jor crime. "113 Thus, even under the revised lesser included offense test re-
cently enunciated in State v. Hawkins, 114 "it is quite possible to commit one 
crime in the act of committing another and yet not have it an included of-
fense. It is not included as a part of the elements of the major offense,"115 
the court explained. The definitional language in the new controlled sub-
'5tances act does not appear to command a different decision. 
c. Possession. 
i. Control of premises. In State v. Reeves,l16 the Iowa supreme court 
for the first time promulgated comprehensive guidelines as to what constituted 
possession under Iowa's former stimulant or depressant drug act. These guide-
lines were expressly made applicable to prosecutions for violation of Iowa's 
controlled substances act. They include: 
( 1) Unlawful possession of narcotics is established by proof: 
(a) that the accused exercised dominion and control (i.e., posses-
sion) over the contraband, 
(b) that he had knowledge of its presence, and 
(c) that the accused had knowledge that the material was a nar-
cotic. 
(2) These necessary elements of unlawful possession may be establ-
lished by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences 
drawn from such evidence. 
( 3) Proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are found 
will not, without more, support a finding of unlawful possession. 
( 4) But dominion and control (1-a) by the accused over the narcotics 
does not mean the narcotic needs to be found on his person, nor 
does it mean that he must have had sole and exclusive use of the 
premises on which drugs are found. 
110. See IOWA ConE§ 204 (1971) (since repealed). 
111. 209 N.W.2d at 75. 
112. /d. 
113. ld. 
114. 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973 ). For a further discussion of this case, see text 
accompanying notes 776-770, infra. 
115. 209 N.W.2d at 75. 
116. 209 N.W.2d 18 (Iowa 1973). 
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(5) Constructive possession is all that is necessary and occurs when the 
accused maintains control or a right to control the narcotic; posses-
sion may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which 
is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and sub-
ject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and con-
trol of the accused and another. 
( 6) If the premises on which the drugs are found are exclusively ac-
cessible to the accused and subject to his use, possession or con-
trol, knowledge of their presence on such premises ( 1-b) coupled 
with his ability to maintain dominion control (1-a) may be in-
ferred. 
(7) Even if the accused does not have exclusive control of the hiding 
place possession may be imputed if he has not abandoned the nar-
cotic and no other person has obtained possession. 
( 8) Knowledge of the narcotic character ( 1-c) of the drug, as well as 
of their presence (1-b) may be shown by the conduct, behavior 
and declarations of the accused.U 7 
Summarizing these principles, the supreme court said that the Iowa pro-
cedure in prosecutions for unlawful possession of controlled substances or drugs 
will be that "the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the ac-
cused knew of the presence of such substances or premises occupied and con-
trolled by him, either exclusively or jointly with others and the nature of the 
material."118 However, the type of proof required varies according to whether 
the premises are in the exclusive or joint possession of the accused. If the ac-
cused exclusively possesses the premises on which the substances or drugs 
are found, "knowledge of their presence on such premises coupled with his 
ability to maintain control over such substances may be inferred." This infer-
ence of knowledge, of course, "is rebuttable and not conclusive;" however, "no 
further proof of knowledge by the State is required .... "119 On the other 
hand, if the accused has only joint possession of the premises, "knowledge of 
the presence of the substances on the premises and the ability to maintain 
control over them by the accused will not be inferred but must be established 
by proof." This proof may be by way of evidence establishing the accused's 
actual knowledge, his incriminating statements or circumstantial evidence from 
which the jury "might lawfully infer knowledge .... "120 Either way, the 
question of knowledge is one for the jury upon instructions embodying these 
principles. 
ii. Quantity of substance. State v. Grady121 established that even a 
miniscule quantity of a drug is sufficient to support a conviction for violation of 
117. /d.at23. 
118. ld. at 23. 
119. ld. 
120. ld. 
121. 201 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972). 
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Iowa's former narcotic drugs act, rather than requiring that a usable quantity 
be involved. Pointing out that the Code "defines marijuana, but makes no 
distinction as to the quantitative amount of marijuana in any gross substance 
containing the same," the court concluded, th'erefore, that the statute was "qual-
itative rather than quantitative .... "122 Accordingly, it was immaterial in 
the instant prosecution for illegal sale of mariquana that there was "an insuffi-
cient quantity of marijuana in the exhibit to be used in the usual manner, that 
is, to be smoked," or "to produce a narcotic effect."123 The terminology in 
the successor statute (the uniform controlled substances act) is similar, includ-
ing the express language "any quantity" in several sections.124 
8. Driving While Operator's License Under Suspension 
A conviction for driving while operator's license under suspension125 was 
reversed in State v. Hoffer126 because of lack of proof that defendant's license 
was still under suspension at the time he was driving. Effective April 19, 1970, 
defendant's driving privilege was suspended for ninety days, with the sus-
pension to remain in effect until such time as he posted proof of financial re-
sponsibility.127 Thus, the fixed suspension period expired July 18, 1970, and 
defendant was stopped on October 13, 1970, for a faulty headlight. The State's 
claim of sufficiency of evidence rested entirely on the ninety-day notice served 
on March 19, 1970, and "absence of license in defendant's possession at the 
time he was stopped."128 The supreme court said: "It is as reasonable to be-
lieve defendant may have tolled the suspension by proving financial responsi-
bility as not."129 With the State having the burden of proving defendant's 
license was still suspended on October 13, 1970, there was insufficient evidence 
for a jury question since "[p]roof defendant's license might have been sus-
pended at the time does not support a finding it was."130 The only evi-
evidence of continued suspension of defendant's license was a police teletype 
message at the time defendant was stopped that he was under suspension. 
This message being hearsay, the State conceded that it was offered only to 
show the reason for arresting defendant and "not to establish the truth of the 
message."131 Agr'eeing, the supreme court determined: "What the message 
said has no probative value on the issue of license suspension."132 
9. Failure to Have Motor Vehicle Under Control 
A motorist's unreasonable speed while approaching a sharp curve was 
122. I d. at 496. 
123. ld. 
124. See, e.g., IOWA CODE§§ 204.204(4), .208(2), and .210(2) (1973). 
125. See IOWA CODE§ 321A.32(1) (1973). 
126. 197 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972). 
127. See IOWA CoDE§ 321A.18 (1973). 
128. 197 N.W.2d at 369. 
129. ld. 
130. Id. at 370. 
131. ld. at 369. 
132. ld. 
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held in State v. Nelson133 to be a proper basis for a conviction for failure to have 
motor vehicle under control. Code section 321.288 is essentially "a speed stat-
ute," the supreme court determined, adding that "[a] speed which is reason-
able and proper under some circumstances may be excessive under others."134 
10. False Drawing and Uttering 
a. Evidence of Intent to Defraud. That defendant is entitled to show 
restitution, not as a defense but as to evidence of drawer's lack of intent to de-
fraud, in a prosecution for false drawing and uttering135 was determined in 
State v. Johnson. 136 The reversible error occurred here during defendant's 
cross-examination of the person given the bad check. After the drawee stated 
that defendant had given him bad checks in the past and that defendant's 
father had paid them, defendant attempted to show restitution of the check in-
stantly involved "for the limited purpose of aiding the jury in determining 
whether defendant acted with an intent to defraud."137 Holding that such evi-
dence could not be excluded, the supreme court added: "It would be proper 
to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which it might consider such 
evidence." 138 
Another error occurred in this same case when the trial court excluded 
evidence of past transactions between defendant and the drawee involving bad 
checks. Defendant had attempted to show that because of defendant's pre-
vious bad checks to the drawee which subsequently were made good by de-
fendant's father, the drawee was not deceived by the instant bad check. Hold-
ing the exclusion of such evidence to be error, the supreme court said: "For 
the [limited] purpose of determining whether defendant obtained the money 
by intentionally false representations, it was material to know defendant's re-
lations to the bank and the manner in which the business between them had 
been carried on."139 
b. The Ten-Day Presumptive Evidence Rule. The Code section 713.4 
ten-day presumptive evidence rule was characterized in State v. Mason140 as 
"merely articulat[ing] an evidentiary rule." Accordingly, "[f]ailure to pay 
the check after a ten-day notice is not an element"141 of the crime of false 
uttering of a check and the trial court thus correctly refused to instruct that 
defendant could not be convicted unless he was s'erved with a notice of non-
payment at least ten days before filing of the charge. This crime, instead, 
is committed "when the check writer receives a thing of value, assuming all 
133. 207 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1973). 
134. /d. at 753. 
135. See IowA CODE§ 713.3 (1973). 
136. 196 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1972). 
137. /d. at 568. 
138. /d. at 570. 
139. ld. at 571. 
140. 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972). 
141. /d. at 295. 
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other elements are present"142 and Code section 713.4 does not accord a ten-
day grace period to make restitution for a worthless check. Nor is defendant 
entitled to a ten-day notice, but then the State is precluded from the benefit 
of the rebuttable presumption of fraudulent intent. All that this provision im-
ports is that failure of the maker or drawer of the check to pay the holder 
the amount due thereon within ten days after sufficient notice that the check 
has not been paid by the drawee constitutes "prima facie evidence of intent 
to defraud."143 The State, of course, is free to elect to not rely on section 
713.4, as it did instantly.144 
11. Flag Desecration 
The constitutionality of Iowa's flag desecration statute145 was upheld in 
State v. Farrell, 146 against the twin contentions that the act is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad and that it cannot constitutionally be applied to symbolic 
political protest.147 Accordingly, defendant's conviction for burning a United 
States flag was upheld on an 8-1 vote. Applying the United States v. O'Brien148 
guidelines, the court agreed that "the State unquestionably has a compelling 
vital interest in preservation of the public peace, and in furtherance thereof 
may prohibit forms of conduct which constitute a threat thereto."149 Declar-
ing that section 32.1 "is no longer applicable to the utterance of pure speech,"150 
the court determined that this statute, as applied, "is directed to and regulates 
the form by which defendant's message was expressed, not the content 
thereo£."151 Thus, the court concluded that Code section 32.1, as here ap-
plied, "is sufficiently irrelative to suppression of free expression."152 
That no evidence was presented disclosing that a breach of peac·e was 
committed or imminent was considered immaterial, "since the physical act of 
burning a United States flag is conduct which could reasonably be expected 
to provoke a breach of peace."153 Moreover, only a minimal restriction on 
expression emanates from section 32.1, which is "no more than essential to a 
furtherance of the State's legitimate interest in maintaining public order."154 
The overbreadth challenge was not reached because of defendant's lack of 
standing under the Raines doctrine.155 
142. ld.; accord State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Iowa 1972): "When the 
other elements exist, the crime under § 713.3 is complete whether or not the check is ever 
presented to the drawee." 
143. See IOWA CODE§ 713.4 (1973). 
144. 203 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Iowa 1972). 
145. IOWA CODE § 32.1 ( 1973). 
146. 209 N.W.2d 103 (1973) (en bane). 
147. This latter claim had not been asserted in State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809 
(Iowa 1971 ). 
148. 391 u.s. 367, 377 (1968). 
149. 209 N.W.2d at 107. 
150. ld. at 106, citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
151. ld. at 107. 
152. ld. 
153. Jd. 
154. ld. at 108. 
155. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960): "[O]ne to whom appli-
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12. Going Armed with Intent 
That the State is not required in a prosecution for going armed with in-
tent156 to introduce proof of the particular person against whom defendant 
intended to use his gun was settled in State v. Buchanan. 151 The supreme 
court explained that Code section 695.1 "contains no requirement that a per-
son going forth with a pistol have intent to shoot some particular person or 
class of persons. If he intends to use the weapon against the person of some-
one unlawfully, the intent element of the crime is satisfied."158 Additionally, 
the fact that defendant had only proceeded a short distance from his home 
does not present a question of sufficiency of evidence. Indeed, "[t]he distance 
an armed individual goes from his home might be relevant upon the intent 
element in a proper case, but that would be a matter for the jury."159 
13. Hunting by Artificial Light 
In State v. Hocker,l 60 the supreme court found error in the trial court's 
instruction in a prosecution for hunting by artificial light161 that the jury 
should find defendant not guilty if it determined that he was on the premises 
in question at the request of the landowner for the purpose of tracking down 
animals that had been killing the owner's domestic animals. On this State's 
appeal following defendant's acquittal,l 62 the supreme court said: "It was 
error to instruct on an exception to the statute which is plainly not present in 
its language."163 Here, "[d]ogs were not being used" and "[n]o treed animal 
was being pursued"164 (the only exceptions in the statute). 
14. Interference with the Administration of Justice 
The crime of interference with the administration of justice165 was dif-
ferentiated from that of resisting execution of process166 in State v. Graham.161 
Any willful, improper obstruction of a law enforcement officer's effectuation 
of an administrative duty violates the former, the supreme court pointed out. 
An officer acts in an administrative capacity while engaged "in the perform-
ance of his duties required of him by a court order, judgment or decree, civil 
cation of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground 
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in 
which its application might be unconstitutional." 
156. See IOWA CODE§ 695.1 (1973). 
157. 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973). 
158. ld. at 786. 
159. ld., citing State v. Hunley, 167 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 1969). 
160. 201 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1972). 
161. See IowA CoDE§ 109.93 (1973). 
162. ld. § 793.9. 
163. 201 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Iowa 1972). 
164. ld. 
165. See IOWA CODE§ 723.1 (1973). 
166. ld. § 742.1. 
167. 203 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1973). 
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or criminal. "168 But when he acts or attempts to act "by virtue of his 
general authority he is performing an executive function."169 Accordingly, 
any person "willfully resisting or opposing him in the carrying out of such 
functions would be violating Code § 742.1"170 (i.e., r'esisting execution of 
process). 
In Graham, the criminal conduct arose when the deputies were ordered (in 
a supplemental divorce decree) to take custody of two minor children from 
defendant's friend. Upon the. deputies' inquiry at defendant's apartment, and 
advisement of the judicial decree, 171 defendant denied the children's presence 
and refused entry to the deputies-but the deputies thereupon got a warrant 
and the children were found therein. Defendant's conviction for interference 
with the administration of justice was affirmed since the sheriff's deputies 
were effectuating a judicial decree (for taking custody of minor children) and 
thus "any willful, improper obstruction of such administration of justice would 
constitute a violation of Code§ 723.1 . "172 
15. Larceny 
A larceny173 conviction was reversed in State v. Durham174 because the 
owner turned the property over to defendant.175 "Th'e owner's nonconsent 
has always been an indispensable element to the crime of larceny,"176 the su-
preme court declared. In fact, as here, "even though an accused conceives 
a larcenous scheme, where it becomes known to the property owner and the 
property owner informs the police and furnishes the property for taking so 
as to apprehend the accused, the owner thereby consents to the taking and 
the accused is not guilty of larceny."177 
16. Larceny of a Motor Vehicle 
Overruling State v. Everett,178 the supreme court held in State v. Hawk-
ins179 that operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent180 can be a 
lesser included offense of the crime of larceny of a motor v'ehicle.181 Never-
168. Jd. at 603. 
169. Jd. 
170. Jd. 
171. "[l]t was the State's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant 
acted 'intentionally' and 'knew' the officers were executing or attempting to execute a 
court order." ld. at 604. 
172. Id. at 603. 
173. See IowA CoDE§ 709.1 (1973). 
174. 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972). 
175. For the factual situation in Durham, 8ee text accompanying notes 47-50, supra. 
176. 196 N.W.2d at 430. 
177. Id., quoting 10 A.L.R.3d 1126. See also State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731 
(Iowa 1972) concerning defendant's allegedly mistaken belief that his accomplice had 
authority to remove the property and thus men8 rea was lacking. 
178. 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968). 
179. 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973). 
180. See IowA CODE§ 321.76 (1973). 
181. ld. § 321.82. 
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theless, the court reiterated that "the evidence must justify the submission of the 
included offense" and thus "if there is no evidence from which the jury could 
find the defendant guilty of the included offense, then such included offense 
need not be submitted."182 Applying this test to the instant facts, the court 
determined that "it would have been impossible for defendant to commit the 
offense charged without a showing of each element necessary to convict him 
of the lesser offense."183 This was because the State's evidence showed that 
defendant had taken another's automobile without permission and had been 
apprehended while driving it. This without more would constitute the crime 
of operating a motor vehicle without th'e owner's consent, and proof of one 
additional element (i.e., defendant's intent to permanently convert the auto-
mobile to his own use) was all that was necessary to constitute the crime of 
larceny of a motor vehicle.184 Accordingly, defendant's conviction for larceny 
of a motor vehicle was reversed because of the failure to submit an instruction 
on the aforementioned lesser included offense. 
17. Larceny in the Nighttime 
That a theft must be made from within (and not from) a building, vessel, 
or motor vehicle in order to constitute larceny in the nighttime185 was made 
clear in State v. Smith.186 Reversing defendant's conviction for stealing a 
tire and rim from a wheel on an automobile, the supreme court noted: "There 
was no indication that defendant had entered the Buick passenger section, 
trunk, or engine compartm'ent."187 The court said that the word "in" is 
"more restrictive than 'from'. We believe that 'in' as used here means 'within 
a particular place' or 'on the interior or inner side: within.' "188 
18. Loitering 
In its first interpretations of anti-loitering statutes189 since Papachristou 
182. 203 N.W.2d at 557, quoting State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 
106 (1928). 
183. 203 N.W.2d at 557. 
184. Contrastingly, in State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968) the factual sit-
uation was similar but the trial court (and the supreme court) refused to consider the 
evidence of the case, relying instead on an abstract proposition that it would have been 
possible for the motor vehicle to have been stolen without anyone operating it (e.g., by 
using a crane and truck). "Proof of the operation of the car which is an essential element 
of section 321.76 would in such instances be irrelevant" and thus the crime of operating 
a motor vehicle without the owner's consent is not "necessarily included" in the crime of 
larceny of a motor vehicle, the court reasoned, notwithstanding the lack of evidence of 
any such bizarre events in the instant case. 157 N.\V.2d at 149. Of course, if this hy-
pothetical ever materializes, then State v. Hawkins would not require the submission of 
the lesser included offense, since the evidence of the case would indicate the lack of de-
fendant's operating of the vehicle. 
185. See IOWA CoDE§ 709.4 (1973). 
186. 196 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1972). 
187. /d. at 440. 
188. /d. 
189. IowA CoDE § 746.1 (1973) ("Vagrants" defined) was declared unconstitutional 
by the trial court and thus was not reviewed in the instant appeal of defendant's convic-
tion under the municipal ordinance. 
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v. City of Jacksonville, 190 the Iowa supreme court upheld a distinguishable mu-
nicipal ordinance191 in Henrichs v. Hildreth. 192 Nevertheless, the court "sug-
gested" certain guidelines for a constitutionally-acceptable anti-loitering ordi-
nance. Specifically, the court held that such an ordinance like the instant one, 
is not unconstitutional on its face if it is "directed to those persons, grouped 
or assembled, who obstruct the free and open use of public walkways by 
pedestrians" and if it "is stated in sufficiently definite terms to enable all rea-
sonable persons to know what conduct is proscribed and what acts will make 
them subject to the penalty provided."193 
19. Manslaughter 
A conviction for involuntary manslaughter194 was reversed in State v. 
Davis195 because of the State's testimony regarding defendant's invalid driver's 
license "in the absence of a showing of a causal relationship between the in-
valid license and the collision."196 After the officer's bare statement indi-
cating a separate offense, "[t]he subject was pursued no further. Whether 
defendant's license had expired or was invalid for other reasons does not ap-
pear."l97 
The supreme court also held in Davis that defendant is not entitled to an 
instruction on recklessness that "even if he was aware of a dangerous situation, 
recklessness would be shown only if he did not exercise the slightest care to 
avoid injury to others . . . ."198 As to defendant's belated effort to stop, the 
supreme court reaffirmed: 
One who, by his recklessness has created a hazard which he should 
have foreseen and guarded against, is not exonerated from the charge 
of gross indifference to the safety of others by a futile last minute 
effort to retrieve the situation and avoid the danger and injury. Such 
an attempt may have some bearing upon the degree of the indiffer-
ence but it is not an absolute cleaning of the slate.199 
It was further clarified in Davis that a death caused by a defendant who 
was driving "while under the influence" of an alcoholic beverage is a valid 
basis for involuntary manslaughter, the same as was the former foundational 
190. 405 u.s. 156 (1972). 
191. The instant ordinance reads: 
It shall be unlawful for persons to collect, assemble or group together and after 
being so collected, assembled or grouped together, to stand, or loiter, on any 
sidewalk, parking or any street comer, or at any other place in the city to the 
hindrance or obstruction to free passage of any person or persons passing on or 
along any sidewalk or street in said city. 
See Des Moines ordinance § 32-28.01. 
192. 207 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 1973). 
193. ld. at 808, citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) and Shut-
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). 
194. See IowA CoDE § 690.10 (1973 ). 
195. 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972). 
196. Id. at 894. 
197. ld. 
198. Id. at 891. 
199. /d. 
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crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. These two expressions 
(O.M.V.I. and O.M.V.U.I.) "mean essentially the same thing." And, even 
if they did not, "the State's manslaughter charge (predicated on defendant's 
driving while under the influence of intoxicants) involves involuntary man-
slaughter based on death resulting from the commission of a misdemeanor 
which is in itself wrongful (malum in se)."200 On a related matter, the court 
also reiterated in Davis that "if the jurors were not persuaded defendant was 
intoxicated, they could still take his drinking into consideration under the charge 
of recklessness."201 
20. Obscenity 
In an octology of recent significant cases, the United States Supreme 
Court has made several revisions in the federal constitutional guidelines for 
state anti-obscenity prosecutions. 
a. The Tripartite Standard. In Miller v. California,202 the Supreme 
Court redefined "the standards which must be used to identify obscene material 
that a State may regulate without infringing the First Amendment as appli-
cable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment."203 Specifically, the 
new basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: "(a) whether 'the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [citations], (b) whether 
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct spe-
cifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."204 
Thus, the "Burger Court" discarded the " 'utterly without redeeming social 
value' test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts"205 in favor of the less stringent "lacks 
serious literary value" prong of the aforementioned three-part test. 
i. Statutory adjustments. The Court thereupon added: "Under the 
holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale 
or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe pat-
ently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating 
state law, as written or construed."206 Emphasizing that its function is not to 
propose specifics of State regulatory schemes, the Court said: "That must 
await their concrete legislative efforts."207 Rather, the Court's role is "to de-
fine the area in which [the States] may chart their own course in dealing with 
ZOO. ld. at 890. 
201. Id. at 891; see also State v. Boner, 203 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1972): "[T]he 
question of intoxication may be considered as bearing upon the wilful and wanton mis-
conduct of defendant in violating an ordinary law of the road." 
202. 93 S. Ct. 2607 ( 1973). 
203. ld. at 2612. 
204. /d. at 2615. 
205. /d., citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
206. ld. at 2616. 
207. /d. at 2615. 
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obscene material."2os Dictating that "State statutes designed to regulate ob-
scene materials must be carefully limited," the Court "confine[d] the per-
missible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual 
conduct."209 That conduct "must be specifically defined by the applicable 
state law, as written or authoritatively construed," the Court added.210 Whether 
violations of an existing generally-worded state obscenity statute (like Iowa's 
Code sections 725.1-.5) can be instantly prosecuted without benefit of legisla-
tive revisions to specifically detail the acts of sexual conduct expressly pro-
scribed is not made clear. The abovementioned reference, in the alternative, 
to construction of the applicable State law suggests that prosecutions under ex-
isting generally-worded statutes may lie provided that the trial court properly 
instructs the jury that obscene references must relate to portrayal of acts of 
sexual conduct and the aforementioned three-part obscenity definition is in-
corporated therein. Nevertheless, prudent State legislatures should hasten to 
revise their applicable statutes.211 Incidentally, the Supreme Court lightened 
their burdens in justifying legislative controls of obscene materials. In Kaplan 
v. California, the Court said: "States need not wait until behavioral experts 
or educators can provide empirical data before enacting controls of commerce 
in obscen·e materials unprotected by the First Amendment or by a constitu-
tional right to privacy. We have noted the power of a legislative body to enact 
208. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2633 (1973). 
209. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607,2614-15 (1973). 
210. ld. at 2615. 
211. The proposed sections on obscenity in the Final Report of the Iowa Criminal 
Code Review Study Committee, which was submitted to the general assembly in January 
1973, provide: 
Sec. 2505. NEW SECTION. FURNISIDNG PORNOGRAPHY TO MI-
NORS. A person commits a serious misdemeanor when he knowingly exhibits 
or furnishes to any minor under seventeen years of age any play, dance, or 
other performance, or any picture, writing, recording, or other form of com-
munication, which consists in whole or part of any of the following: 
1. A description, portrayal, or exhibition emphasizing human genitalia, or 
the pubes, whether covered or not, which goes beyond customary limits of 
candor in such matters. 
2. A sex act, or sexual contact between humans and animals, or mastur-
bation, or a simulation of any of these. 
3. Sadistic or masochistic practices. 
Nothing in this section prohibits the use of appropriate material for educational 
purposes in any accredited school, or in any educational program in which the 
minor is participating with the informed consent of his parent or guardian. 
Nothing in this section prohibits the attendance of minors at an exhibition or 
display of art works with the informed consent of his parent or guardian. 
Sec. 2506. NEW SECTION. PUBLIC DISPLAY OF OFFENSIVE SEX-
UAL MATERIAL. A person commits a serious misdemeanor when he know-
ingly exhibits or displays or permits to be exhibited or displayed any of the 
following in such a manner that such exhibit or display is easily visible from 
any street, sidewalk or thoroughfare, or from any transportation facility, or from 
any residence when he knows that the owner of such residence objects to such 
exhibit or display: 
1. Human genitals or pubes without a full opaque covering, or any graphic 
or pictorial depiction thereof, or any depiction of the ~overed male genitals in a 
discernibly erect state. 
2. An actual or simulated sex act, or sexual contact between humans 
and animals, or masturbation, or any graphic or pictorial depiction thereof. 
3. Any depiction of sadistic or masochistic practices. 
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such regulatory laws on the basis of unprovable assumptions."212 
ii. The Iowa standard. Four months prior to this Supreme Court oc-
tology, the Iowa supreme court in State v. Lavin213 upheld the constitution-
ality of Iowa's obscenity statute214 on the sole basis that trial courts must in-
corporate the standards of Memoirs v. Attorney Genera/.215 That is, the State 
must establish the obscene nature of the questioned material through proof 
(beyond a reasonable doubt) of the coalescence of the three factors of the 
then-existing federal constitutional standard of Memoirs v. Attorney General. 
Accordingly, the latest pronouncement of the Iowa supreme court includes a 
requirement that the State prove, inter alia, that "the material is utterly without 
redeeming social value,"216 whereas the new applicable federal constitutional 
standard is less stringent (i.e., that the material "lacks serious literary . . . 
value"). 217 This leaves open to question whether Iowa trial courts can imme-
diately apply the new federal standard or whether they must apply the former 
federal standard incorporated in State v. Lavin in the interim until a test case is 
prosecuted and appealed to the Iowa supreme court. It appears that the Iowa 
supreme court will adjust its obscenity test, since all that it required in Lavin 
were the minimal federal constitutional requirements of the first amendment 
(as the latter was currently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court at 
that time), and Miller v. Calijornia218 has now lessened these minimal federal 
constitutional requirements. No State constitutional issues w'ere raised or dis-
cussed in Lavin. Indeed, the Iowa supreme court left little doubt that its ap-
proach in Lavin was dictated by the federal constiutional standard: 
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court also make 
plain that a state statute like ours will stand if the courts of the state 
incorporate the Memoirs' requirements in the application of [the] 
statute .... 
The Ultimate question on this issue, therefore, is whether we 
will apply the Memoirs' definition in the application of our statute. 
We believe we shoUld do so .... [C]ourts shoUld construe statutes 
to avoid unconstitutionality if they reasonably can. 219 
b. The "Community". Another major revision made in Miller v. 
California was to eliminate the heretofore constitutional requirement that 
a "national" standard be utilized in determining whether contemporary com-
munity standards are offended by the allegedly obscene material. Specif-
ically, the Court stated in Miller: "We hold the requirement that the jury 
evaluate the materials with reference to 'contemporary standards of the 
212. 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1973); accord Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 
2628, 2636-37 ( 1973 ). 
213. 204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973). 
214. See IowA CooE § 125.5 (1973): "Whoever sells ... any obscene, lewd, inde-
cent, lascivious, or filthy book . . . . " 
215. 383 u.s. 413 (1966). 
216. State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 1973). 
217. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973). 
218. /d. 
219. 204 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Iowa 1973). 
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State of California' ... is constitutionally adequate."220 Whether the new 
non-national standard must only be a statewide standard or whether an indi-
vidualized city-by-city standard can be applied was not made clear.221 More-
over, the Iowa supreme court noted in Lavin that the then-existing Memoirs 
standards incorporate "contemporary national community standards,"222 but it 
is expected to follow the federal court's lead once the specific non-national 
standard is figured out. 
c. No Immunity for "Adulf' Materials. The Supreme Court clearly re-
jected any demarcation of the application of obscenity laws on the basis of 
the age of the intended customer. Refusing to carve out an exception from 
obscenity laws for materials distributed only to consenting adults, the Supreme 
Court said in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton: 223 "We categorically disapprove 
the theory . . . that obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immu-
nity from state regulation simply because they are exhibited for consenting 
adults only."224 A similar stance was taken concerning "adult" books in 
Kaplan v. California, to wit: "[C]ommercial exposure and sale of obscene 
materials to anyone, including consenting adults, is subject to state regula-
tion."225 
d. Obscene Words, Pictures, Conduct. That the new obscenity stand-
ards are applicable to pictureless "adult" books was made clear in Kaplan v. 
California, with the Supreme Court holding that "expression by words alone 
can be legally 'obscene' in the sense of being unprotected by the First Amend-
ment."226 The book in question contained no pictures but instead consisted 
entirely of repetitive explicit descriptions of "(a]lmost every conceivable variety 
of sexual contact, homosexual and heterosexual."227 Applying the obscenity 
standards without distinction as to "the medium of the expression," the Su-
preme Court pointed out: "Obscenity can, of course, manifest itself in con-
duct, in the pictorial representation of conduct, or in the written and oral 
description of conduct."22s 
220. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2620 (1973 ), accord Kaplan v. California, 
93 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1973). 
221. The confusion arises because of the following conflicting statements, in addition 
to the aforementioned reference to "contemporary standards of the State of California": 
"Under a national Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations of the powers 
of the States do not vary from community to community" and "our nation is simply too 
big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be 
articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation .... " Contrastingly, the Court also 
observed: "The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in 
criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers-of-fact to draw on the standards of 
their community" and "[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the 
First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public de-
piction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City." ld. at 2618-19 
(emphasis added). 
222. State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 1973) (emphasis added). 
223. 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973). 
224. Id. at 2635. 
225. 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 ( 1973). 
226. Id. at 2683. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 2684. 
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Two other recent United States Supreme Court decisions are illustrative 
of the application of obscenity standards to conduct and to words. In Cali-
fornia v. LaRue,229 the Court held that it was constitutionally permissible for 
States to broadly regulate "obscene" live entertainment in State-licensed liquor 
establishments (e.g., go-go girls in taverns),230 notwithstanding whether such 
broad censorship if applied across the board to all other mediums of expres-
sion could pass muster under the first and fourteenth amendments. "[T]he 
broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as confer-
ring something more than the normal state authority over public health, wel-
fare, and morals," 231 the Court pointed out. In Cohen v. California,232 the 
Court reversed a conviction under a State statute proscribing "disturbing the 
peace ... by ... offensive conduct .... " The prosecution was based 
upon defendant's wearing of a jacket inscribed "Puck the Draft." The Court 
majority pointed out that "this is not . . . an obscenity case" since no one's 
prurient interest would be arised by "this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service 
System" and since an illegal obscene expression "must be, in some significant 
way, erotic."233 
e. Expert Testimony/Best Evidence. The Supreme Court also counte-
nanced not requiring " 'expert' affirmative evidence that the materials were ob-
scene when the materials themselves were actually placed in evidence."234 In 
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, in which the two films were exhibited to the 
trial court, the Supreme Court noted: "The films, obviously, are the best evi-
dence of what they represent."235 Likewise, in Kaplan v. California, the book 
not only was received in evidence, but also read, in its entirety, to the jury 
as well as being inspected by each juror. Approving, the Supreme Court re-
jected "any constitutional need for 'expert' testimony on behalf of the prose-
cution, or for any other ancillary evidence of obscenity, once the allegedly ob-
scene materials themselves are placed in evidence."236 Nevertheless, defend-
ant "should be free to introduce appropriate expert testimony," the Court 
added. 237 
f. Seizure of Allegedly Obscene Materials. Three alternative ways of 
seizing a film for a judicial determination as to obscenity were discussed. 
In Heller v. New York, 238 the Supreme Court upheld the policy of a magistrate, 
229. 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972). 
230. See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 93 S. Ct. 2222 (1973) (municipal corpora-
tion is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus cannot be sued for denial of 
petitioners' liquor license because of alleged nude dancing at their retail liquor establish-
ments; i.e., nude go-go dancers in taverns). 
231. California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 395 (1972). 
232. 403 u.s. 15 (1971). 
233. ld. at 20. 
234. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2634 (1973). 
235. ld. The films were shown in court in this case. A presumably acceptable al-
ternative approach of arranging a private showing of the contested film in the theater 
itself for the jury was followed in a recent California jury trial on whether the movie 
"Deep Throat" is obscene. See Des Moines Register, July 21, 1973, p. 3-S, col. 8. 
236. Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1973). 
237. Id. 
238. 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973). 
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at the police's prompting, to attend the public showing of an allegedly obscene 
movie and then issue a search warrant for seizure of the film, without benefit 
of a prior adversary hearing. However, the&e guidelines must be followed: 
(1) only one copy of the film must be seized, (2) the exhibitor must be per-
mitted, upon his request, to copy the seized film when no other copies are 
available to him for continued showing, and (3) a prompt judicial determina-
tion of the obscenity issue in an adversary hearing must be made at the re-
quest of any interested party. 239 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Roaden v. Kentucky240 that 
the fourth amendment is violated by a warrantless seizure of an allegedly ob-
scene film being regularly shown to the public even though the seizure is made 
incident to the arrest of the exhibitor by a law enforcement officer who has 
viewed the film as a customer. Relying on its earlier decisions in Marcus v. 
Search Warrant241 and Lee Art Theater v. Virginia242 that an officer's mere 
conclusory allegations cannot support a warrant for seizing allegedly obscene 
material, the Supreme Court held that "a fortiori, the officer may not make 
such a seizure with no warrant at all. "243 Taking judicial notice of a film's 
susceptibility to destruction, alteration, or removal to another jurisdiction, the 
Court nevertheless said: "But . . . where films are scheduled for exhibition 
in a commercial theater open to the public, procuring a warrant based on a 
prior judicial determination of probable cause of obscenity need not risk loss 
of the evidence."244 Thus, there were no "now or never" exigent circum-
stances justifying the warrantless seizure. 
A third approach-a civil injunction of th'e exhibition of obscene mate-
rials pursuant to a state's caselaw-was approved of in Paris Adult Theatre I 
v. Slaton. 245 Indicating that such a proceeding must incorporate the definition 
of "obscene materials" used in the criminal (obscenity) statute, the Court 
opined that the civil injunction proceeding "provides an exhibitor or purveyor 
of materials the best possible notice, prior to any criminal indictments, as to 
whether the materials are unprotected by the First Amendment and subject to 
state regulation."246 In the instant case, however, the continued exhibition of 
the films was not enjoined. Nevertheless, a temporary injunction was granted 
ex parte "restraining petitioners from destroying the films or removing them 
from the jurisdiction," with petitioners further ordered "to have one print each 
of the films in court on January 13, 1971, together with the proper viewing 
equipment."247 
239. See also Alexander v. Virginia, 93 S. Ct. 2803 (1973) (no sixth amendment 
right to trial by jury in state civil obscenity forfeiture proceedings). 
240. 93 s. Ct. 2796 (1973). 
241. 367 u.s. 717 (1961). 
242. 392 u.s. 636 (1968). 
243. Roaden v. Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 2796, 2802 (1973). 
244. ld. at 2802 n.6. 
245. 93 S. Ct. 2628 ( 1973). 
246. Jd. at 2634. 
247. Jd. at 2632. 
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g. Miscellany. 
Several other federal and state developments concerning obscenity prose-
cutions warrant summary mention. 
i. Pre-arrest adversary proceeding. The Iowa supreme court h'eld in 
State v. Lavin248 that defendant has no right to a pre-arrest adversary proceed-
ing similar to that afforded in a case of seizure of obscene material. Here, offi-
cers purchased a copy of a book in an "adult" bookstore, examined it, and 
thereupon arrested the managers of the bookstore. 
ii. Forfeiture proceedings. The United States Supreme Court held 
in Alexander v. Virginia249 that there is no sixth amendment right to trial 
by jury in state civil obscenity forfeiture proceedings. 
iii. Importation and interstate transportation. In the two remain-
ing cases of its recent octology, the United States Supreme Court upheld broad 
Congressional powers under the interstate commerce clause to prevent impor-
tation of, 250 as well as interstate transportation of, 251 obscene material. In 
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film,252 the Court held that 
Congress "may constitutionally prohibit importation of obsc·ene material which 
the importer claims is for private, personal use and possession only."253 Sim-
ilarly, the Court opined in United States v. Orito: 254 "(W]e cannot say that the 
Constitution forbids comprehensive federal regulation of interstate transporta-
tion of obscene material merely because such transport may be by private 
carriage, or because [the] material is intended for the private use of the trans-
porter. "255 
iv. Scienter. An obscenity conviction was reversed by the Iowa 
supreme court in State v. Lavin256 because scient'er was not alleged in the county 
attorney's information and the trial court thus erred in overruling defendant's 
demurrer thereto. Holding that "(k]nowledge of the obscene material is an 
essential element in obscenity prosecutions," the court nevertheless added that 
indictments or informations "need not charge the offense in the language of the 
Memoirs' definition, they may charge the ultimate fact of obscenity."257 
21. Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence 
A proliferation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence 
cases (O.M.V.U.I.) continued to command attention of the Iowa supreme 
court. 
248. 204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973). 
249. 93 S. Ct. 2803 (1973). 
250. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970). 
251. 18 u.s.c. § 1462 (1970). 
252. 93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973 ). 
253. ld. at 2667. 
254. 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973). 
255. ld. at 2678. 
256. 204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973). 
257. ld. at 848-49. 
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a. Definition of the Offense. The statutory definition of the crime25S was 
attacked unsuccessfully in two cases. In State v. Tiernan, 259 the court held 
that the proscription on driving while under the influence of an alcoholic bev-
erage is not unconstitutionally overbroad, vague or indefinite so as to require 
persons of common intelligence to guess its meaning. Likewise, the court held 
in State v. Davis260 that (after the legislative change of the crime from O.M.V.I. 
to O.M.V.U.I.)261 manslaughter can be predicated upon a vehicular death 
caused by a driver who, under the new verbiage, was under the influence of 
an alcoholic beverage, just as before when the latter offense was characterized 
as driving while intoxicated. Accordingly, the court held that the definition 
in the Bar Association's uniform jury instruction number 520.3262 "applies 
equally to both expressions--driving in an intoxicated condition and driving 
while under the influence of intoxicants-and the two expr·essions mean essen-
tially the same thing."263 
b. Time of Intoxication. State v. Creighton264 dramatically illustrates 
that the State must prove that defendant was under the influence at the time 
he was driving. Here, the only evidence of defendant's intoxicated condition 
was adduced in the arresting officer's testimony as to defendant's condition 
at the time that the officer arrived at the scene of defendant's one-car accident. 
There was no evidence as to the time of the accident, the length of the interval 
before arrival of the officer, or "what transpired between the time of the acci-
dent and the time of arrest."265 Because of the lack of this evidence, the court 
rejected the State's circumstantial evidence argument, noting contrariwise: 
"[T]hat rule becomes applicable only upon a showing of the circumstances 
from which it is said the ultimate fact may be found to exist."266 The court 
pointed out that none of the persons at the scene before the officer's arrival 
was called to testify and that "[n]o search was made of the car nor of the 
surrounding area to disclose evidence--or the lack of it-to refute a claim de-
fendant may have become intoxicated after the accident." 267 Consequently, 
the court refused to hold that "one who is under the influence of an alcoholic 
beverage at an established time was necessarily in that condition at some earlier 
unspecified moment without any evidence concerning the length of the interval 
between the two or of the events occurring during it."26s 
c. Blood Test Evidentiary Foundation. Three cases involved the foun-
258. See IOWA ConE § 321.281 (1973 ). 
259. 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973). 
260. 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972). 
261. Cf. IOWA CODE§ 321.281 (1966) (O.M.V.I.) with IOWA CODE§ 321.281 (1973) 
(O.M.V.U.I.). 
262. II Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions, No. 520.3 (1970). 
263. State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Iowa 1972). 
264. 201 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1972); accord State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 
1973) (O.M.V.U.I. conviction reversed because the only evidence of defendant's driving 
while under the influence was inadmissible hearsay). 
265. State v. Creighton, 201 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 1972). 
266. /d. 
267. /d. 
268. Id. 
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dational requirements for the taking of a blood sample. 269 One issue involved 
the qualifications for a medical technologist. In State v. Snyder,270 the supreme 
court concluded that "the legislature did not intend that an individual have 
the educational background required by the American Society of Clinical Pa-
thologists in order to qualify as a medical technologist under section 321B.4,"271 
and thus being licensed in Iowa as a registered medical technologist is suffi-
cient. Two cases posed questions of the sufficiency of the authorization to the 
registered nurse by the licensed physician. Telephonic authorization by the 
licensed physician who was on call at the hospital was upheld in State v. Bink-
ley, 272 as was a general authorization as a standing order to all registered 
nurses in that hospital in State v. Sloan. 273 On the other hand, it was further 
held in Binkley that defendant's failure to object until moving for a new trial 
waived the error in admitting blood test results notwithstanding the lack of a 
written request by the peace officer for the taking of a blood test.274 
Sanitation requirements concerning the vial in which the blood sample 
is placed were established in Binkley also. The supreme court rejected de-
fendant's contention that the statutory requirement that syringes and needles 
used for drawing blood be kept "under strictly sanitary and sterile condi-
tions"275 applied also to the vial. Nevertheless, the State must prove that the 
vial was "uncontaminated by alcohol or other substances which might affect 
the test."276 
d. Breath Test Evidentiary Foundation. Five cases dealt with the admis-
sibility into evidence of the results of breath tests administered under Code 
§ 321B.l. Two convictions277 were summarily reversed under the Rodriquez 
v. Fulton278 precedent that it is reversible error in an O.M.V.U.I. prosecution 
to admit breath test results where no blood test had previously been offered 
and refused before the officer requested a breath specimen. Even though evi-
dence of the offer and refusal of the blood test is admissible "under the plain 
terms of section 321B.l1,"279 one trial court actually granted a pretrial motion 
in limine ordering the State to make no such introduction at trial. Appealing 
his conviction, defendant claimed prejudicial error in the State's violation of 
269. See IOWA CODE§ 321B.4 (1973). 
270. 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1972). 
271. ld. at 285. 
272. Telephonic authorization "minimally satisfies § 321B.4 as a designation of the 
nurse by a licensed physician." 201 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1972). 
273. 203 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1972). 
274. The supreme court noted: "It is equally clear under § 321B.4, The Code, as 
interpreted in State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Boner, 186 
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1971), proof of such written request was foundationaily essential for 
admission of the test results." State v. Binkley, 201 N.W.2d 917, 918 (Iowa 1972). 
275. See IowA CoDE§ 321B.4 (1973). 
276. State v. Binkley, 201 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1972), citing Lessenhop v. Norton, 
261 Iowa 44, 52-53, 153 N.W.2d 107, 112 (1967) (enumeration of "the foundational evi-
dence which must be introduced prior to admission of blood test results"). 
277. State v. Rowland, 202 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Williams, 201 
N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 1972). 
278. 190 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1971). 
279. State v. Tieman, 206 N.W.2d 898, 899 (Iowa 1973). 
88 Drake Law Review [Vol. 23 
the order in limine. Affirming the conviction, the supreme court pointed out 
in State v. Tiernan280 that the error here, inuring to defendant's benefit, was in 
the trial court's sustaining of defendant's motion in limine. Indeed, "[e]vi-
dence of the refusal was not only admissible, it was required as a foundation 
for any evidence of the breath test."281 
The Rodriquez v. Fulton doctrine was extended in State v. Hall282 to in-
clude admission into evidence the defendant's refusal to take a breath test 
when the results of the breath test, if taken, would have been inadmissible 
for noncompliance with the Rodriquez procedure. Reversing the conviction, 
the supreme court thought a rule (like the Rodriquez rule) "would be anom-
alous indeed which would permit introduction of evidenc'e of refusal to take a 
test when the test itself cannot be shown."283 The court added: "Defendant 
had a right to take manual tests and still refuse a breath test which could not 
legally be required of him without the prior offer of a blood test."284 
State v. Hansen285 set forth the remaining foundation requirements for 
admissibility of th'e results of a breath test, following the offer and refusal 
of a blood test. Such results "should be admitted only upon a showing (1) 
of the devices and methods approved by the Commissioner of Public Saftey 
for the taking of such tests . . . and (2) proof that the test was given by use 
of the approved devices and methods."286 The arresting officer's "bare conclu-
sion" that he followed the prescribed procedures "is insufficient," the court 
concluded. 287 If this two-part foundational requirement is met, the supreme 
court has held in State v. Tiernan288 that stringent standards of mechanical 
precision of the breathalyzer equipment are not required. Specifically, the 
court held therein that a showing of p'eriodic testing of the equipment is unnec-
essary. 
e. Statutory Presumption of Intoxication. Four cases dealt with the stat-
utory presumption of intoxication provision of Code section 321.218, which 
provides: "[E]vidence that there was, at the time, more than ten hundredths 
of one percentum by weight of alcohol in his blood shall be admitted as pre-
sumptive evidence that the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic 
beverage." 
i. Additional testimony. While noting that the purpose of this stat-
utory presumption is "to permit a case to go to the jury on this issue on nothing 
more than a showing of the required blood alcohol content," State v. Boner289 
280. 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973). 
281. Id. at 899. 
282. 203 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1973). 
283. Id. at 376. 
284. /d. 
285. 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972). 
286. /d. at 223. See Iowa Departmental Rules p. 123 (Supp. July 1972), designating 
"an indium encapsulation breath crimper" as the device and prescribing collection pro-
cedures. 
287. State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 223 (Iowa 1972). 
288. 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973). 
289. 203 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1972). 
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makes it clear that the State "may prove a stronger case by additional testi-
mony."290 The supreme court approved of the State's calJing of an expert 
witness "to express his opinion that defendant was under the influence of an 
alcoholic beverage and to describe the effect of alcohol on human behavior."291 
Thus, while defendant may, of course, introduce evidence to rebut this statu-
tory presumption, "there is nothing to suggest that otherwise competent evi-
dence cannot similarly be used to fortify it. "292 
ii. Jury instructions. The Bar Association's Uniform Jury Instruc-
tion 520.8293 was declared by a 5-4 vote in State v. Hansen294 to be an uncon-
stitutional application of this statutory presumption, which itself was consid-
ered constitutional. However, the supreme court limited th'e statute's operation 
to raising "an inference (sometimes calJed a 'presumption of fact') .... "295 
The constitutional flaw thus was not in the first paragraph of the instruction 
stating that a stipulated percentage of alcohol in defendant's blood is "pre-
sumptive evidence" of being under the influence nor in the second paragraph 
permitting the jury to "infer" defendant's being under th'e influence if his 
blood-alcohol content exceeded the stipulated proportion. However, the last 
sentence of the third paragraph ("[Such inference] may be overcome or re-
butted by evidence to the contrary") was considered by the supreme court as 
"erroneously convert[ing] this into a conclusive presumtion if evidence is not 
produced to rebut it."296 Agreeing with defendant's contention that this in-
struction "compels" an accused to forego his fifth amendment right to not tes-
tify, the supreme court characterized the latter part of the above-mentioned 
instruction as "convey[ing] to the jury the notion that the unrebutted 'pre-
sumptive evidence' required, rather than permitted, a finding defendant was 
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage."297 Reiterating that a proper 
instruction concerning the Code section 321.281 statutory presumption "should 
not place significance on the failure to produce rebutting evidence," th'e court 
added that such an instruction "should set out the fact that the test is presump-
tive evidence and charge the jury to determine under al1 the facts and circum-
stances in the case whether defendant was under the influence of an intoxi-
cating beverage."29S The sam·e instruction was given verbatim in State v. 
Sloan, 299 and the supreme court reversed the conviction (by a 5-4 vote) de-
spite the State's contention that giving this improper instruction was harrril'ess 
error. 
The supreme court added in State v. Hutton300 that the constitutional 
291. 
292. 
293. 
294. 
295. 
296. 
297. 
298. 
299. 
300. 
ld. at 199-200. 
ld. at 199. 
ld. 
II Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions, No. 520.8 (1973). 
203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972). 
ld. at 219. 
ld. at 220. 
ld. at 222. 
ld. 
203 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1972). 
207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973). 
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defect in this uniform instruction was not cured or rendered harmless by the 
addition of this fourth paragraph: 
You are instructed that despite the permissible infer'ence from the 
blood test, the burden remains at all times upon the State to establish 
each and every element of the crime and the crime itself beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the burden remains at all times upon the State 
to go forward with the proof of all matters in issue in the case. 
There is no burden upon the Defendant in a criminal case.301 
Reversing the conviction by a 6-3 vote, the supreme court refused to speculate 
"whether the jury followed the erroneous part of [the] instruction" (para-
graph three of the uniform instruction) "or the curative part" (the aforemen-
tioned additional fourth paragraph).so2 
22. Operating an Overweight Vehicle on a Public Highway 
In State v. McDonald, 303 an employee of a construction company pri-
marily engaged in road building, was prosecuted for operating an overweight 
vehicle on a public highway304 because he drove a caterpillar on a public 
highway to a new work site. On a State's appeal following a directed ver-
dict, the supreme court refused to accept the State's proferred definition of 
road machinery within the Code section 321.453 exemption as meaning "spe-
cial equipment designed for road work, either construction or maintenance, 
while being so used at that time for those purposes at or in close proximity 
to the site of the road work."305 The court pointed out that there is little or 
no equipment designed exclusively for road work. Moreover, the court also 
rejected the State's restrictive reading of the Code section 321.453 exemption 
for temporary moving of overweight vehicles to mean that any such moving 
must be done "in close proximity to the site of the road work."306 
23. Possession of Burglar's Tools 
A detailed exposition of the rules governing opinion testimony as to the 
nature of burglar's tools 307 was made in State v. Knudtson. 308 First, the su-
preme court concluded that it is proper to permit opinion testimony of prop-
erly-qualified witnesses as to whether certain tools which may also have le-
301. ld. at 582. 
302. ld. at 583. 
303. 197 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 1972). 
304. See IowA CoDE§ 321.463 (1973). 
305. 197 N.W.2d at 574. 
306. ld. 
307. See IowA CoDE § 708.7 (1973) (possession of burglar's tools). 
308. 195 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1972). Actually, in the instant case, defendant was 
convicted of attempted breaking and entering. See IowA CoDE§ 708.10 (1973). Follow-
ing the proprietor's hearing of pounding at the unused door at the rear of his building at 
3:00 a.m., police apprehended defendant attempting to hide behind a nearby truck and in 
possession of, or in close proximity to, burglar's tools. This case is included in this sub-
section because of the attention being focused therein upon foundational requirements as 
to testimony identifying burglar's tools. 
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gitimate uses are of the type that could be used as burglar's tools.309 Next, 
it upheld the foundation laid in the instant case for the police officers' testi-
mony. The court, noting that the officers "qualified themselves by showing 
they had been involved in investigations of other breakings and enterings or 
burglaries," determined that it was unnecessary for these witnesses to show 
that their other investigations had been "judicially determined to be breakings 
and enterings or burglaries."310 On the subject of these officers being quali-
fied as expert witnesses, the court agreed with defendant that "a mere show-
ing they were in fact police officers does not in and of itself qualify them as 
[experts]."311 However, the court pointed out that these officers were shown 
to have been veteran officers experienced in investigating burglary scenes and 
in finding burglar's tools thereat similar to those in the instant case. More-
over, all but one of the testifying officers had attended special institutes with 
training in crime scene investigations. Finally, the court confirmed that quali-
fied experts, such as these officers, can state that these are burglar's tools 
instead of being limited to testifying that the tools could be burglar's tools. 312 
24. Rape 
Two surv'ey cases dealt with sufficiency of the other evidence required 
by Code section 782.4 to corroborate a rape313 prosecutrix's testimony. In 
State v. Smith, 314 defendant supplied it himself! He accomplished this by tes-
tifying as a witness in his own behalf that he did have sexual intercourse with 
prosecutrix on the date in question, albeit claiming it was voluntary inter-
course. There being sufficient corroboration, it was a matter for the jury to 
decide whose version of the nature of the intercourse to believe--defendant's 
voluntary version or prosecutrix's involuntary version. Defendant was less 
cooperative in State v. Polson,315 in which the other corroborating evidence 
was garnered from "the ·entire combination of circumstances."316 These in-
cluded defendant's "suspicious conduct" as well as his "presence very near 
the site of the assault both before and after its commission."317 
Questions involving the introduction of other lascivious acts arose in two 
rape convictions which were reversed. The general rule was noted in State 
v. Wright318 that "on a charge of statutory rape evidence of lascivious conduct 
with girls other than prosecutrix is inadmissible unless essential to complete 
309. "Tools used to accomplish breakings and enterings are commonly called burglar 
tools, and consist of tools which may also have a perfectly legitimate use, such as ham-
mers, screwdrivers, punches, pliers, and prybars." 195 N.W.2d at 700. 
310. Id. at 701. 
311. Id. 
312. Id., citing Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 348, 5 N.W.2d 
646, 657 (1942). 
313. See IOWA CoDE§ 698.1 (1973). 
314. 195 N.W.2d 673 (Iowa 1972). 
315. 205 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1973). 
316. ld. at 742. 
317. ld. at 741. 
318. 203 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1972). 
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the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings 
near in time and place."319 Here, the State erroneously introduced 'evidence 
concerning defendant's fondling of his own daughter (who was prosecutrix's 
step-sister) for approximately a two-year period during which time he had sex-
ual intercourse a number of times with his step-daughter. The supreme court 
concluded that the State "utterly failed to prove" the relationship of this evi-
dence of other criminal conduct as an integral transaction (which is appli-
cable "only where the separate offenses are so related to each other that proof 
of one tends to establish the other").320 Thus, this proof of separate offenses 
was inadmissible. On the other hand, exclusion of evidence of prosecutrix's 
promiscuous behavior was held error under the particular circumstances in 
State v. McDaniel, 321 in which defendant's proferred evidence of the statutory 
rape being committed by his companion was excluded. Repeating that prior 
unchastity of prosecutrix is no defense to a charge of rape, the supreme court 
added that such evidence is admissible "not on the issue of consent or justifi-
cation for the act, but in answer to any inferences which might arise by reason 
of the State's offer of evidence on the laboratory tests and physical condition 
of the prosecutrix. Defendant had a right to attempt to show another person 
... was the one responsible for any violation of the prosecutrix."322 
25. Reckless Driving 
State v. Baker323 held that the offense of reckless driving324 "is not an 
intentional wrong in the sense that resulting harm is intended."325 Thus, 
Code section 321.283 is violated by "conscious and intentional driving which 
the driver knows, or should know, creates an unreasonable risk of harm to 
others,"326 irrespective of the lack of intended harm to anyone. Addition-
ally, "[m]omentary nonuse of the traveled way by others certainly could not, 
as a matter of law, excuse defendant's violations."327 
26. Simulated Intoxication 
In its first interpretation of the crime of simulated intoxication, 328 the 
supreme court believed in State v. McGuire329 that "it is clear the legislature, 
when using the word 'simulate' in section 123.42, intended to make it illegal 
to pretend or to feign intoxication."830 Accordingly, the State "must establish 
319. ld. at 251. 
320. ld. 
321. 204 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1973). 
322. ld. at 630. 
323. 203 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1973). 
324. See IowA CoDE§ 321.283 (1973). 
325. 203 N.W.2d at 796. 
326. ld. 
327. ld. 
328. See IOWA CODE§ 123.46 (1973) (formerly§ 123.42). 
329. 200 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1972). 
330. Id. at 833. 
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the intentional or voluntary nature of the acts relied on as one of the elements 
of the offense."331 Defendant's conviction had been based solely on the ar-
resting officer's testimony as to defendant's slow and deliberate movements, 
slurred speech, contracted pupils, and fixed-focus eyes. Because of the offi-
cer's testimony that he did not know whether those physical characteristics 
were normal or abnormal as relating to defendant, there was no evidence that 
defendant was intentionally acting intoxicated. Reversing the conviction, the 
supreme court was "unwilling to say one who looks and acts as the witness 
described defendant-without more-is guilty of violating the statute in ques-
tion"332 since the unusual movements could have been the unintentional result 
of illness, physical peculiarity, or other natural cause. Because the conviction 
was reversed for failure of proof, the supreme court did not reach the uncon-
stitutionality-for-vagu'eness challenge. 
27. Sodomy 
The supreme court noted in State v. Schurman: 333 "In a prosecution for 
sodomy334 the State must prove penetration, but it may be proved by circum-
stantial as well as by direct evidence."335 In this stepfather-stepson involuntary 
act of buggery, it was unnecessary for the stepson, a six-year-old, to testify. 
C. Defenses 
1. Entrapment 
The United States Supreme Court characterized entrapment as "a rela-
tively limited defense" in United States v. Russell,336 saying: "It is only when 
the government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind 
of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play."337 The 
thrust of this defense focuses on "the intent or predisposition of the defendant 
to commit the crime."338 The Russell opinion turned on the fact that defend-
ant instantly conceded that "he may have harbored a predisposition to commit 
the charged offens'es."339 Accordingly, the fact that government officers 
"merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does 
not defeat the prosecution."340 Here, the undercover agent had supplied an 
essential ingredient for the illicit manufacture of a controlled substance. Nev-
ertheless, the Court pointed out that defendant had obtained this ingredient 
elsewhere for previous activities and that he could have done so again. Had 
the undercover agent been the only possible supplier for this ingredient, it is 
331. ld. at 834. 
332. ld. 
333. 205 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1973). 
334. See IowA CoDE§ 705.1 (1973). 
335. 205 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1973). 
336. 93 S. Ct. 1637 (1973). 
337. Id. at 1645. 
338. ld. at 1641. 
339. Id. at 1643. 
340. Id. at 1644; accord State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973). 
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possible that the Court may have found entrapment. (This possibility would 
be increased in situations, unlike here, where the ingredient itself was contra-
band.). This premise is based upon the Court's following observation: 
"While w·e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct 
of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would 
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction . . . the instant case is distinctly not of that breed."341 
The Iowa supreme court held in State v. Bruno342 that the defense of 
entrapment is not available when defendant denies the very acts upon which 
the prosecution is predicated. In the instant prosecution for unlawful sale of 
hallucinogenic drugs, defendant testified that the tablets in question really 
were aspirin. Affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct on entrapment, the 
supreme court said: 
Although the doctrine of entrapment may be asserted even though 
defendant pleads not guilty, ordinarily the defense is not available 
where defendant denies commission of the very acts upon which the 
prosecution is predicated. Such a denial is inconsistent with the 
defense, which assumes the offense charged was committed but per-
mits accused to seek relief from guilt on the ground the criminal 
intent or design was not his, but rather that of employees or agents 
of the government who planted the idea in his otherwise innocent 
mind by suggestion or solicitation.343 
2. Intoxication 
In State v. Buchanan, 344 the constitutionality of placing on defendant the 
burden of proving his intoxication as a partial defense (i.e., to render him 
"incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent")345 was raised. However, 
the alleged error in the giving of the Iowa Bar Association's uniform instruc-
tion346 was not preserved by defendant and thus the supreme court did not 
decide the issue. Four justices nevertheless indicated their views that this 
instruction is unconstitutional. Because the other five justices remained silent, 
it is open to conjecture what the supreme court will rule when the issue is 
squarely before them. 
Justice McCormick (concurring specially),347 arguing that the defense of 
voluntary intoxication "is not generically different from the defense of alibi,"348 
pointed out that the former Iowa rule of requiring defendant to prove his 
alibi was held in Stump v. Bennett349 to violate federal due process. He added: 
341. ld. at 1643. 
342. 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973). 
343. ld. at 882. 
344. 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973) (en bane). 
345. II Uniform Jury Instruction 501.18 ( 1970). 
346. ld. 
347. Justices Mason and Reynoldson joined in McCormick's opinion. See 207 N.W.2d 
at 788. Justice Rawlings, on the other hand, agreed with McCormick's rationale but, 
because of CODE§ 793.18, would reverse the conviction. See 207 N.W.2d at 792. 
348. ld. at 791. 
349. 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1001 (1968). 
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"I believe, as did the court in Stump of our former alibi rule, there is no 
doubt our rule as to the affirmative defense of intoxication shifts the burden 
of persuasion to a defendant to disprove an essential element of a crime, in 
this case specific intent."350 
In State v. Sill,351 the trial court committed reversible error by instructing 
the jury that intoxication cannot preclude acquittal on a charge with specific 
intent as an essential element. "The jury should have been told voluntary 
intoxication to a degree preventing defendant from having such intent would 
entitle him to acquittal,"352 the supreme court said. 
3. Self Defense 
That defendant must interpose the defense of self defense853 in order to 
require the State to disprove it was made clear in State v. Vick. 854 In this 
prosecution for assault (with a rifle) defendant testified he shot the rifle "but 
never intimated that in doing so he acted in self defense," nor was there "the 
slightest hint defendant was ever threatened or felt intimidated. "355 Indeed, 
he testified he was merely taking some target practice. However, the shots 
struck the ground a few feet behind an inspector for the state highway com-
mission, with whom defendant was feuding over a proposed fencing project. 356 
4. Statutory Challenges351 
a. Constitutionality. In State v. Vick,358 the Iowa supreme court upheld 
the constitutionality of Code section 694.1 proscribing, but not defining, as-
saults-against defendant's contention that it is "so vague and standardless that 
it leaves an individual uncertain as to the particular conduct it prohibit'i 
• • • ."
359 Conceding that "a penal statute must define the crime in a man-
ner that permits a reasonable man of common intelligence to comprehend the 
type of activity proscribed by the statute,"360 the supreme court relied on the 
350. 207 N.W.2d at 790. 
351. 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972) (prosecution for assault with intent to inflict great 
bodily injury). 
352. ld. at 49. 
353. See IowA CoDE§§ 691.1-.2 (1973). 
354. 205 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1973). 
355. Id. at 731. 
356. See also State v. Fields, 199 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 1972) (where there is 
conflicting testimony as to self defense "differing inferences might reasonably be drawn" 
thus creating a jury issue and accordingly the trial court should not grant defendant's 
motion for a directed verdict). 
357. In other cases invoiving novei statutory chailenges, see State v. McGranahan, 
206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973) [the passage of Iowa's new Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act, and its express repealer of Iowa's former Uniform Narcotics Act therein, does not 
preclude conviction under the former Act of a defendant who had been arrested but not 
yet indicted under the latter Act at the time (July 1, 1971) the new Act became effective] 
and State v. Allison, 206 N.W.2d 893, 894 (Iowa 1973) ("[O]therwise valid statutes are 
not invalid because the legislature which enacted them was malapportioned."). 
358. 205 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1973), 
359. Id. at 729. 
360. ld. at 730. 
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rule that "a statute may punish an offense by giving it a name known to the 
common law, without further defining it, and the common-law definition will 
be applied."361 · 
b. Exemptions. In State v. Lynch,362 the supreme court upheld the re-
quirement in Iowa's former Uniform Narcotics Act that defendant prove he 
came within one of the lawful exceptions enumerated in the statute rather 
than requiring the State to disprove the converse. The supreme court formu-
lated the following general rule: 
If an exception is material in arriving at the definition of the crime, 
it is generally held the State has the burden of showing the excep-
tion does not apply because it is then one of the essential elements 
of the offense. How·ever, where the exception merely furnishes an 
excuse for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, the duty de-
volves upon the defendant to bring himself within the exculpatory 
provision. 363 
1. Counsel for Indigents 
ill. PROCEDURAL LAW 
A. Pretrial 
a. Appointment of Counsel. The major development in this area364 
during the survey period was the United States Supreme Court's refusal, in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin,365 to extend the sixth amendment right of counsel to 
State misdemeanor prosecutions. Instead, the Court limited its holdings to 
precluding the imprisonment of a convicted indigent who stood trial without 
counsel and without effectively waiving same366-rather than rendering a 
361. ld. at 731, quoting State v. Flory, 203 Iowa 918, 924, 210 N.W. 961, 964 
(1926). A comprehensive statement concerning constitutional challenges was made in 
Vick, to wit: 
Ordinarily, statutes, with notable exceptions, regularly enacted by legislatures will 
be accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality. Where the constitution· 
ality of a statute is merely doubtful or fairly debatable the courts will not inter-
fere. The burden of proving a legislative enactment to be violative of the con-
stitution rests upon those so asserting to the degree of negativing every reason-
able basis of support therefor. A constitutional challenge must specify constitu-
tional provisions invoked and state with precision the details of a claimed de-
fect .... 
I d. at 729; accord Henrichs v. Hildreth, 207 N.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Iowa 1973) (void for 
vagueness challenge). 
362. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972). 
363. Id. at 190. For a further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 
95-98 supra. 
364. See State v. Kephart, 202 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972): "[Coleman v. Alabama, 
399 U.S. 1 ( 1970)] held that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of the State's 
criminal process at which an accused was entitled to aid of counsel." See also Adams v. 
lllinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) (Coleman v. Alabama does not apply retroactively to State 
preliminary hearings conducted prior to June 22, 1970). For a discussion of the role of 
judicial discretion in the appointment of counsel process, see Dunahoo, Judicial Discretion 
in the Iowa Criminal Trial Process, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 1023, 1025-29 ( 1973) [hereinafter 
cited as Dunahoo]. 
365. 407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
366. See also text accompanying notes 813-20 infra. (sentencing) 
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counselless misdemeanor conviction void.367 However, the Court left the door 
slightly ajar on the question of an unqualified right to counsel on misdemeanor 
charges, to wit: "We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amend-
ment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, how-
ever, for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail."368 
b. Effectiveness of Counsel. State v. Williams369 held that a court-ap-
pointed counsel's application under Code section 775.5 for public funds for 
an investigator must be specific. Indeed, this statute was further interpreted 
as "requir[ing] the trial judge to satisfy himself that such services are neces-
sary and to articulate the reasons therefor."370 It accordingly is within the trial 
court's discretion to ascertain if defense counsel's claim is "necessary in the in-
terest of justice" or is "frivolous and unwarranted."371 The instant applica-
tion, which was turned down, read: "That there are certain witnesses whose 
names are known to the defense counsel, but defense counsel is unable to lo-
cate them, and that their testimony is necessary for the defense of defendant. " 372 
There is an implication that a Code section 775.5 application does not require 
the defense attorney to inform the court and prosecutor of the names and 
addresses of the persons he wanted to investigate, but that a trial court can 
insist upon specific information concerning "the number of inv'estigators to be 
employed, the area to be investigated and probable cost or rate of pay."373 
For a guide in determining these applications, trial courts should familiarize 
themselves with the comparable federal provision, 3 74 the supreme court 
added. 375 
367. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). (State felony conviction 
void if tried without counsel and counsel not waived.) 
368. 407 u.s. 25, 37 (1972). 
369. 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973). 
370. Id. at 106. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. at 103. 
373. Id. at 105. 
374. Id. at 106, citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006(A)(e) (1969), as amended (Supp. 1973), 
which sets forth the following federal procedure: Counsel for a person "financially un-
able to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense 
may request them" in an ex parte proceeding from the court or U.S. Magistrate. Ap-
pointed counsel may, subject to later review, obtain such services for an adequate defense 
without prior authorization but the cost cannot exceed $150 plus reimbursement of ex-
penses reasonably incurred. The maximum compensation paid to a person for services 
rendered hereunder shall not exceed $300 exclusive of reimbursement of expenses reason-
ably incurred, unless certified by the court. 
375. In the related matter of effective assistance rendered by counsel, the supreme 
court consistently upheld the adequacy of the representation: 
(a) Access: Effective assistance is not denied merely because of defendant's con-
finement in a different city during the trial where he "was not otherwise denied access io 
his attorneys" and consulted with them both before opening and after closing of the trial 
days. State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 1972). 
(b) Degree of Guilt: Counsel is not inadequate because he waived a possible de-
fense and relied unsuccessfully on a somewhat-supportable theory for reduction of de-
gree of guilt-here to second-degree murder on a felony-murder charge. State v. Kelley, 
195 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1972). 
(c) Mistake: "Counsel are often in error as to an item of fact. When such an 
error is a factor in advice to plead guilty it cannot be said later to void the guilty plea." 
State v. Jackson, 199 N.W.2d 102, 103 (Iowa 1972). 
(d) Multiple Defendants: Multiple representation of several co~defendants does not 
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2. Speedy Indictment 
Several issues concerning the Code section 795.1 requirement that a de-
fendant be indicted within thirty days of being held to answer for a public 
offense were decided during the survey period.376 
a. Demand-Waiver Doctrine. Following the United States Supr'eme 
Court's lead in Barker v. Wingo377 (viz., the sixth amendment right to a speedy 
trial is violated by a State procedural ru1e forever barring dismissals for lack 
thereof unless defendant demands a speedy trial),378 the Iowa supreme court 
has dropped its long-standing policy of applying a demand-waiver require-
ment in the speedy indictment procedure. In State v. Morningstar,379 the court, 
referring to its decision to drop the demand-waiver requirement under the 
Code section 795.2 speedy trial provision,380 said: "[W]e have recently elimi-
nated demand as a prerequisite to operation of the section."381 This means 
that the thirty-day statutory period for indicting a defendant382 begins to run 
automatically upon his being "held to answer,"383 irrespective of whether or not 
he files a demand for speedy indictment. If the indictment is not returned 
during this requisite period, the prosecution must be dismissed unless "good 
cause" for the delay is shown.384 Conversely, the State need not show good 
cause for any alleged "delay" when the indictment is returned within the stat-
utory period. 385 
ipso facto render counsel ineffective where there is "nothing in the record to establish any 
conflict of interest resulting in prejudice to the defendant;" defendant has the burden of 
showing such a conflict "to his resultant prejudice." State v. Donohue, 207 N.W.2d 750, 
751 (Iowa 1973). 
(e) Preparation: "If a review of the [entire] record shows counsel alertly and 
capable defended his client's rights throughout the trial, an assertion by counsel before 
trial that he needed more information [and time] to prepare his case is not conclusive in 
establishing inadequate representation." State v. Massey, 207 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Iowa 
1973); accord State v. Kelley, 195 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1972). 
376. See generally Dunahoo and Sullins, Speedy Justice, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 266 
( 1973), which was written before the Iowa supreme court adopted its policy change re-
garding the demand-waiver doctrine under Iowa's speedy indictment and speedy trial stat-
utes, as discussed below. 
See also One Certain Person Named in Indictment v. Grand Jury, 207 N.W.2d 33 
(Iowa 1973) (legal existence of a grand jury may not be extended into the calendar year 
following its selections even though pursuant to a district court order). 
377. 407 u.s. 514 (1972). 
378. See also text accompanying notes 515-27 infra. (Speedy trial). 
379. 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973 ). 
380. See State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973). 
381. 207 N.W.2d 772,775 (Iowa 1973). 
382. Thirty days is "a reasonable pre-indictment period" which does not violate fed-
eral constitutional standards of due process or of speedy trial. State v. Bledsoe, 200 
N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1972). 
383. See IowA ConE § 795.1 (1973 ). 
384. Cf. State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 849, 134 N.W.2d 906, 909 (1965) (a § 
795.1 speedy indictment case): "The defendant urges that the court made no finding of 
good cause. This was not necessary; it is sufficient if this element is shown by the rec-
ord." (emphasis added) with State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Iowa 1973) (a 
§ 795.2 speedy trial case): "[A]n accused ... is entitled to a dismissal if not brought 
to trial within 60 days after being indicted unless 'good cause' to the contrary be Prose-
cutorially shown . •.. " (emphasis added). 
385. See State v. Bledsoe, 200 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1972) ("speedy indictment" not 
violated where defendant not formally charged with escape until 23 days after his capture 
and return to Iowa). 
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b. "Held to answer." The crucial point in time in the criminal trial proc-
ess concerning speedy indictment (and speedy trial subsequently)386 is the 
time when an accused is "held to answer" for the offense charged. This is 
because, by express terms of Code section 795.1, "speedy indictment" does 
not attach until the "held to answer" stage. This stage was defined in State 
v. Mays387 as follows: "§ 795.1 comes into operation by its own language and 
as a part of the regular procedure when an accused is held to answer after 
preliminary examination or waiver of same."388 Thus, the speedy indict-
ment provision is not triggered by either an arrest389 or the filing of a prelimi-
nary information, or even by taking defendant before a magistrate for pre-
liminary arraignment.390 Defendant's remedy to cause a "speedy" prelimi-
nary hearing lies in habeas corpus, the supreme court pointed out in Mays. 391 
c. Incarceration on Unrelated Charges. In State v. Mason, 392 the su-
preme court held that the thirty-day speedy indictment period under Code 
section 795.1 is not applicable when defendant is already incarcerated on an 
unrelated charge. The court determined that it was not the legislative intent 
"to grant an incarcerated defendant the benefit of a 30 day statute of limita-
tions on offenses unconnected with the one for which he was restrained."393 
Consequently, a section 795.1 dismissal "is not mandated where the public 
offense for which a defendant is held to answer is unrelated to the one on 
which the allegedly late indictment or information is subsequently filed." 394 
d. Motion to dismiss. That a defendant who has been denied his right 
to speedy indictment waives his right to dismissal therefor unless he not only 
files a pretrial motion to dismiss but also insists upon a ruling thereon was 
made dramatically clear in State v. Schiernbeck.395 Here, defendant "pro-
ceeded to trial knowing there had been no ruling on either of his motions 
to dismiss and without having called the omission to the attention of the 
386. CoDE § 795.2 (speedy trial), by its express terms, is triggered only by an in-
dictment (or county attorney's information). 
387. 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973). 
388. ld. at 866 (emphasis changed). Accord State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 
(Iowa 1973 ). 
389. But see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21 ( 1971): "[l]t is either a 
formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and 
holding to answer a criminal charge that engage ... the Sixth Amendment. Invocation 
of the speedy-trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal 
charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the period prior to 
arrest." 
390. See State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973) (defendant taken before 
magistrate for preliminary arraignment and posted bail, but no preliminary examination 
was held or waived. and so defendant was not "held to answer"). See also Parsons v. 
Brewer, 202 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Iowa 1972) (The CoDE § 795.7 requirement that defendant, 
when arrested, be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay does not apply to 
a penitentiary inmate who committed another crime while imprisoned-where he was 
confined in a special cell "pending further investigation" and was not arrested "for the 
instant offense until taken before a magistrate."). 
391. 204 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (Iowa 1973). 
392. 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972). 
393. /d. at 294. 
394. /d. 
395. 203 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1973). 
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court."396 The supreme court pointed out: "A motion not ruled on in the 
trial court, where there has been no r·equest or demand for ruling, preserves 
no error."397 
e. Representation of counsel. Code section 795.1, as well as section 
795.2, contains a provision exempting a defendant who is neither represented 
by counsel nor free on bail from the historical requirement of making a de-
mand for a speedy indictment (or a speedy trial). That is, "the court on its 
own motion shall carry out the provisions of this section as to dismissal," not-
withstanding defendant's failure to make a demand on a motion to dismiss. 398 
The supreme court's recent elimination of the demand-waiver requirement as 
to both the speedy indictment399 and the speedy trial400 statutes has rendered 
this provision of minimal importance. Nevertheless, the supreme court said 
in State v. Gorham:401 "[W]hen an accused is neither at liberty on bail nor 
represented by an attorney, then absence of demand for or assertion of right 
to a speedy trial shall under no circumstances be considered ["in an ad hoc 
delicate balancing process in evaluating any good cause so shown"]402 in con-
nection with trial time delay."4oa 
In State v. Cennon,404 the Iowa supreme court held that whether a de-
fendant is "represented" by counsel for purposes of Code section 795.1 de-
pends upon whether he has consulted with an attorney and not upon the time 
of formal appointment (or retainer) of counsel. Thus, "a defendant who, 
prior to indictment, has the opportunity and actually does consult freely with 
an attorney of his choice, but voluntarily elects not to discuss the charge 
(known to him) upon which an indictment is subsequently found," 405 is repre-
sented by legal counsel for the purposes of Code section 795.1. The record 
showed that a few days after defendant waived preliminary hearing and was 
bound over to the district court on the instant charge, he had a conference 
with his court-appointed attorney on another matter (i.e., a hold order from 
California authorities). The same attorney was formally appointed at his ar-
raignment on the instant charge. The supreme court "recognize[d] the fre-
quent practice of assigning an attorney for a defendant, followed by a formal 
appointment at arraignment in district court" and "doubt[ed] such an arrange-
ment would result in a holding that defendant was 'unrepresented' during the 
pre-indictment period."406 
396. ld. at 547. 
397. ld. 
398. See IOWA CODE§§ 795.1, .2 (1973). 
399. State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973). 
400. State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973). 
401. ld. 
402. Id. at 914. 
403. ld. 
404. 201 N.W.2d 715 (Iowa 1972). This decision was prior to State v. Morningstar, 
207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973), but is illustrative as to what constitutes representation by 
counsel (although itself turning on defendant's failure to demand a speedy indictment 
under the old demand-waiver rule. 
405. ld. at 717. 
406. ld. 
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3. Double Jeopardy 
In State v. White, 401 the Iowa supreme court finally considered the ques-
tion of the attachment of double jeopardy upon retrials following a hung jury. 
In the instant case, defendant was retried and convicted following mistrials in 
each of two prior trials because the respective juries were unable to agree. 
The supreme court concluded that the United States Supreme Court "has 
long favored the rule of discretion in the trial judge to declare a mistrial and 
to require another panel to try the defendant if the ends of justice will be 
best served."408 Accordingly, the Iowa court distilled the "flexible rule" that, 
in ruling on a demurrer alleging double jeopardy, the trial court "must consider 
all surrounding facts and circumstances and in fairness determine when the 
accused's right to be finally tried by a particular tribunal outweighs the public 
interest in justice."409 Thus, the supreme court rejected any rigid, mechanical 
rule that defendant "may not be retried, regardless of the 'manifest necessity' 
or considerations of 'the ends of public justice' for aborting two trials . . . ."410 
In White, there was presented "only the stark fact of two mistrials for jury 
disagreement" and thus there was "no evidence upon which to review trial 
court's discretion in declaring the mistrials .... " 411 Consequently, the su-
preme court found no double jeopardy violation412 and defendant's conviction 
was therefore affirmed. 413 
4. Discovery414 
a. Alibi rebuttal witnesses. The leading development in the area of dis-
covery was the United States Supreme Court decision in Wardius v. Oregon,415 
in whiCh the Court held that federal due process requires reciprocal discovery 
concerning a state's statutory notice-of-alibi rule.416 Specifically, the Court 
held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids en-
forcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal 
407. 209 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1973). 
408. ld. at 17, citing Illinois v. Somerville, 93 S. Ct. 1066 (1973). 
409. ld. 
410. Jd. 
411. ld. 
412. In a related development, the supreme court refused to overrule State v. Sefcheck, 
261 Iowa 1159, 157 N.W.2d 128 (1968) (reprosecution after supreme court's voiding of 
first conviction-here, for lack of trial counsel-is not barred by reason of double jeo-
pardy. 
413. See also Robinson v. Neil, 93 S. Ct. 876 (1973) (Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 
387 (1970), which bars on the fifth amendment ground of double jeopardy state and 
municipal prosecutions based on the same criminal activity, is fully retroactive). 
414. For a discussion of the role of judicial discretion in the discovery process, see 
Dunahoo, supra note 364 at 1031-34. · 
415. 93 S. Ct. 2208 (1973 ). 
416. Concerning other types of State's discovery, see Cupp v. Murphy, 93 S. Ct. 2000 
(1973) (fingernail scrapings), as discussed in note 472(d) infra; United States v. Mara, 
93 S. Ct. 774 (1973) (handwriting exemplars), as discussed in text accompanying notes 
496-98 infra and note 472(c) infra; and United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 (1973) 
(voice exemplars), as discussed in text accompanying notes 496-98 infra and note 472(f) 
infra. 
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defendants."417 At issue was Oregon's statute requiring a defendant to give the 
State notice of the particulars of an intended alibi defense but remaining silent 
as to any subsequent reciprocation by the State as to pretrial notice of intended 
alibi rebuttal witnesses. 418 Holding that such a statutory scheme was "facially 
invalid,"419 the Supreme Court dictated that "in the absence of fair notice 
that he would have opportunity to discover the State's rebuttal witnesses, peti-
tioner cannot be compelled to reveal his alibi defense. " 420 Thus, the Court 
did not retreat from its position in Williams v. Florida421 that a State's notice-
of-alibi statute is not unconstitutional as an infringement of the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self incrimination. Nor did the Court hold that the 
State must provide notice-of-alibi rebuttal witnesses. Indeed, the State appar-
ently may, consistent with Wardius, either abandon its notice-of-alibi rule or 
add a notice-of-alibi rebuttal witness requirement. 
b. Expert witness' reference materials. Copies of an expert witness' ref-
erence materials were deemed non-discoverable in State v. Allison.422 De-
fendant therein had requested a disclosure order requiring production to him 
of the medical texts, treatises, journals, and articles upon which the State's 
physician was expected to base his opinion that a blood test of 249 shows 
intoxication. "Had the State's physician rendered a report with respect to this 
particular case and defendant requested the State to produce it, a different 
question would be presented,"423 the supreme court cautioned. 
c. Informer's identity. Two survey cases dealt with the general principle 
that the identity of confidential informants can be withheld from the defense 
subject to disclosure on a case-by-case basis where the requisite showing of 
necessity for disclosure is made. 424 That is, such disclosure "is required where 
it would be relevant and helpful to the defense, i.e. when the informer was a 
participant in, or a witness to, the crime charged."425 Defendant carries the 
burden of showing such need and "[m]ere speculation an informer may be 
helpful is not enough to carry the burden,"426 the supreme court determined 
in State v. Battle.421 Defendant's burden in Battle was not met merely by re-
questing the informer's name during cross examination of a police officer. In 
State v. Crawford,428 the non-disclosure rule was held to extend to reputation 
testimony such that a police officer testifying as to defendant's bad reputation 
was not required to divulge the identity of informers who were his sources re-
417. 93 S. Ct. 2208, 2211. 
418. Cf. IowA CoDE § 777.18 (1973). See also State v. Kappos, 189 N.W.2d 563 
(Iowa 1971) (the name of a rebuttal witness need not be endorsed on the county attor-
ney's information). 
419. 93 S. Ct. 2208, 2211 n.4. 
420. ld. at 2214. 
421. 399 u.s. 78 (1970). 
422. 206 N.W.2d 893 (Iowa 1973). 
423. Id. at 894. 
424. See State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1972). 
425. Id. 
426. Id. at 72. 
427. 199 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972). 
428. 202 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1972). 
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garding defendant's reputation. Notwithstanding the general rule requmng 
(on cross-examination) identification of the source of reputation statements, 
the supreme court held that "public policy favoring the non divulgence privilege 
[outweighs] ... the rule for testing collateral testimony by cross-examina-
tion."429 The court added that even if the informants were identified, de-
fendant, "under the present state of our case law, could not have called them 
to impeach statements of the witness in this collateral area."430 Thus, the 
trial court "did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require the witness to 
name the informants."431 
d. Statements of witnesses. In State v. Aossey,432 the supreme court 
attempted to strike a balance between State v. Eads433 (abuse of court's discre-
tion to order production of statements of all of State's witnesses expected to 
testify at trial) and Brady v. Maryland434 (State must tum over requested 
statements which are materially exculpatory). Affirming the trial court's re-
fusal to order the State to produce a written statement of Aossey's accomplice, 
the supreme court characterized the statement as "highly inculpatory."435 So 
viewing it, as non-exculpatory, the supreme court held that the State was not 
required to produce it-unless it was "necessary to his proper defense,"436 
which it was not (since defendant's theory of mistake as to his accomplice's 
lack of authority to remove goods from his employer "taxe[d] credulity to the 
limit"). 437 And, even if parts of it were exculpatory, the issue of non-produc-
tion was mooted since other state's witnesses acknowledged these particular 
allegedly exculpatory matters at trial. 438 Moreover, since defendant's accom-
plice himself did not testify, there was no Jencks problem, the supreme court 
concluded. 
In State v. Houston, 439 the Iowa supreme court upheld the trial court's 
refusal to order in-trial turnover of a police officer's summary of a statement 
of a state's witness. After the state's witness testified on direct examination 
as to the description of defendant he gave to the investigating officer at the 
scene of the crime, defendant requested turnover to him of the witness' state-
ment before cross examination. The trial court examined the police report 
in camera and, finding no inconsistency in the summary of the witness' state-
ment and his testimony, refused to order turnover of the statement. Affirm-
ing, the supreme court noted that defendant "does not claim access to the police 
429. ld. at 102. 
430. ld. 
431. ld. 
432. 201 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1972). 
433. 166 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1969). However, the supreme court in Eads did "not 
foreclose the possibility that a defendant may be entitled to a particular statement upon 
showing it is necessary to his proper defense." ld. at 774. 
434. 373 u.s. 83 (1963). 
435. 201 N.W.2d 731, 734. 
436. ld. 
437. ld. at 733. 
438. ld. 
439. 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973). 
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report because it is exculpatory or a verbatim, signed or adopted statement 
of the witness."440 Noting that ther·e is a distinction between "a statement 
made by a witness and an imprecise summary of what another understood him 
to say," the supreme court cited a number of cases in which it had "approved 
the federal Jencks Act procedure for determining defendant's right to see state-
ments of witnesses."441 The test, in making this distinction, is "whether the 
statement is the witness' own, rather than the product of the investigator's s·e-
lections, interpretations and interpolations."442 Moreover, "[i]t must be 
shown, unless there is direct evidence the witness prepared, signed or adopted 
the statement, that it minimally is a continuous, narrative statement made by 
the witness and recorded verbatim, or nearly so."443 The instant statement 
did not meet this test and thus "[t]here was no error in depriving the defense 
access thereto."444 Indeed, the court recalled that it had rejected "a dragnet 
demand for all statements, reports or summaries of those persons the State 
intended to call as witnesses"445 in State v. Cunha.446 
5. Motions to Suppress 
Rulings by the trial courts on pretrial motions to suppress447 provided the 
c·entral issue in many of the survey cases, as defendants asserted that incrim-
inatory evidence had been obtained against them in an unconstitutional or 
illegal fashion. 448 
a. Identification Procedures. 
i. Individualized Confrontations. The leading development in the 
area of identification procedures449 was Kirby v. Illinois,450 in which the United 
States Supreme Court sharply limited United States v. Wade.451 The latter had 
set forth a sixth amendment standard of per se exclusion of identification testi-
mony based upon a post-indictment lineup when defendant was not afforded 
right to assistance of counsel. Kirby held that the Wade doctrine does not 
extend to identification testimony based upon "a police station showup that 
took place before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise formally 
440. ld. at 46, distinguishing State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1969), on 
appeal after remand, 183 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1971). 
441. ld. 
442. ld. Cf. State v. Hodge, 252 Iowa 449, 105 N.W.2d 613 (1960), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 402 (1962) (State witness' "work product" not discoverable). 
443. ld. 
444. ld. 
445. ld. 
446. 193 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1971). 
447. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discussion in rulings on motions to 
suppress, see Dunahoo, supra note 364 at 1041-42. 
448. For a discussion of challenges to blood-test and breath-test evidence in 
O.M.V.U.I. cases during the survey period, see text accompanying notes 269-88 supra. 
449. In the related areas of compelled handwriting and voice exemplars, see text 
accompanying notes 496-98 infra. 
450. 406 u.s. 682 (1972). 
451. 388 u.s. 218 (1967). 
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charged with any criminal offense. "4~2 Thus, while there is no federal consti-
tutional requirement of counsel at a lineup or in an individualized confronta-
tion until a criminal suspect has been formally charged, the states were left 
free to apply a broader right of counsel. 
Iowa is one of the states453 that has stuck with the Kirby minimal standards. 
In SUlte v. Jackson,454 the Iowa supreme court observed that Kirby "held ad-
missible evidence of pieindictment identification at a police station where ac-
cused was without counsel."455 In Jackson, the robbery victim was asked to 
come to the police station because the police had detained suspects fitting the 
description of his assailants, and as he entered the station he recognized de-
fendant coming down the stairs. Noting the similarity with the factual situation 
in Kirby, the Iowa supreme court said: "The identification was spontaneous 
and was received without prompting from any law enforcement officer."456 
Similarly, a counselless one-man showup was upheld in Williamson v. 
State.451 The robbery victim obtained defendant's name from a third party 
and reported to police that he had been robbed by defendant. Two or three 
hours later, defendant was arrested and the victim was called to the police sta-
tion. Upon entering, the victim spotted defendant and immediately confronted 
him about the stolen billfold. Applying Kirby, the Iowa supreme court held 
that this procedure was not "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrep-
arable mistaken identification,"458 even though defendant was the only black 
defendant in the station at the time. The court noted, inter alia, that the 
counselless confrontation "occurred soon after the offense while the victim's 
memory was fresh" and that the identification was "spontaneous."459 More-
over, an in-court identification was made. 460 
ii. Photographic displays. In a related matter, the United States 
Supreme Court held in United States v. Ash461 that "the Sixth Amendment 
does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the 
Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification 
452. 406 u.s. 682, 684 (1972). 
453. See State v. Saint Andre, 263 La. 48, 267 So. 2d 190 ( 1972); State v. Carey, 
486 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. 1972) (counsel applies only to post-indictment lineups); People v. 
Faulkner, 28 Cal. App. 3d 384, 104 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1972); contra, Arnold v. State, 
484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972). 
454. 199 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1972). 
455. Id. at 103 (emphasis added). 
456. ld. at 102. 
457. 201 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1972). 
458. Id. at 491. 
459. ld. 
460. On the related matter of an independent origin for in-court testin10ny, the supreme 
court said in State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973): "Assuming there was an 
illegal identification procedure used prior to trial, the in-court identification testimony is 
admissible if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence the in-court identification 
had an independent origin." Here, the above test was met by witness' identification hav-
ing "untainted origin" in his observations of defendant (from 3-4 feet away in a well-
lighted area) at the scene of the crime. Thus, he could identify defendant in court not-
withstanding an arguably illegal police station lineup (the evidence of which was partially 
"suppressed" by an order in limine). 
461. 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973 ). 
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of the offender."462 This holding covers both pre-indictment and post-indict-
ment photographic displays,463 both of which were used in Ash. Only the 
post-indictment display was argued to the Supreme Court in Ash, since de-
fendant recognized that Kirby, in the Court's words, "forecloses application 
of the Sixth Amendment to events before the initiation of adversary criminal 
proceedings."464 The Court's rationale was based on its formulation of the 
following test for determining when a pretrial event constitutes a "critical 
stage" thus necessitating the right to assistance of counsel, viz., "whether the 
accused require[s] aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting 
his adversary."465 Concluding that requiring counsel in the instant case would 
require a "substantial departure" from the abovementioned historical test, the 
Court reasoned: "Since the accused himself is not present at the time of the 
photographic display, and asserts no right to be present, ... no possibility 
arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law 
or overpowered by his professional adversary. Similarly, the counsel guaran-
tee would not be used to produce equality in a trial-like adversary confronta-
tion."466 
b. Search and seizure evidence. 
i. Standing to challenge. A comprehensive standard for determin-
ing a person's standing to challenge the legality of a search, and the admissi-
bility of evidence derived therefrom, was expressed in State v. Osborn.461 Spe-
cifically, the court held that standing proceeds from any of the following: "In-
vasion of privacy may be claimed by that person [1] who is charged with an 
offense of possession; or [2] who has a proprietary or possessory interest in the 
property seized; or [3] who is legitimately on the premises when the search 
occurs."468 But the court then proceeded to qualify all three bases for stand-
ing, which are discussed below in the context of the instant factual situation. 
Here, the supreme court held that a guest in another's automobile has standing 
to challenge the legality of the search of that automobile when the fruits of 
the search are being used against the guest on a burglary charge provided that 
he alleges that the search invaded his expectation of privacy. 
462. ld. at 2579. 
463. See also State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1973) (no showing that 
counselless photographic identification "was so impermissibly induced or suggestive as to 
create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification;" counsel issue not 
raised). 
464. 93 S. Ct. 2568, 2570 n.3 (1973 ). 
465. Id. at 2575. 
466. ld. at 2577. 
467. 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972). 
468. I d. at 804, accord Brown v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1565, 1569 (1973): 
[T]here is no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, the de-
fendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and 
seizure; (b) had no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and (c) 
were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of the 
offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested 
search and seizure. 
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While the court pointed out that standing is automatic for anyone charged 
with an offense of possession, it nevertheless noted that possession of the 
seized evidence must itself be an essential element of the crime charged in 
order for the automatic standing rule to apply. Thus, there is no automatic 
standing on a charge of burglary (as opposed, e.g., to a charge of unlawful 
possession of marijuana). Next, the court qualified the automatic-standing rule 
where the accused has a proprietary or possessory interest in either the premises 
searched or the property seized by saying that it is unlikely that the accused 
bas standing by virtue of an interest in stolen goods seized as evidence. In 
other words, it appears that a thief (such as the accused here in a burglary 
case) lacks standing generally. Finally, the court held that an automobile-
guest normally would have standing-since standing normally evolves when 
the accused is legitimately on the premises in an area in which there was "a 
reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion"469 (such as 
in a friend's automobile). However, the court ruled that it is proper to require 
that an otherwise 'aggrieved person' "allege, and if the allegation be disputed, 
that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy."470 
In other words "it is an invasion of his personal right of privacy of person or 
premises due to an unreasonable search and seizure that Osborn must verify 
to obtain standing to question the legality of the search of Nott's automobile."471 
Because defendant did not so allege, he lacked standing, the supreme court 
concluded. 
ii. Warrantless searches with consent. The United States Supreme 
Court provided the major development concerning warrantless searches,472 by 
469. /d. at 805, quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
470. Id. at 806, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). 
471. /d. at 804. 
472. In other warrantless search and seizure cases, the United States Supreme Court 
held: 
(a) Business records. No fourth amendment claim arises when petitioner's rec-
ords, which have been turned over to her accountant, are subpoenaed from the accountant 
by the government for criminal investigative purposes. "[T]here can be little expectation 
of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory dis-
closure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax return." Couch 
v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 611, 619 (1973). 
(b) Exigent circumstances-Impounded Vehicles. The fourth amendment is not 
violated by a warrantless search of an impounded automobile (including its locked trunk) 
pursuant to a standard police procedure of carrying out "community caretaking functions, 
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to 
the violation of a criminal statute." Here, the impounded automobile was stored in a 
rural area seven miles from the police station and a revolver was suspected to be in it 
since the car belonged to a police officer who was unconscious following an accident. 
The search was for the purpose of removing the gnn as a matter of public safety and not 
for discovery of evidence of criminal activity (here, a murder). Cady v. Dombrowski, 
93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973). 
(c) Handwriting exemplars: "We have held today in Dionisio, [United States v. 
Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 ( 1973)] that a grand jury subpoena is not a 'seizure' within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and further, that that Amendment is not violated by 
a grand jury directive compelling production of 'physical characteristics' which are 'con-
stantly exposed to the public'. . . . Handwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown to the 
public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of a 
person's script than there is the tone of his voice." United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774, 
775-56 (1973). 
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holding in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte473 that Miranda-type474 warnings ar'e not 
a prerequisite to a valid consent search. That is, an accused's knowledge of 
a right to refuse is not an indispensable element of a valid cons'ent. Never-
theless, this knowledge is a consideration: 
We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody 
and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate 
that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of 
duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question 
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the 
subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into 
account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowl-
edge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.475 
111. Warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances. In State 
v. Simmons,476 the Iowa supreme court reaffirmed the principle that "a police 
officer may make a valid search of a vehicle on a public highway without a 
warrant or consent or prior to arrest where exigent circumstances and probable 
cause exist."477 Here, police officers stopped a car containing four blacks while 
investigating a reported robbery by four black juveniles. One of the occupants 
fit the reported description of one of the robbers. After the stopping, one oc-
cupant (Smith) was observed bending over and apparently shoving something 
under the front seat. Meanwhile, the driver (Colton) alighted and started 
walking back to the police car. Based upon their experience that "such conduct 
was often an attempt to keep them from observing the contents and occu-
pants of the vehicle,"478 the officers return'ed Colton to the car. One of the offi-
cers then shined his flashlight through the open car door and saw a brown 
paper bag protruding from under the front seat. Upon questioning, Colton 
(d) Incident to arrest. The Chimel v. California [395 U.S. 752 (1969)] doctrine 
of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest applies to a limited station house 
seizure of highly evanescent evidence (here, fingernail scrapings) from a person who was 
not under arrest at the time but was voluntarily being generally questioned. This limited 
intrusion was constitutionally permissible in light of defendant's attempted destruction of 
this evidence; however, the Court added that it did "not hold that a full Chime! search 
would have been justified in this case without a formal arrest and without a warrant." 
Cupp v. Murphy, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2004 (1973). 
(e) Stop and Frisk. Reasonable cause for a stop-and-frisk "search" need not be 
based upon the officer's personal observation and thus can rest upon an informant's tip 
provided that the tip has some indicia of reliability. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 
(1972). 
(f) Voice exemplars. "It is clear that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is 
not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense . . . . The required disclosure of a per-
son's voice is thus immeasurably further removed from the Fourth Amendment protection 
than was the intrusion into the body effected by the blood extraction in Schmerber 
[Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)]." United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 
764, 769, 772 (1973). 
473. 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973). 
474. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
475. 93 s. Ct. 2041, 2059 (1972). 
476. 195 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1972). 
477. Id. at 724-25. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 
2537-38 (1973): "[T]he Carroll doctrine [Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)] 
does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no 
automobile, there must be probable cause for the search." 
478. Id. at 724. 
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repeatedly said nothing was in the bag and kept inching it out when directed 
to remove the bag. The officer thereupon reached in and pulled out the bag 
which contained blasting caps. Affirming the conviction of the defendant 
(another occupant of the car) for unlawful possession of explosive devices, the 
supreme court concluded: "Exigent circumstances and probable cause existed 
for the warrantless seizure of the caps. In so holding we find the actions of 
Smith and Colton added some weight to the probable cause issue."479 
iv. Searches with warrant. The only significant new general develop-
ment concerning search warrants during the survey period480 was the holding 
in State v. Dodson481 that Miranda warnings482 ar·e not necessary before execu-
tion of a search warrant provided that there are "no tainted elicitation of in-
criminatory statements .... "483 Thus, any of defendant's attendant state-
ments or admissions were admissible. 
In other cases, the supreme court reaffirmed a number of standard princi-
ples-e.g., that a warrant "may issue upon [reliable] hearsay supplied by an 
unidentified informant"484 and that probable cause for a warrant cannot rest 
upon the unsupported conclusions of the affiant-officer.485 State v. Lynch486 
is the only case in which the Iowa supreme court discussed probable cause for 
a warrant in detail. 487 In Lynch, the content of the police officers' affidavit 
was summarized as follows: 
That they had made a complete investigation into defendant's activi-
ties and knew all of the facts in the police file; that they were aware 
of defendant's suspicious actions during the previous two weeks; that 
they had reliable information from a reliable informant who is a 
credible resident of the state of Iowa that defendant has been selling 
narcotic drugs and marijuana, and that defendant left several days 
previous to the date of the application for California to pick up a 
load of drugs; that during a flight into Cedar Rapids defendant had 
offered to obtain drugs for the airline stewardess; that defendant was 
arrested on or about June 5, 1968, in California on a narcotics 
charge; that an official from United Air Lines informed affiants that 
defendant had offered to obtain narcotics for the stewardess on his 
flight on December 19, 1968.488 
479. ld. at 725. 
480. On the specific topic of necessity for a search warrant for seizure of allegedly 
obscene materials, see text accompanying notes 238-44 supra. 
481. 195 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1972). 
482. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
483. 195 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa 1972). 
484. State v. Dodson, 195 N.W.2d 684, 685 (Iowa 1972). 
485. "[I]t is not the arresting officer's determination which counts: it is that of 
the_ magistrate, who must reach his conclusion solely upon information supplied to him at 
the time the warrant is requested." The Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 ( 1959) 
probable cause standard for an officer making a warrantless arrest (and search incident 
thereto) does not apply to an officer's stating probable cause in his affidavit for a search 
warrant. State v. Johnson, 203 N.W.2d 126, 128 (Iowa 1972). 
486. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972). 
487. For other cases, in which the supreme court summarily upheld the affidavits for 
search warrants, see State v. Dodson, 195 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Simmons, 
195 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1972). 
488. 197 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa 1972). 
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The supreme court said that "except for the recitation that defendant had 
offered to supply narcotics to the stewardess on the flight into Cedar Rapids, 
we have no hesitancy in saying that probable cause for issuance of the warrant 
could not be found." 489 The court continued: 
Nothing else appears except the conclusions of the police officers, 
who asserted they had the defendant under surveillance for several 
weeks and that his actions were "suspicious." This conclusion was 
entirely unsupported by facts. They also stated they knew every-
thing that was in the police files; but the writ cannot issue on what 
they secretly know. It can issue only on information communicated 
to the issuing officer who then makes his own determination of prob-
able cause.490 
The supreme court held "it is reasonable to conclude that one traveling on an 
airliner who offers narcotics to the stewardess may have such narcotics on his 
person or among his effects." This reported offer "[s]upported by the state-
ments of an official of the airlines . . . was sufficient to furnish probable 
cause," the supreme court concluded.491 
b. Privilege against self incrimination. During the survey period, the 
United States Supreme Court handed down three major opinions concerning 
the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. These cases are all 
discussed in this section on evidentiary standards, although not all of them 
involved motions to suppress. 
i. Production of records in another's possession. In Couch v. United 
States, 492 the Court, stating that this is "a personal privilege,"493 held that a 
taxpayer-defendant may not invoke the fifth amendment to prevent the sub-
poena-coerced production of her business records in the possession of her ac-
countant (albeit title remained in the taxpayer). Noting that the accountant 
was "the on:ly one compelled to do anything"494 by the subpoena, the court 
recalled Justice Holmes' observation: "A party is privileged from producing 
the evidence but not from its production."495 
ii. Non-testimonial evidence. That this fifth amendment privilege 
protects on:ly against compelled disclosure of incriminatory testimonial evidence 
sought for its communicative content was once more made clear. In United 
States v. Mara496 and United States v. Dionisio,497 respectively, the Supreme 
Court held that this privilege does not preclude grand jury subpoenas ordering 
certain named witnesses to appear and produce handwriting and voice ex-
emplars. It has long been held that "the compelled display of identifiable 
physical characteristics infringes no interest protected by the privilege against 
489. Id. at 192. 
490. Id. 
491. Id. 
492. 93S.Ct.611 (1973). 
493. Id. at 616. 
494. ld. 
495. Id., quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457,458 (1913). 
496. 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973 ). 
497. 93 S. Ct. 764 (1973). 
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compulsory self-incrimination,"498 the Court pointed out. Thus, defendants' 
contempt convictions for refusal to abide by the subpoenas were affirmed in 
both cases. 
ill. Confessions. The standard for determining the voluntariness of 
defendant's confession499 was set forth in State v. Fetters,500 to wit: "[W]hen 
a confession of a criminal defendant is challenged at a pretrial suppression 
hearing as involuntary, the burden is on the state to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the confession was voluntary as a prerequisite to its ad-
missibility into evidence at his trial."501 The Iowa supreme court thus adopted 
the less-stringent standard after the United States Supreme Court502 had "left 
States free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt the higher standard."503 
6. Change of Venue 
A new dimension in deciding applications for change of venue504 was 
added in Pollard v. District Court.505 The supreme court held therein that the 
application must be considered in the context of the publicity attending the 
entire matter and not merely the isolated publicity concerning an individual 
wrongdoer. Accordingly, it was reversible error to deny defendant's applica-
tion for change of venue based upon considerable media coverage of a city 
council meeting in which there was considerable bickering between the State 
Auditor and the city councilmen but only casual reference to defendant being 
named in the state audit as the only city employee who had possibly violated 
any law. Rejecting the traditional approach of requiring defendant to "dem-
onstrate conclusively she cannot receive a fair trial,"506 the court said: "When 
498. ld. at 767. 
499. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2046 (1973 ), a consent search 
case, as to the nature of voluntariness. See also State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 
1973) (confession is inadmissible when induced by officer's promissory leniency), as 
discussed in text accompanying notes 663-67 infra. (Trial-mistrial). 
500. 202 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Iowa 1972) (defendant's subnormal intelligence by itself 
does not render a confession involuntary if he can "understand the meaning and effect of 
the confession," but this is a factor to be considered in the court's determination). 
501. ld. at 88. However, the admissibility of confessions made before Miranda 
[Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] must be determined "by application of con-
comitant case law explicating the due process standard of voluntariness." On a postcon-
viction relief petition, the burden thus is upon defendant to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that his confession, viewed reasonably in light of the totality of circumstances, 
was involuntarily given. See Parsons v. Brewer, 202 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1972). 
502. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). 
503. 202 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Iowa 1972). 
504. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in ruling on applications for 
change of venue, see Dunahoo, supra note 364, at 1047-52. 
505. 200 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1972). 
506. Id. at 521. On the other hand, the court upheld denials of defendant's applica-
tions for changes of venue in three other cases involving allegedly prejudicial publicity 
concerning defendants alone. [In these cases, defendants failed to show actual excite-
ment and the material was not "so potentially prejudicial that prejudice must be pre-
sumed." Pollard v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Iowa 1972).]. See State v. 
Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972) (not prejudicial that one newspaper account was 
subject to misinterpretation in two respects since it was in "substantial accord with the 
facts"); State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972) (insufficient showing of local ex-
citement and prejudice to require a change of venue although a minor reference was 
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the spotlight's glare comes to rest on a certain individual in a matter of large 
public interest involving widespread and intensive publicity of a prejudicial 
nature, the test is whether a 'reasonable likelihood' exists that the voir dire 
jury examination or a continuance will not be sufficient to allow a fair trial."507 
The supreme court also made a policy change regarding the scope of its 
review of rulings on change of venue applications. In State v. Elmore,508 it 
said: "We are required to make 'an independent evaluation of the circum-
stances' on change of venue issues in criminal cases involving the right to an 
impartial jury, i.e., our review is de novo whether the questions comes to us 
on certiorari in advance of trial, or on direct appeal following judgment. 
To this extent only our pronouncement in Harnack v. District Court 
. is no longer controlling."509 
In other cases involving procedural aspects, the court held: that mer·e con-
clusions or generalities in a supporting affidavit (unlike in the motion itself) 
will not support a change of venue and thus the grounds therefor must be 
stated with definiteness and certainty;510 that the State's failure to file affidavits 
in resistance to defendant's motion does not convert defendant's motion and 
affidavit from a prima facie to a conclusive showing;511 and that sustaining 
of defendant's motion for continuance renders moot his motion for change of 
venue when alternative relief was sought in the two concurrently-filed mo-
tions.512 The court also suggested: "[W]hen motions to change venue are 
overruled, counsel on both sides would be well advised to have voir dire ex-
amination of the jury reported."513 
7. Speedy Trial5 14 
The survey period evidenced a major change in the area of speedy trial, 
which was occasioned by a monumental ruling of the United States Supreme 
Court. 
a. Demand-waiver doctrine. Prompted by the United States Supreme 
Court's June 22, 1972 holding in Barker v. Wingo 515 that rejected a State's 
demand-waiver rule that "a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial for-
ever waives his right,"516 the Iowa supreme court belatedly did an aboutface517 
made in one newspaper account during the trial to a parole violation being the reason 
defendant was not free on bond); and State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973) (in-
sufficient showing of local excitement and prejudice to preclude retrial in same county 
only two weeks after a mistrial). 
507. 200 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Iowa 1972). 
508. 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972). 
509. Id. at 445, referring to Harnack v. District Court, 179 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Iowa 
1970). 
510. State v. Dague, 206 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 1973). 
511. Id. 
512. State v. Weiland, 202 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1972). 
513. State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972). 
514. See generally Dunahoo and Sullins, Speedy Justice, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 266 
(1973). See also note 517 infra. 
515. 407 u.s. 514 (1972). 
516. Id. at 528. 
517. Prior to its dropping of the demand-waiver rule under CoDB §§ 795.1 and 795.2 
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in State v. Gorham: 518 "In light of contemporary standards we now reject 
the rule that absent a demand an accused, per se, waives his right to a Code 
§ 795.2 speedy trial."519 This means that "an accused, on bail and repre-
sented by counsel, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application is 
entitled to a dismissal if not brought to trial within 60 days after being indicted 
unless 'good cause' to the contrary be prosecutorially shown, and (2) courts 
must engage in an ad hoc delicate balancing process in evaluating any 'good 
cause' so shown."520 
This new procedural rule represents a policy change on the part of the 
Iowa supreme court, which "[s]ince 1943 ... has repeatedly held ... an 
accused, unless not admitted to bail and unrepresented by counsel, waives 
right to dismissal for failure to demand a speedy trial."521 Thus, once a case 
is not brought to trial within sixty days of indictment, 522 defendant must file 
in State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973) on April 25, 1973, the Iowa supreme 
court had expressly maintained same in State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1972) 
on December 20, 1972 (and thus differentiated "speedy trial" under the CoDE and the 
sixth amendment). In Kimball, the supreme court held that "a defendant represented by 
counsel or at bail is required to demand trial in order to take advantage of the time limi-
tation" (of CoDE § 795.2) and accordingly "[s]ince a demand for trial was not filed, 
the trial court properly refused to dismiss the case under the statute." ld. at 300 (empha-
sis added). The court then noted that "[t]he federal constitutional right to speedy trial 
was recently expounded by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo," and 
upon applying the four-part Barker balancing test, concluded: "We hold, under the 
Barker decision, that defendant's federal constitutional right to speedy trial was not vio-
lated. ld. at 300, 301 (emphasis added). Then, in Gorham, the supreme court ob-
served: "Now, for the first time since issuance of the opinion in Barker v. Wingo . . ., 
we are called upon to determine the propriety of our aforesaid demand-waiver rule." 
Jd. at 910 (emphasis added). The court, without mentioning Kimball, thereupon held 
that "to the extent Pines v. District Court [233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W.2d 574 (1943)] and 
its successors conflict herewith they are no longer controlling." ld. at 913. The apparent 
explanation for this Kimball-Gorham discrepancy is that in Gorham, presumably unlike 
in Kimball, defendant "argue[d] the so-called demand waiver rule, specifically and by 
judicial construction inherent in § 795.2, is constitutionally proscribed." _/d. at 909. 
518. 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973). 
519. Id. at 913. 
520. Id. at 914. 
521. Jd. at 909 [new text added]. 
522. This sixty-day period is subject to computational rules recogmzmg certain ex-
cluded periods. In State v. Gorham, supra, the court constructed the following chronol-
ogy: indictment on April 26, defendant's committal (upon defendant's request) to a State 
medical facility for mental evaluation on May 17, defendant's return to local jail on July 14 
and September 3 order setting trial for October 11, and defendant's request for replacement 
counsel on September 13. The supreme court observed: "Stated briefly, absent any de-
fense initiated cause for delay, ( 1) 61 full days elapsed from the time Gorham was in-
carcerated in the Linn County Jail on return from the medical facility and his request for 
replacement counsel; ... (3) the initial trial date fixed by court order was 89 days after 
defendant's aforesaid return to jail." 206 N.W.2d at 914-15 (emphasis added). Thus, the 
court placed considerable emphasis upon the time that defendant returned from the medi-
cal evaluation, however, the fact remains that the State failed to try him within 60 days 
after his return from commitment. It, of course, remains to be seen what it will do with 
this type of scenario (medical commitment on 50th day after indictment, trial begun on 
50th day after defendant's return from commitment, motion to dismiss on the basis that 
any period of the State's unexcusable delay in getting defendant committed should be 
tacked on to the time period following release from commitment). 
As to recommended excluded periods, see ABA, PRoJEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL, § 2.3, at 25-26 (Approved Draft 
1968): 
The following periods should be excluded in computing the time for trial: 
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a motion to dismiss523 which must be granted unless the State can show good 
cause for the delay, irrespective of defendant's making or not making demand 
for speedy trial. What constitutes good cause remains a matter of the trial 
court's determination within its sound judicial discretion. 524 The language in 
Gorham (i.e., "courts must engage in an ad hoc delicate balancing process in 
evaluating any 'good cause' so shown")525 suggests that the courts, in deter-
mining good cause, should consider, inter alia, the four factors of the Barker 
balancing test, to wit: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the 
delay, (3) the existence of absence of resultant prejudice to defendant, and 
( 4) defendant's demand or lack thereof. 526 This premise is further sup-
(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the 
defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on compe-
tency and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial, hearings 
on pretrial motions, interlocutory appeals, and trial of other charges. 
(b) The period of delay resulting from congestion of the trial docket when 
the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances. 
(c) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the re-
quest or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel. A defendant without 
counsel should not be deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he has 
been advised by the court of his right to a speedy trial and the effect of his con-
sent. 
(d) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the re-
quest of the prosecuting attorney, if: 
(i) the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence 
material to the state's case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due 
diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that such evidence will be available at the later date; or 
(ii) the continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney addi-
tional time to prepare the state's case and additional time is justified because of 
the exceptional circumstances of the case. 
(e) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the 
defendant. A defendant should be considered absent whenever his whereabouts 
are unknown and in addition he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecu-
tion or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. A defendant 
should be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his 
presence for trial cannot be obtained or he resists being returned to the state for 
trial. 
(f) If the charge was dismissed upon motion of the prosecuting attorney 
and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense or an 
offense required to be joined with that offense, the period of delay from the date 
the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitations would commence run-
ning as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge. 
(g) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial 
with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good 
cause for not granting a severance. In all other cases the defendant should be 
granted a severance so that he may be tried within the time limits applicable to 
him. (h) Other periods of delay for good cause. 
523. See Foster v. Brewer, 197 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Iowa 1972): "Our ruling [in State 
v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 156 N.W.2d 266 (1968)] that defendant waived his right to 
speedy trial by failing to move to dismiss until after trial surely applies to this petitioner, 
who never made such motion." 
Of course, the motion to dismiss requirement does not apply to a defendant who is 
both incarcerated and unrepresented. See IowA ConE § 795.2 (1973 ). 
524. See, e.g., Maher v. Brown, 225 Iowa 341, 280 N.W. 553 (1938). However, 
when it becomes apparent that there is good cause, "giving the accused the full benefit of 
the evidence ... no such discretion lies." State v. Jackson, 252 Iowa 671, 677, 108 
N.W.2d 62, 66 (1961). 
525. 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Iowa 1973). 
526. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 
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ported by the following statement in Gorham: "[W]hen an accused is neither 
at liberty on bail nor represented by an attorney, then absence of demand 
for or assertion of right to a speedy trial shall under no circumstances be con-
sidered in connection with trial time delay." 5 27 
In Gorham, the State made no attempt to show good cause for the de-
lay,528 relying instead entirely on the then-operative demand-waiver rule. It 
appears that the reason for the delay is the paramount factor in the four-part 
Barker balancing test as it seemingly was applied to Iowa law in Gorham, and 
that the State must carry its burden as to the factor irrespective of the presence 
or absence of the other factors (e.g., lengthy delay, prejudice, and demand) 
in order to show good cause to the contrary why the prosecution should not 
be dismissed. Even so, a sufficient showing as to the reason for the delay 
might possibly still be offset by other factors, 529 in application of "the ad hoc 
delicate balancing process." That is, an extraordinarily lengthy delay coupled 
with actual prejudice to defendant and/or defendant's demand for speedy trial, 
could possibly "tip the balance" against the State's showing of a legitimate or 
plausible reason for the delay, thus requiring a dismissal for lack of speedy 
trial. Because the State made no attempt to show good cause in Gorham, it 
remains to be seen exactly how the Iowa supreme court will oversee "the ad 
hoc delicate balancing process" it voiced, but did not definitively describe, in 
Gorham. 530 
b. Remedy. There being no good cause shown for the delay in Gorham, 
the supreme court concluded: "This case must be reversed and remanded for 
dismissal."531 Thus, whether this dismissal for lack of speedy trial is with 
prejudice was not expressly made clear.532 However, it appears that this is 
the case in light of the court's notation of the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy 
Trial, to wit: "If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the 
time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, the consequence should be ab-
solute discharge. Such discharge should forever bar prosecution for the offense 
charged and for any other offense required to be joined with that offense."533 
That this remedy is dictated is strongly implied, if not made absolutely clear, in 
Barker: 
The amorphous quality of the right also leads to the unsatisfactorily 
severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has 
been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it 
means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will 
527. 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (emphasis added). 
528. See note 384 supra. 
529. 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Iowa 1973). 
530. But see State v. Kimball, 204 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1972) in light of the discussion 
in note 517 supra. 
531. 206 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Iowa 1973). 
532. Cf. Keever v. Bainter, 195 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Iowa 1972) (denial of speedy trial 
because of delay in bringing committed-for-incompetency defendant back for another 
competency-to-stand-trial): "[R]espondent [trial court] is ordered and directed to 
dismiss the above case with prejudice forthwith." (emphasis added). 
533. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL, § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1968). 
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go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious 
than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the 
only possible remedy.534 
That dismissal of the indictment remains "the only remedy"535 for speedy 
trial violations was recently made clear by the United States Supreme Court 
in Strunk v. United States. 536 It reversed an order by the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit which had fashioned a new substitute remedy of reduc-
ing defendant's sentence to the extent of the unnecessary delay. That the 
Supreme Court does not contemplate reindictment and retrial is apparent in 
its observation that speedy trial is "unlike some of the other guarantees of the 
Sixth Amendment. For example, failure to afford a public trial, an impartial 
jury, notice of charges, or compulsory service can ordinarily be cured by pro-
viding those guaranteed rights in a new tria/."531 
It remains to be seen what the Iowa supreme court will do regarding 
whether the State can reindict defendant following the trial court's granting 
of his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy indictment. Thus, unlike the 
situation in State v. Bowers,538 in which defendant's motion to dismiss for lack 
of speedy indictment was improperly overruled and he then stood trial, such 
a hypothetical defendant would not have been placed in jeopardy.539 
8. Guilty Pleas 
a. Scope of the interrogation colloquy. With the exception of one aber-
ration, trial courts experienced little difficulty with the Sisco colloquy stand-
ards540 in accepting guilty pleas. 541 In State v. Clary,542 the entire colloquy 
actually consisted merely of the judge asking defendant if he wished to with-
draw his plea of not guilty and to enter a guilty plea. Otherwise, the supreme 
court took the general position that the trial court's interrogation "need not 
follow a ritualistic or rigid formula"543 so long as there is substantial compliance 
with the Sisco guidelines. Accordingly, a guilty plea was upheld in State v. 
Slawson544 even though the name of the offense charged was not mentioned 
during the taking of the plea since during the sentencing interrogation defend-
ant "admitted acts constituting the offense to which he pleaded guilty."545 
534. 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (emphasis added). "[Barker] lays to rest any existing 
doubt that the appropriate remedy-in fact the 'only possible remedy'-for a deprivation of 
the constitutional guaranty is dismissal operating as a bar to subsequent trial." Godbold, 
Speedy Trial-Major Surgery for a National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REv. 265, 294 (1972). 
535. Strunk v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 (1973) (emphasis added), quoting 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,522 (1972). 
536. 93 S. Ct. 2260 (1973). 
537. ld. at 2263 (emphasis added). 
538. 162 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1968). 
539. See generally State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 134 N.W.2d 906 (1965). 
540. See State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969). 
541. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the taking -of guilty pleas, 
see Dunahoo, supra note 364, at 1036-40. 
542. 203 N.W.2d 382 (Iowa 1973). 
543. State v. Bledsoe, 200 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1972). 
544. 201 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 1972). 
545. ld. at 461-62. 
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Moreover defendant's equivocation in admitting his guilt was held in State v. 
Quinn546 to not vitiate the plea. 
All attempts to expand the scope of the interrogation were unsuccessful, 
with the supreme court variously holding that the trial court is not required 
to interrogate defendant regarding each essential element of the crime charged547 
nor as to any plea arrangement. 548 Neither is the trial court required to warn 
defendant as to "the effect of [this] conviction on any future conviction."549 
b. Competency to stand trial. A new twist was put on a trial court's 
jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea from a person whose mental competency 
has been put in issue.550 In State v. Thomas, 551 the supreme court held that 
the Sisco guidelines "require the trial court to personally make a determination 
of the validity of the plea"552 notwithstanding a prior jury's adjudication that 
defendant is competent to stand trial. "[S]uch a determination is a factor to be 
considered, but is not controlling," the supreme court declared. 553 The trial 
court's task is to determine whether there are "circumstances present" that 
demand "further demonstration of defendant's competency before accepting 
the proffered plea."554 Then on appellate review, the supreme court "ex-
amine[s] all the circumstances before the trial court to determine if there then 
existed reasonable doubt as to defendant's competency to plead guilty .... "555 
c. Waiver of defenses. That a guilty plea waives defendant's right to 
reversal of his conviction because of lack of speedy indictment or speedy trial 
was suggested, but not determined, in Foster v. Brewer.556 The supreme 
court volunteered: "It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether petitioner's 
plea of guilty was a waiver of his right to speedy trial, although this issue has 
been decided against defendants in several jurisdictions."557 
B. Trial 
The Iowa supreme court dealt with a variety of significant trial matters 
during the survey period. These included the topical areas of methods of jury 
selection, the scope of examination of witnesses, the admissibility of evidence, 
the propriety of motions for mistrial, and the content of instructions to the jury 
-all of which are discussed in detail below. In related matters not discussed 
in this section, the supreme court: extended the right to jury trial in contempt 
546. 197 N.W.2d 624, 625 (Iowa 1972), quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25, 37 (1969): " ... An individual accused of crinle may voluntarily, knowingly, 
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is un-
willing or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." 
547. State v. Hackett, 201 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1972}. 
548. State v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1972). 
549. ld. at 459. 
550. See IowA CoDE§ 783.1 (1973 ). 
551. 205 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1973). 
552. ld. at 719 (emphasis added). 
553. ld. at 720. 
554. Id. at 719. 
555. ld. at 721. 
556. 197 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1972). 
557. Id. at 367. 
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cases involving multiple counts;558 reiterated that the "right" to a jury trial on 
a simple misdemeanor charge is waived if not demanded before the taking 
of any evidence;559 held that a jury conviction is not invalidated because of 
failure to record defendant's plea of not guilty;560 and continued to uphold a 
liberal policy of permitting the State to amend the charge after the trial has 
begun so long as a new offense is not charged thereby. 561 
1. Jury Selection 
Questions involving various aspects of jury selection562 arose in three Iowa 
supreme court cases. Additionally, a United States Supreme Court decision 
in this area of the law could have some impact on Iowa criminal procedure. 
a. Scope of Voir Dire 
While the Iowa supreme court accords broad discretion to trial courts in 
ruling on questions regarding the scope of voir dire of prospective jurors, 563 
the United States Supreme Court recently held in Ham v. South Carolina564 
that such discretion is curtailed whenever issues with federal constitutional 
overtones are involved. Ham, a black civil-rights activist, claimed that he was 
being framed by the police. Accordingly, he requested trial court to interro-
gate the prospective jurors specifically as to racial prejudice. 565 "[T]he es-
sential fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that under the facts shown by this record the petitioner be per-
mitted to have the [prospective] jurors interrogated on the issue of racial 
bias," the Supreme Court concluded. 566 It was not sufficient for the inter-
rogation to consist of the three statutorily-prescribed general questions (con-
cerning bias, prejudice, or partiality). 567 Nevertheless, the trial court "was 
558. See Sarich v. Havercamp, 203 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 72-82 supra. 
559. State v. Baker, 203 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1973). 
560. "Defendant was not prejudiced by the inadvertent omission of recording a for-
mal not guilty plea. He stood trial without objection and his position was precisely the 
same as if such a plea had been entered. The jury, in fact, was told that the defendant 
had entered a not guilty plea." State v. Lynch, 197 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 1972). 
561. See State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973) (OK for amendment to 
eliminate surplusage which had merely defined the alleged crime more specifically by cit-
ing the definitional section) and State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972) (OK for 
amendment to substitute the name of the correct owner of the property burglarized). 
562. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the jury selection process, 
see Dunahoo, note 364 at 1060-67. 
563. See Elkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 148 N.W.2d 442 (1967). 
564. 93S.Ct.848 (1973). 
565. The two questions about specific racial prejudice defendant sought to be asked 
were the following: 
1. Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and disre-
garding the defendant's race? 
You have no prejudice against negroes? Against black people? You would 
not be influenced by the use of the term "black"? 
93 S. Ct. 848, 849 n.2 (1973). 
566. Id. at 850. 
567. These included: 
1. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence 
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not required to put the [specific racial prejudice] question in any particular 
form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the subject, simply be-
cause requested to do so by petitioner."568 
On the other hand, Ham held further that the trial court's refusal to in-
quire "as to particular bias against beards, after his inquiries as to bias in 
general, does not reach the level of a constitutional violation."569 The Su-
preme Court stated: "Given the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the 
trial judge in conducting voir dire, . . . and our inability to constitutionally 
distinguish possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible sim-
ilar prejudices, we do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were vio-
lated when the trial judge refused to put this question (i.e., "Would you disre-
gard the fact that this defendant wears a beard in deciding this case?"). 570 
b. Segregated Voir Dire 
That segregated voir dire of prospective jurors is not required upon a 
party's request was reaffirmed in State v. Elmore. 511 Discounting defendant's 
claim of excitement and prejudice engendered against him by a "constant bar-
rage"572 of media coverage of his arrest, the trial court nevertheless required 
that counsel not ask prospective jurors to repeat what they had read or heard 
about the case. Rather, they were merely asked if, as a result of any of this 
pretrial publicity, they had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt or inno-
cence. After all, "the real issue was whether any of the prospective jurors 
has formed or expressed an opinion . . . which would prevent them from being 
fair and impartial jurors," the court opined. 573 On the other hand, this ap-
proach strictly leaves it to the individual veniremen to determine if he has been 
prejudiced by the publicity rather than forcing a disclosure on the record as to 
what he heard or read for purposes of challenges for cause by the parties. 574 
c. Challenges for Cause 
The trial courts' "broad discretionary power" in ruling on challenges for 
cause to prospective jurors was upheld in State v. Houston515 even though the 
contested venireman initially indicated some difficulty in being able to return 
of the defendant, Gene Ham? 
2. Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him? 
3. Can you give the State and the defendant a fair and impartial trial? 
93 S. Ct. at 850 n.3. 
568. /d. at 850. 
569. /d. at 851. 
570. ld. at 850 n.3. 
571. 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972). 
572. /d. at 444. 
573. /d. at 446. 
574. Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 440 Pa. 342, 351-52, 269 A.2d 752, 757 (1970): 
"When there is present in a case inflammatory pretrial publicity which creates the pos-
sibility that a trial could be prejudiced, there are exactly those circumstances present 
which require each juror to be questioned out of the hearing of the other jurors." 
575. 206 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 1973). 
120 Drake Law Review [Vol. 23 
a verdict of not guilty. In response to questioning by defense counsel, the 
venireman not only expressed doubt about defendant's innocence if, as hy-
pothesized, defendant's picture was on file with the police but also said it was 
doubtful he could disregard an accomplice's testimony even though not cor-
roborated. Nevertheless, upon further questioning, he "clearly demonstrated 
he could base his decision on the evidence presented and would follow instruc-
tions given by the court."576 
d. Tainted Panel 
State v. Lunsford577 held that it is ipso facto reversible error for de-
fendant to be tried before the same jury panel which was previously dismissed 
and told that defendant, who was named, had pled guilty. Here, defendant 
subsequently changed his mind and his guilty plea was allowed to be with-
drawn, and he was tried two weeks after his abortive guilty plea. Noting the 
general rule that "admission into evidence of a withdrawn plea of guilty de-
prives a defendant of a fair trial," the court reasoned that "[t]he prejudicial 
impact would seem to be nearly as great from such a communication before 
trial as during trial." 578 Conceding that the jurors, like other members of the 
public, could have learned of the guilty plea anyway since it was reported rou-
tinely in the local newspaper, the supreme court opined: "Unlike the situation 
with an ordinary news report, there is little doubt the panel received the mes-
sage, associated it with defendant, and remembered it two weeks later."579 
Holding that the burden was not on defendant to demonstrate prejudice, the 
court reasoned: "The unfortunate sequence of events compels an inference 
of prejudice."580 
2. Examination of Witnesses 
The principal issues concerning the scope of 'examination of witnesses dis-
cussed in this section include: proper serving of notice of State's additional 
witnesses not listed on the indictment, proper limiting of cross examination to 
avoid attacks on the credibility of witnesses through collateral matters, and im-
proper controlling of equivocation and unresponsiveness of witnesses' testimony 
on direct examination. In other cases, the Iowa supreme court: reaffirmed 
that a defendant (consistent with the federal Constitution) can be impeached 
with his prior felony convictions;581 noted that correcting one's own witness' 
576. Id. 
577. 204 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1973). 
578. Id. at 619. 
579. ld. 
580. ld. 
581. Requiring a defendant testifying in his own behalf to state whether he had ever 
before been .convicted of a felony "is not prohibited by any provision of the United 
States Constitution." State v. Hackett, 200 N.W.2d 493, 494 (Iowa 1972) (majority 
opinion confined "to the constitutional issue here posed"). Cf. Justice McCormick's spe-
cial concurring opinion (joined by Justice Mason), in which he suggests there is nothing 
in CoDE § 622.17 conferring upon a cross-examiner "an absolute right in all circumstances 
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testimony does not constitute impeaching his own witness;582 held that a wit-
ness is not disqualified from testifying becuse he may have been granted 
extra-legal immunity from prosecution;583 reaffirmed the trial courts' discretion 
in considering juvenile witnesses competent to testify;584 and even had the oc-
casion to differentiate a "witness" from an accomplice brought into the court-
room merely to be identified. 585 
a. Additional WUnesses. Wide discretion was accorded trial courts in 
determining whether due diligence was followed before granting a motion to 
introduce additional testimony586 by a State's witness whose minutes of testi-
mony were not endorsed on the indictment.587 In State v. Bruno,588 the state 
had delivered a "four-day" notice of additional testimony to the local sheriff 
for service on defendant, and the sheriff ultimately served defendant's counsel 
when he was unable to locate defendant in the county at least four days before 
trial-notwithstanding the Code section 780.10 requirement that the notice be 
served on defendant himself. "To authorize service of the notice of additional 
testimony on the attorney, instead of the accused, it is not essential that the 
latter should have gone beyond the boundaries of the county. It is sufficient 
to inquire of a witness as to prior felony convictions" but rather that the admissibility lies 
within the trial court's sound discretion. 200 N.W.2d at 497. Accordingly, McCormick 
proposed that the trial courts should, in determining the admissibility or exclusion of such 
evidence, consider "the nature of the crime which resulted in the conviction and its re-
moteness in time." /d. at 498. 
582. Impeachment of a witness consists of "showing contradictory statements which 
have been made out of court and which are at variance with the testimony at trial," and 
thus does not arise through attempts to correct "testimonial inconsistency or contradic-
tion." State v. Fields, 199 N.W.2d 144, 146 (Iowa 1972). See also State v. Fetters, 
202 N.W.2d 84, 93 (Iowa 1972): "Relative to the contention the State was attempting to 
impeach its witness, see Rule 607, Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts 
and Magistrates which provides: 'The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any 
party, including the party calling him.'" 
583. A county attorney's extra-legal granting of immunity to defendant's alleged 
confederates "did not disqualify them from testifying or negate their testimony;" rather, 
"an assurance of prosecutorial abstinence, regardless of its effectiveness, goes only to 
credibility of the promisees." State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Iowa 1973). 
584. The determination of the competency of a juvenile witness (here, that of a 
ten-year old prosecutrix in a sodomy case) lies within the trial court's sound discretion. 
State v. Hackett, 200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972). A youthful witness' competency to 
testify "is not refuted by mere testimonial inconsistency, going more to the weight to be 
accorded his evidential statements by the fact finding body.'' State v. Cartee, 202 N.W.2d 
93, 96 (Iowa 1972). 
585. This novel issue arose in State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972), in which 
the brief courtroom appearance of defendant's accomplice solely to be identified by the 
State's witness testifying at the time was asserted by defendant to be a violation of a pre-
trial order of sequestration of witnesses. However, the accomplice did not come within 
the supreme court's following definition of a witness: "[O]ne who gives evidence under 
oath or affirmation, in person or by affidavit or deposition, in any pmceeding in any 
court of justice .... " /d. at 65. 
586. See IowA CoDE§ 780.10 (1973). 
587. In a related development, the supreme court reiterated its position that "[a] 
witness whose name is endorsed on the indictment (or information), and minutes of 
whose testimony are filed, is not limited to those minutes in his actual testimony.'' In 
State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1973), the State's witness testified as to his 
meeting with defendant for buying drugs (as listed in the minutes) as well as to a previ-
ous meeting (not listed in the minutes) at which other drugs were purchased. 
588. 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973). · 
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that the officer, after diligent search, failed to find him,"589 the court ex-
plained. " 'Matters concerning due diligence . . . are so much in the discre-
tion of the trial court that we cannot say the ruling was improper,' "590 the su-
preme court added. 
b. Credibility of Witnesses. That trial courts in Iowa have broad dis-
cretion in "defin(ing] the ambit of permissible cross examination in an attack 
on the credibility of a witness by questions concerning collateral acts of alleged 
misconduct" was reiterated in State v. Crawford. 591 Thus, the Iowa rule rejects 
both extreme minority approaches of "imposing no limitations of any kind upon 
such examination" and "entirely prohibiting such cross-examination;" and in-
stead follows the majority rule under which "repression of possible abuses is 
left to the discretion of the trial judge and questions upon facts relevant to 
character may still be forbidden by him where he believes under the circum-
stances it is unnecessary and undesirable."592 
That this task is delicate is evidenced in the supreme court's observation 
that there is a "dim line where evidence which in an important and material 
way bears directly on the veracity of the witness fades into that evidence which 
has little bearing on that factor but excites prejudice against the witness and 
needlessly besmirches and degrades him."593 However, that the supreme court 
accords great weight to the trial court's actions was evidenced in Crawford, in 
which the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to permit defense coun-
sel to ask a policeman, a state's witness, if he had ever been reprimanded for 
drinking while on duty. Distinguishing In re Thorman's Estate, 594 which up-
held the trial court's requiring a witness to answer in a will contest if he had 
ever been disbarred from law practice, the supreme court noted as one of the 
two "important distinctions": "In Thorman, trial court exercised its discretion 
in p'ermitting the examination. In this case, discretion was exercised in re-
stricting cross-examination. In both cases the ruling was within the area where 
trial court's discretion may permissibly range." Concerning the second dis-
tinction, the supreme court added: "(T]he nature of the disclosed miscon-
duct [in Crawford] would have had little bearing on the issue of the detec-
tive's inclination to be truthful under oath," whereas in Thorman "the question 
was directly relevant to an issue in the case concerning the professional com-
petency of the witness."595 
c. Equivocation. The supreme court held in State v. Smiley596 that it 
was error for the trial court to sustain the prosecutor's objections grounded on 
a defense witness' equivocation in giving answers on direct examination. The 
witness was attempting "to qualify his answer by saying that he believed the 
589. ld. at 886. 
590. ld., quoting State v. Gilliland, 252 Iowa 664, 669, 108 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1961). 
591. 202 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Iowa 1972). 
592. Id. at 104. 
593. ld. at 103. 
594. 162 Iowa 237, 144 N.W.2d 7 (1913). 
595. 202 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Iowa 1972). 
596. 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972). 
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facts to be as he testified,"597 and the supreme court said that such equivoca-
tion merely affects the testimony's probative force rather than its admissibility. 
d. Unresponsiveness. In Smiley, the supreme court also held it error for 
the trial court to sustain the prosecutor's objections that witnesses being exam-
ined by the defense counsel were not responding to the questions asked. The 
supreme court said: "Only the attorney conducting the examination at the 
time may object to the lack of responsiveness on the part of a witness. Such 
objection is never available to opposing counsel."598 
3. Evidence 
The Iowa supreme court dealt with a wide variety of issues concerning 
admissibility of evidence599 during the survey period. The major categorks 
of issues, which are discussed in detail below, included: hearsay, opinion 
evidence, relevancy of evidence, and reputation evidence. In other cases, the 
supreme court: reversed two convictions based solely upon circumstantial evi-
dence and raising nothing more than suspicion of defendant's guilt;600 con-
firmed an unbroken chain of custody of evidence in several cases notwith-
standing the fact that not everyone with access to the seized exhibit testified 
at trial, where, however, there was unlikelihood of tampering;601 discussed the 
597. Jd. at 731. 
598. ld. 
599. As to evidentiary rules concerning the trial on habitual criminal charges, see 
text accompanying notes 807-12 infra. 
600. See State v. Jellema, 206 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1973) (breaking and entering) and 
State v. Streit, 205 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1973) (arson). See generally State v. Johnson, 
196 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Iowa 1972): Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, it 
must be "so convincing as to exclude a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the 
offense charged." 
See also State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 1972): "Unless defendant's 
motion for directed verdict is renewed at the close of all evidence, it is deemed waived," 
notwithstanding the motion being made (and overruled) at the close of the State's case. 
601. See State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972) (only the chemist testified out 
of the three persons with access to laboratory where drug analysis was made; a second 
police officer with a key to the evidence-being-held-for-trial locker testified); State v. 
Burton, 201 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1972) (prosecutor, to whom exhibit was delivered a few 
days before trial, did not testify); State v. Grady, 201 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972) (front seat 
passenger in informer's car in which drug-buy exhibit is stashed on floor of back seat did 
not testify); and State v. Lunsford, 204 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1973) no testimony by in-
formant who arranged the purchase by an undercover agent and subsequent to seller's 
arrest drove by himself, with marijuana exhibit in the car, briefly to police station to get 
more officers). But see State v. Bruno, 204 N. W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973) (chain of custody 
of evidence defect waived by defendant's failure to object until after the witness' testi-
mony). 
As to the requisite foundation for a chain of custody of substances such as mari-
juana, which are ne.ither hard objects nor readily identifiable articles, see State- v. Luns-
ford, 204 N.W.2d 613,616-17 (Iowa 1973): 
Marijuana is susceptible to tampering or substitution. . . . A more elabo-
rate foundation to establish identification is therefore required than as to readily 
identifiable articles. . . . 
Determination of the sufficiency of identification is made by the trial 
judge. "Factors to be considered in making this determination include the na-
ture of the article, the circumstances surrounding the [nature] and custody of 
it, and the likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it. . . . " 
It is not essential for admissibility that the State negative the possibility of 
tampering or substitution absolutely. It is sufficient to establish that is reason-
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nature of the other evidence necessary to corrorborate an out-of-court con-
fession;602 held that a witness' failure to identify defendant in a lineup does 
not render inadmissible in-court identification;603 and upheld the introduction 
of portions of defendant's first-trial testimony at his retrial despite a contention 
that defendant's original testimony was impelled by the state's use of illegally-
seized evidence. 604 On procedural matters, the supreme court: approved of 
the taking of judicial notice of the alcoholic content of beer sold in lowa;605 
of departmental rules of state agencies;606 and of federal legislation and regu-
lations;607 upheld reopening of the record after the State had rested its case 
without admitting the contraband exhibit into evidence;608 reaffirmed that a 
party whose pretrial motion in limine was overruled must make his record at 
ably probable tampering or substitution did not occur. . . . Contrary specula-
tion affects the weight of the evidence but not its admissibility. . . . 
602. The "other evidence" or other proof besides defendant's confession (unless made 
in open court) required under CoDE § 782.7 to warrant a conviction "need not per se, 
and independent of a confession, be sufficient to prove commission of the crime charged 
beyond a reasonable doubt. It will suffice if, when considered with the confession, it 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the offense was committed by someone." (Here, 
the "other proof" in prosecution for arson of personal property (a car) consisted of the 
car being "unexpectedly found in a remote wooded area where it would not normally be, 
burned almost beyond identification, with the two front wheels missing."). State v. 
Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104, 108-09 (Iowa 1972). 
603. "The question of line-up procedures was brought up only on cross-examination 
as defendant sought to show the witnesses had previously been unable to identify de-
fendant. This, of course, was entirely proper and might well have destroyed the in-court 
identification, but it went only to the weight of the testimony." State v. Masters 196 
N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1972), accord State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972). 
604. The State may introduce portions of defendant's first-trial testimony at a re-
trial notwithstanding defendant's original conviction being reversed because of introduction 
of illegally-seized evidence-where defendant's first-trial testimony was designed to prove 
another point (i.e., that someone else was driving the car) and the illegally-seized evi-
dence went to proof of another point in this O.M.V.U.I. case (i.e., that defendant was 
intoxicated). Thus, the impellation rule of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968) 
was deemed inapplicable. State v. Boner, 203 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1972). 
605. "[l]t was permissible to take judicial notice of the fact that by law ... beer 
sold in this state has an alcoholic content of four percent by weight." State v. Boner, 
203 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1972). 
606. "Courts may . . . take judicial notice of . . . departmental rules and regulations 
adopted pursuant to statutory authority .... " State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 272 
(Iowa 1972). 
607. "The court properly took judicial notice of the Federal Drug Act and regulations 
promulgated pursuant to the act to further define the term 'hallucinogenic drug.' " State 
v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879, 888 (Iowa 1973). 
608. "Trial courts have discretion to permit a party to reopen the record and intro-
duce evidence which was previously omitted." (In this prosecution for sale of hashish, the 
State introduced evidence of the facts of the case but not the hashish itself. Mter the 
State rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict. Over defendant's objection, the 
record was then reopened for introduction of the hashish into evidence. Mfirming, the 
Supreme Court noted the remarkable ·similarity to that in United States v. Keine, 424 F.2d 
39 (lOth Cir. 1970), where there was expert testimony identifying the drug, an unbroken 
chain of custody of evidence, testimony concerning the drug, and jury viewing of the drug-
but failure to admit drug via mere inadvertence. The supreme court added: "[W]e do not 
intimate that the State had to introduce the hashish in order to make a prima facie case." 
State v. Moreland, 201 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Iowa 1972); accord State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 
293, 296 (Iowa 1972): "The testimony introduced in this case after reopening was supple-
mental to and clarified previous evidence. It could arguably be deemed directed to an 
oversight, if not a mistake." Here, the State was allowed to reopen to introduce further 
evidence on the issue of the car title, in this prosecution for false drawing and uttering. 
State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Iowa 1972). 
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trial on that evidentiary point;609 discussed the effect of admitting by stipula-
tion a State criminalistics laboratory report;610 and dealt with a host of suffi-
ciency of, 611 as well as timeliness of, 612 objections to, 613 and curative meas-
ures for, 614 asserted errors in admitting or excluding evidence.615 
a. Hearsay. 616 An O.M.V.U.I. conviction was reversed in State v. 
609. ''The overruling of the motion in limine, even though wrong, is not reversible 
error. Relief must be predicated on a record made during trial when the objectionable 
evidence is sought to be introduced." No objection was made at trial and thus there 
was no record for appeal. (The rule is different where the motion is granted, thus not 
requiring a subsequent record by opponent.). State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 
(Iowa 1972) (emphasis added). See also State v. Tieman, 206 N.W.2d 898, 899 (Iowa 
1973) (State's witness' violation of pretrial order in limine is not prejudicial to defendant 
where the trial court had erred in granting the order, i.e., that the controverted evidence 
was admissible). 
610. Defendant's stipulation "to introduction of the State criminalistics laboratory re-
port which identified the substance as marijuana . . . eliminated any need to resort to 
statutory definition" on the question of identification of the substance. State v. Boose, 
202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972). 
611. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Iowa 1972) (Objection to 
witness' proferred testimony on the basis of a "no proper foundation, irrelevant and im-
material objection" is insufficient and "actually presents nothing for review") and State 
v. Binkley, 201 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1972) (Objection phrased "Yes, I would have 
some objection to it" was "so unspecific trial court did not err in overturning it"); 
accord State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 1973) ("One attempting to exclude 
evidence, whether the attempted exclusion is by objection or motion, has a duty to indi-
cate the specific grounds to the court so as to alert him to the question raised and enable 
opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures to remedy the defect, if possible"). 
612. "The record does not preserve the claim since the objection was not made until 
after answer, no reason for delay appears and no motion to strike was made." State v. 
Taylor, 201 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 1972). 
613. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 109-10 (Iowa 1973) ("A failure to 
assert promptly and specifically an objection to an offer of evidence at the time the offer 
is made is a waiver upon appeal of any ground of complaint against its admission"); 
State v. Schurman, 205 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1973) ("Relevant evidence admitted 
without proper objection, and not excluded upon a motion to strike, has the same effect 
as though it were admissible, even though it might have been excluded under the rules 
of evidence"); and State v. Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972) ("The right to sup-
press was waived in this case because the evidence was received without objection and 
the motion was made long after its ground became apparent"). 
However, State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1973) makes it clear that a prior 
objection in chambers obviates the necessity for objection (in the jury's presence) when 
the objectionable evidence or testimony is introduced. Here, defendant already had made 
clear his position (by way of sufficient objection in chambers) that any testimony by 
third persons as to alleged statements made by his companion would be inadmissible 
hearsay and "[t]he trial court by overruling defendant's objection made it abundantly 
clear that any similar objections to like evidence would be overruled." Thus, "[o]nce a 
proper objection has been urged and overruled, counsel is not required to make further 
objections to preserve his right on appeal when a question is asked raising the same issue 
subsequently in the course of trial." Id. at 841. 
614. "[A] motion to strike or withdraw evidence is not timely where it comes 
without prior objection and the grounds of such motion should have been apparent before 
it was made." State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Iowa 1973): accord State v. 
Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972). · · · 
615. On the specific subject of waiver in the Iowa criminal trial process, see Sullins, 
Preservation of Error: Providing a Basis for Appellate Review, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 435 
(1973). See generally State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Iowa 1972): "Ordi-
narily, matters not raised in the trial court, including constitutional questions, cannot be 
effectively asserted the first time on appeal. Even more appurtenant, the constitutionality 
of a statute may not be considered on appeal where the question was not raised in the 
lower court." Accord State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1972). 
616. The latest definition of hearsay used by the Iowa supreme court is that in rule 
801, Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, viz. "'Hear-
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Miller611 because of the improper admissibility of hearsay evidence. 618 De-
fendant and his companion Fallstone had both been heavily drinking together 
before their one-car accident which was witnessed by no one. The central 
issue on appeal was sufficiency of competent evidence as to defendant being 
the driver. At the scene of the accident, neither defendant nor Fallstone ad-
mitted being the driver. A city police officer testified that he was present dur-
ing a highway patrolman's subsequent interrogation of Fallstone at the hos-
pital, stating: "I was in the room when Patrolman North talked to him, 
and asked him if Cal [defendant] was driving the vehicle, and he said, 
'Yes.' " 619 Fallstone did not testify, however, thus making the statement hear-
say. Applying Gibbs v. Wilmeth620 for "the controlling standards in testing 
admissibility of res gestae statements," the supreme court "conclude[d] Fall-
stone's statement at the hospital does not qualify as res gestae."621 There-
fore, this testimony was admitted improperly. 
Another error concerning hearsay was committed in Miller when the high-
way patrolman was permitted to testify he knew defendant was driving at the 
time of the accident. The supreme court, noting that the patrolman had also 
testified that he had not witnessed the accident himself and that neither de-
fendant nor Miller confessed at the accident scene, concluded: "It is obvious 
the witness did not have personal knowledge of the matter about which he was 
questioned. The answer must of necessity have depended on what some third 
party [i.e., Fallstone] had told the witness."622 
A third asserted instance of hearsay evidence was denied by the supreme 
court in Miller, however. The issue arose when the highway patrolman was 
permitted on direct examination to testify as to the following regarding a con-
versation he allegedly had with defendant: "As night went on, I asked him-
that his partner had said that he had been driving, . . . and he said, 'Yeah, 
what about it,' or something to this effect."623 Recognizing a distinction "be-
tween hearsay and nonhearsay utterances of a declarant not offered as a wit-
ness for cross-examination when such assertions are offered by a testifying wit-
ness," the supreme court said the test was whether the instant testimony "was 
being offered . . . for the purpose of showing the truth of that statement or 
was it being offered merely as reporting a fact that an utterance had been made 
say' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." See State v. 
Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 924 
(Iowa 1972). Cf. State v. Kelsey, supra: "In substance, the hearsay rule does not pre-
vent a witness from testifying only as to what has been heard, being rather a restriction 
on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements." I d. 
617. 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1972). 
618. Cf. State v. Schurman, 205 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1973) (hearsay evidence 
which was not objected to at time of its admission remains in the record "and alone or 
in part may support a verdict or finding"). 
619. 204 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Iowa 1972). 
620. See Gibbs v. Wilmeth, 261 Iowa 1015, 1024-25, 157 N.W.2d 93, 98-99 (1968). 
621. 204 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 1972). 
622. Id. at 842. 
· 623. Id. 
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to [the highway patrolman], a matter of which he had personal knowledge."624 
The supreme court characterized it as being within the latter classification and 
concluded therefore that the statement "his partner said he had been drink-
ing" was not hearsay. In a related fourth hearsay aspect of this case, the su-
preme court agreed that the highway patrolman's recounting of defendant's re-
sponse ("Yeah, what about it") was not hearsay. "[D]efendant's statements 
offered against him are not hearsay on the theory their admissibility in evidence 
is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions 
of the hearsay rule,"625 the supreme court pointed out. 
i. Res Gestae Exception. As noted above, the supreme court held in 
State v. Miller626 that the statements of the defendant's accomplice made while 
he was being questioned by a highway patrolman "sometime later at the hos-
pital"627 did not come within the res gestae exception. By way of contrast, 
the supreme court, noting that "[t]he trend is to extend, rather than to narrow, 
the res gestae doctrine," upheld the application of the res gestae exception 
in State v. Crawford. 628 In the latter case, the statements were made by the 
13-year old rape prosecutrix upon being driven by her attacker back to near 
her home and complaining of the attack upon entering her house. Her state-
ments, testified to by her sister, met the res gestae admissibility standards, viz. 
"(1) spontaneity, and (2) such closeness of connection with the transaction 
as to exclude any presumption of fabrication." 629 
ii. Tacit Admissions. In State v. Kelsey,630 the supreme court held 
that "evidential use of 'tacit admissions' by an accused offends the proscription 
included in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution against self-
incrimination and is therefore no longer permissible in criminal trials within 
this jurisdiction."631 The instant admission-through-silence arose in testimony 
by a State's witness as to a conversation in which one of defendant's accom-
plices told a third person, in defendant's immediate presence and without him 
protesting, that they had robbed and shot a man. The supreme court con-
cluded that this testimony "was for the purpose of proving the facts, i.e., com-
mission of the robbery attendant murder of a man by Kelsey and his three 
accomplices. Surely it was not testimonially offered merely to prove the utter-
ance was made in [the State's witness'] presence."632 Nevertheless, applying 
the harmless error rule, the conviction was upheld since "[a] review of the 
624. ld. at 843. 
625. ld. at 842. 
626. 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1972). 
627. Id. at 840. 
628. 202 N.W.2d 99, 101 (Iowa 1972). 
629. Id. 
630. 201 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1972). 
631. I d. at 927. See also State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Iowa 1973) 
(Corroboration of an accomplice's testimony "may come from defendant himself in the 
way of his admissions, declarations, conduct, writings or other documentary evidence. 
Of course, tacit admissions by an accused may not be relied on in this connection"). 
632. Jd. at 924. 
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record fairly shrieks the guilt of this defendant,"633 th'e supreme court con-
cluded. 
b. Opinion Evidence. On the subject of opinion evidence, the supreme 
court noted in State v. Armstrong634 that the best evidence rule does not pre-
vent a witness from expressing his opinion as to whether an unlicensed person 
could effect a valid sale of insurance under existing law since "this witness 
was not called upon to prove existence or content of any statute or regula-
tion."635 Similarly, in State v. Taylor636 the court, upholding admissibility of 
a fingerprint identification expert's testimony regarding comparison of the fin-
gerprint found at the crime scene and defendant's prints, reiterated: "Where, 
as here, inquiry is directed to a proper subject of expert testimony, an objec-
tion that it invades the province of the jury is invalid."637 
An element of mutuality regarding admissibility of nonexpert state of 
mind evidence was added in State v. Milliken,638 in which sustaining of the 
State's objections to defendant's proferred evidence after the State had admit-
ted an officer's opinion evidence on this point was determined to be an abuse 
of discretion. The officer had expressed his opinion in this O.M.V.U.I. case 
that there was danger of collision of defendant's car with an oncoming truck. 
Testifying in his own behalf, defendant attempted to counter the officer's opin-
ion testimony by giving his own opinion on the sanie question, but the trial 
court sustained the State's "calling for opinion and conclusion" objection. Not-
ing that the admission of opinion evidence, including that relating to nonexpert 
state of mind, rests largely in the trial court's discretion which nevertheless 
must be exercised fairly and impartially, the supreme court implied that a lay 
witness like defendant was entitled to give such an opinion and added that 
"since officer Sunken's opinion evidence was initially admitted it fairly follows 
defendant's attempt to counter same should have been allowed."639 
c. Relevancy. As already discussed, two cases were reversed because 
of improper ·exclusion of defendant's proffered evidence on the grounds of rele-
vancy:640 viz. evidence of a statutory rape prosecutrix's other promiscuous 
acts in an attempt to show someone else was her attacker641 and evidence of 
restitution made in a prosecution for false drawing and uttering of a check in 
633. ld. at 927. 
634. 203 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1972). 
635. ld. at 272. 
636. 201 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1972). 
637. ld. at 727. 
638. 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973). 
639. ld. at 598. 
640. "Relevancy means the logical relation between the proposed evidence and a fact 
to be established. Evidence must generally have probative value to be relevant. . . . 
We have often held the question of relevancy and materiality of evidence rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1972) 
(officer's testimony "had some probative value on the question of a separation of identi-
ties as between defendant and [one] Chin"). 
641. State v. McDaniel, 204 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1973), as discussed in text accom-
panying notes 321-22 supra. 
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order to show lack of intent to defraud. 642 Likewise, in State v. Smiley, 643 
the trial court abused its discretion in excluding for remoteness certain evidence 
proffered by defendant. Defense counsel (for the tavern proprietors being 
prosecuted for assault and battery) had sought to explore the drinking earlier 
that evening by gang members who started the original altercation with another 
patron. Conceding that it is within a trial court's sound judicial discretion 
"to exclude relevant evidence too remote to be material or have any probative 
value," the supreme court mused that "it scarcely qualifies as sound discretion 
to exclude 'evidence of the immediate drinking experience of the participants 
of a brawl giving rise to a criminal charge."644 
On the other hand, the supreme court upheld the admissibility of the 
State's evidence, over the respective defendant's objections, in five other cases. 
Two of these involved introduction of certain photographs, 645 and another 
the results of experimental evidence.646 Moreover, in State v. Lynch,641 
the objectionable testimony "was based on the agent's experience in narcotics 
investigations and described in some detail the manner in which marijuana 
is measured out and packaged for resale purposes," which the supreme court 
believed was a relevant description from which "the jury could properly find 
the marijuana in defendant's possession was intended for sale."648 Similarly, 
it was left within the trial court's discretion in State v. Kimbal/649 to admit into 
evidence bank records of defendant's other accounts besides the account on 
which the instant bad check was written in this prosecution for falsely uttering 
a check. Because the State had to prove defendant's fraudulent intent, in-
cluding lack of arrangement with said bank, its proof that "defendant did not 
have funds in either of the accounts to pay the check negatived any conten-
tion that the check was mistakenly drawn on the wrong account and established 
that defendant did not have 'funds with such bank' sufficient to pay the 
check,"650 the supreme court reasoned. 
642. State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 135-39 supra. But see State v. Graham, 203 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1973) (within 
trial court's discretion to exclude defense-profferred testimony concerning out-of-court 
statements allegedly made by defendant's acquaintance that she intended to comply with a 
child custody decree, in this prosecution for interference with administration of justice 
arising out of defendant's thwarting of execution of that decree), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 165-71 supra. 
643. 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972). 
644. Id. at 731. 
645. See State v. Youngbear, 202 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972) (The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in permitting admission of numerous photographs which may have 
been merely cumulative) and State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973) (The trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting admission into evidence of photographs of 
decedent's fatal head wound). 
646. "Admissibility of experimental evidence rests within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." State v. Lunsford, 204 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1973) (discretion not 
abused in permitting experimental evidence as to driving time from scene of arrest to police 
station in order to minimize speculation of tampering with contraband exhibit seized 
from defendant). 
647. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972). 
648. Jd. at 190. 
649. 203 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1972). 
650. ld. at 299. 
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By way of contrast, the supreme court noted in State v. Hinsey 651 that it 
is improper for the trial court to allow the State to introduce into evidence de-
fendant's statements of hatred toward police which were made at the time of 
his arrest. Noting that the State attempted to justify such evidence as "show-
[ing] defendant's state of mind," the supreme court granted as much for what 
the comments showed but added that this was "on a matter totally irrelevant to 
the charge for which he was being tried."652 "Defendant's general hatred of 
policemen, standing alone, could hardly be relevant evidence in his trial for 
robbing and shooting a storekeeper,"653 the supreme court concluded. Never-
theless, the conviction was upheld notwithstanding this error because of de-
fendant's failure to object to this testimony when it was offered at trial, thus 
leaving no record to be reviewed. 654 
d. Reputation evidence. Reversible error was committed in State v. 
Sill655 by the admission of "truth and veracity reputation testimony over proper 
objection when the foundation requirements of Hobbs656 were not met."657 
Here, three State rebuttal witnesses testified defendant had a bad reputation 
for truth and veracity, notwithstanding the fact that they "did not say whether 
there were in fact comments about his reputation for truth and veracity, nor 
how many, their type, place, time, duration or representative nature."568 Thus, 
the foundation requirements cannot be weaker where, as here, evidence goes 
to credibility than where, as in Hobbs, the evidence went to probability or 
non-probability of guilt. 6 59 
4. Mistrial 
The principal cases concerning motions for mistrial involved constitu-
tionally-proscribed evidence, evidence of other crimes, the bounds of jury ar-
guments, and in-trial interrogation of jurors concerning media publicity, all of 
which are discussed in detail below. In other cases, the supreme court af-
651. 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972). 
652. ld. at 817. 
653. ld. 
654. For a discussion of the related area of relevancy of evidence as it concerns 
admissibility of evidence of other crimes, see text accompanying notes 668-80 infra. 
655. 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972). 
656. See State v. Hobbs, 172 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Iowa 1972): 
When introducing reputation evidence as a means of proving defendant's 
character strict foundation requirements must be met. Several evidentiary facts 
must be established before a witness may testify as to what he has heard con-
cerning defendant's reputation. These include: ( 1) The background, occupation, 
residence, etc., of the character witness, (2) His familiarity and ability to iden-
tify the party whose general reputation was the subject of comment, (3) Whether 
there have in fact been comments concerning the party's reputation for a given 
trait, ( 4) The exact place of these comments, (5) The generality of these com-
ments, many or few in number, (6) Whether from a limited group or class as 
opposed to a general cross-section of the community, (7) When and how long 
a period of time the comments have been made. 
657. 199 N.W.2d at 49. 
658. Id. 
659. See also State v. Crawford, 202 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 428-31 supra. 
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firmed the trial courts' refusals to declare mistrials in the following situations: 
a prosecutor's bringing of several boxes with FBI markings into the court-
room temporarily and intermingling these with other exhibits which were ad-
mitted into evidence;660 coaching of a witness (the ten-year old prosecutrix 
in a sodomy prosecution) by a spectator;661 and bringing defendant's alleged 
accomplice attired in non-distinctive prison garb into the courtroom for identi-
fication purposes. 6 62 
a. Constitutionally-Proscribed Evidence. The general rule as to 
whether interjection into the trial of prejudicial, inadmissible evidence requires 
a mistrial or whether the problem can be cured through the standard strike-
and-admonition approach is as follows: "If evidence is improperly admitted 
but is later withdrawn with a cautionary statement to the jury to disregard it, 
there is no error except in extreme instances where the prejudicial effect 
would probably remain to influence the verdict despite its exclusion."663 
However, in State v. Ware, 664 the supreme court interpreted Chapman v. Cali-
fornia665 as "clearly indicat[ing] certain types of constitutional error require 
an automatic reversal"-including "involuntary confession, right to counsel 
and an impartial presiding judge."666 Accordingly, it held that "the constitu-
tionally proscribed evidential use of . . . defendant's confession or admission 
was [not] dispelled by giving to the jury an oral in-course-of-trial ejaculatory 
instruction."667 The instant mistrial situation arose when a violation of de-
fendant's Miranda rights first came to light upon cross examination of a po-
lice officer following prior introduction of defendant's tainted confession into 
evidence. 668 
b. Evidence of Other Crimes. During the survey p'eriod, two of the 
three cases involving introduction of other crimes into evidence669 were re-
660. State v. Peterson, 196 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1972). 
661. State v. Hackett, 197 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Iowa 1972): Even if it could be 
argued that the trial court had a duty to take some sort of curative action after it had 
observed or had its attention called to the fact that a spectator was coaching a witness, 
much must, of necessity, be left to the sound discretion of the trial court since it had 
the opportunity to see and hear everything that transpired. Such discretion will not be 
disturbed unless it clearly appears it has been abused. 
662. The prisoner was not attired in "any readily discernible prison garb. Neither 
does the record disclose presence of improper official escort or custodial restraint of 
Kelsey in the courtroom." State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 1972). 
663. See State v. Coffee, 182 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1970); accord State v. Osborn, 
200 N.W.2d 798, 807-08 (Iowa 1972) (Striking-and-admonition was sufficient where 
sheriff was asked on cross-examination how he could be so sure of his identification and 
he answered "I have had him in custody on prior occasions," because this "did not imply 
that [defendant] had ever been tried, convicted or even charged with any crime or in any 
way intimate defe.ndant was of bad character or guilty of prior criminal conduct."). 
664. 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1973). 
665. 386 u.s. 18 (1967). 
666. 205 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Iowa 1973). 
667. ld. 
668. Ware's confession was prompted by the arresting officers following up their giv-
ing of the Miranda rights [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] with the statement 
that it would go easier on him if he wanted to tell them anything. This " 'not so subtle' 
promissory leniency expressed by [the officers] induced the then frightened defendant to 
incriminate himself," the supreme court opined. ld. at 703. 
669. See also State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798, 807-08 (Iowa 1972) (Sheriffs testi-
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versed because the purpose for introducing such evidence did not come within 
any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule barring such evidence. 670 
In State v. Wright, 611 the State persistently interjected allusions to de-
fendant's incestuous behavior with his own daughter into the instant prosecu-
tion for statutory rape of his step-daughter, notwithstanding the trial court's 
repeated sustaining of defendant's objections. Reversing the conviction be-
cause of the introduction of evidence of these other crimes without their com-
ing within any of the recognized exceptions, the supreme court rejected de-
fendant's twin contentions that this evidence was being offered as corrobo-
ration as well as being part of an integral transaction. That evidence of a 
crime other than the one being prosecuted is offered as "corroboration" of 
that crime "is not a recognized exception permitting its use."672 Such evi-
dence "would be corroboration only in the sense of proving defendant's alleged 
criminal character and thus that he was more likely to have committed the 
crime. This is exactly why it may not be introduced. . . . A defendant 
must be convicted only if it is proved he committed the offense charged and 
not because he is a bad man," th'e supreme court reiterated. 673 The court 
added that the integral transaction exception to the general rule barring proof 
of other crimes in the instant prosecution "is applicable only where the sepa-
rate offenses are so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish 
the other."674 Generally, on a charge of statutory rape, as in the instant case, 
"evidence of lascivious conduct with girls other than prosecutrix is inadmissi-
ble unless essential to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its 
immediate context of happenings near in time and place." Because the State 
had "failed utterly to prove that relationship here," the conviction was re-
versed. 675 In what appears to be somewhat of a new stance, th'e court added, 
however, that "even if the evidence could have been brought within some 
recognized exception, [the] trial court had discretion to exclude it."676 
mony that he had had defendant "in custody on prior occasions" did not require a mistrial 
since the statement "did not tend to put defendant's character in issue since it did not 
imply that [defendant] had ever been tried, convicted or even charged" (and it was 
stricken); however, this type of testimony is not approved of). 
See generally State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972) (error for State to 
introduce into evidence defendant's statements of hatred toward police since "[d]efend-
ant's general hatred of policemen, standing alone, could hardly be relevant evidence in 
his trial for robbing and shooting a storekeeper;" however, error not preserved here by 
timely and sufficient objection at trial). 
670. "We have long held, subject to well-circumscribed exceptions, that the State can-
not prove against a defendant any crime for which he is not being tried, either as a foun-
dation for separate punishment or as aiding the proof in the case being tried." State v. 
Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 1972). See also State v. Wright, 191 N.W.2d 638, 
639 (Iowa 1971) listing the five exceptions as permitting proof of: (1) motive, (2) in-
tent, ( 3) absence of mistake or intent, ( 4) a common scheme with two or more crimes 
so related in an integral transaction that proof of one tends to prove the other, and 
(5) identity of the accused. 
671. 203 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1972). 
672. Id. at 250. 
673. Id. 
674. Id. at 251. 
675. Id. 
676. Id. This leeway of discretion empowers the judge to exclude the other-crimes 
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In State v. Davis, 677 a conviction for manslaughter arising out of a traffic 
death was reversed because the State's case brought out at trial that defend-
ant did not have a valid driver's license at the tinie of the accident. Because 
the subject was not pursued further, it did not appear whether his license "had 
expired or was invalid for other reasons."678 This evidence was inadmissible 
for lack of relevancy "in the absence of a showing of a causal relationship 
between the invalid license and the collision,"679 the supreme court opined. It 
concluded a new trial was required in light of this evidence revealing a sepa-
rate offense without the above showing of relevancy or connection to the crime 
being instantly prosecuted. 
On the other hand, State v. Fetters680 held that evidence of other break-
ings and enterings involving thefts in which defendant participated both be-
fore and after the one being instantly prosecuted was admissible for the State 
to establish the specific felonious intent of breaking and entering with intent 
to commit larceny. Moreover, the State could elect to introduce this evidence 
even though defendant attempted to remove his intent as an issue through 
his admission as a witness. 68 1 
c. Jury Arguments. Although it generally affords trial courts wide lati-
tude in ruling on motions for a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct 
in the making of improper remarks682 during jury arguments, the supreme 
court nevertheless determined in State v. Vickroy 683 that the court erred in re-
fusing to order a mistrial for prejudicial remarks during both the opening and 
closing arguments. In his opening argument, the prosecutor told the jury he 
knew defendant was guilty. He thus "improperly commissioned himself an ex-
pert witness, then exceeded his prerogative as such by expressing an imper-
missible opinion as to defendant's guilt. " 684 Th'en, on closing argument, he 
called upon the jurors "to place themselves and members of their families in 
a hypothetical position of peril created by a drunken, car operating defend-
ant."685 He thus undertook "to inflame the fears, passion and prejudice of the 
jury as against defendant,"686 the supreme court determined. Observing that 
"[p]rejudice flowing therefrom is self-evident,"687 the supreme court appears 
to have dictated that such arguments as the above necessitate a mistrial rather 
evidence, even when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its proba-
tive value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir such passion in 
the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the 
crime on trial. !d., quoting C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 453-54 (2d ed. 1972). 
677. 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972). 
678. !d. at 894. 
679. /d. 
680. 202 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1972). 
681. ld. at 91. 
682. On the somewhat related matter of the propriety of remarks made by the judge 
during trial and in the jury's presence, see State v. Taylor, 201 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1972). 
683. 205 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1973). 
684. ld. at 751. 
685. /d. 
686. /d. 
687. Id. 
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than a mere strike-and-admonition "remedy" (which was not even done 
here). 688 
On the other hand, the prosecutor's impropriety by being argum'entative 
in his opening argument in State v. Schiernbeck689 was effectively cured by the 
trial court's admonition for the jury to disregard the argumentative portion. 
Here, the prosecutor "argued" that since defendant was the only one in the 
motel that night then the person who entered the motel and was robbed had 
to have been robbed by defendant. The supreme court believed that the 
trial court acted "within its permissible range of discretion in finding the 
county attorney's statements did not deprive defendant of a fair trial."690 
d. Publicity and Jury Interrogation. A new policy for dealing with the 
prejudicial effect of during-trial publicity was established in State v. Big-
ley.691 Until Bigley, the trial court could decide, in its discretion, whether or 
not to interrogate jurors concerning their knowledge of inflammatory media 
accounts of the trial. In Bigley, the trial court refused to do so, relying in-
stead on its earlier giving of the standard admonition that jurors are not to read 
(or listen to) news accounts of the trial. Determining that defendant had 
failed to demonstrate prejudice, the supreme court affirmed the conviction and 
thus gave only prospective application to the following new procedural rule. 
In all trials started after November 15, 1972, the procedure when an issue 
arises during trial about possible jury exposure to potentially prejudicial material 
going beyond the record has been as follows: "[T]he court may on its own 
motion or shall on motion of either party question each juror, out of the pres-
ence of the others, about his exposure to that material."692 This examination 
"shall take place in the presence of counsel, and an accurate record of the ·ex-
amination shall be kept."693 The A.B.A. Standards Relating to Fair Trial and 
Free Press694 shall serve as guidelines for excusing a juror challenged for ex-
posure to prejudicial publicity. 
5. Instructions 
The Iowa supreme court dealt with a wide range of issues concerning jury 
instructions during the survey period. These are discussed below under the 
general headings of preservation of the record for appellate review, substan-
688. See also State v. Moreland, 201 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1972) (Improper in closing 
argument for the prosecutor, in rebuttal, to say one of the reasons that the informant had 
not testified was that if an informant testifies then his life might be imperilled-where 
there was no evidence introduced as to danger to this particular informant's life and so 
the court was right in promptly directing the jury to disregard that part of the argument 
thus obviating a mistrial; moreover, this argument was in rebuttal and "[d]efense counsel 
should certainly have anticipated a strong response from the prosecutor."). 
689. 203 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1973). 
690. ld. at 548. 
691. 202 N.W.2d 56 (Iowa 1972). 
692. Id. at 58. 
693. ld. 
694. A.B.A. Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Fair 
Trial and Free Press§ 3.4(b). 
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tive content of the instructions given, propriety of giving certain instructions, 
and propriety of failing to give certain instructions. 
a. Preservation of the Record for Appellate Review. Defense counsel 
fr'equently failed to make a proper record for appellate review of jury instruc-
tions.695 
Requisites for the sufficiency of objections timely made were discussed 
in two cases. In State v. Y oungbear, 696 the supreme court pointed out that 
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 196 "requiring that objections to instructions set 
out the grounds for complaint governs in criminal cases as well as civil. . . . 
Except that the time for making such objections is enlarged by section 787.3, 
this condition applies whether instructions are challenged by motion for new 
trial or by objections made during trial."697 The instant objection asserted 
that the instruction "did not embody the law applicable to this case and clearly 
misled the jury and prejudiced this defendant."698 "Such a blanket objec-
tion without specifying the nature of the claimed defects present[ed] no is-
sue" for the supreme court to consider.699 The court added that while the 
Code700 permits a defendant to postpone making his objections until filing a 
motion for a new trial, "he is not thereby relieved of the duty to state what he 
complains of."701 Similarly, the defense counsel stated in his objection in State 
v. Buchanan702 that he "believe[d] that is no longer the law."703 "This is 
tantamount to saying that the instruction does not state the law, which is insuf-
ficiently specific to constitute a basis for error," the supreme court con-
cluded.704 The supreme court also made it clear in Buchanan that an objec-
tion made at trial cannot be amplified subsequently in the motion for new trial. 
"This ground of the motion must stand or fall on the exception taken at trial, 
for if a defendant undertakes to except the instructions at trial he must rest on 
those exceptions [and he thus] cannot in a post-verdict motion amplify them 
or add new ones," the supreme court ruled. 705 
Timeliness in making objections was at issue in several cases that dealt 
with exceptions to the rule that "[i]n a criminal case it is permissible to post-
pone objections to instructions until after trial and to make them a basis for 
a new trial."706 The exceptions are: "A party may waive the right ... or 
if the instruction was correct as given but not as explicit as a party may 
have desired, he must request an additional instruction before the jury is 
695. See generally, Sullins, Preservation of Error: Providing a Basis for Appellate 
Review, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 435,469-73 (1973). 
696. 202 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972). 
697. Id. at 72. 
698. Id. 
699. Id. 
700. See IowA CODE§§ 787.3(5), (7) (1973). 
701. 202 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1972). 
702. 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973). 
703. Id. at 787. 
704. Id. 
705. Jd. 
706. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 196 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1972). 
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charged."707 Defendant waived his right to raise objections in his motion for 
new trial in State v. Cox708 and State v. Dagne709 by making express disclaimers 
of objections at the time of submission of the instructions to the jury. Likewise, 
the supreme court upheld a waiver in State v. Youngbear710 in which defense 
counsel at trial not only indicated he had not requested instructions and made 
no objections to the instructions given but also "did not indicate an intention of 
reserving the right to take later exceptions."711 That defendant should spe-
cifically reserve the right at trial to take exceptions later (in a motion for new 
trial) is suggested by the statement in State v. Cox712 (as well as the above-
mentioned reference in Y oungbear): "Defendant did not indicate an intention 
of reserving the right to take later exceptions. He cannot be permitted thus to 
change his position after the verdict. " 713 The "record" made at trial in Cox 
consisted of defendant objecting to other instructions not involved in this ap-
peal and thereafter advising the court: "Defendant has no other objections 
and makes no further exceptions to the instructions .... "714 Lastly, State 
v. Hackett1 15 reaffirmed that the issue of improper jury instructions cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
b. Substantive Content of the Instructions Given. As already discussed 
in detail above, the United States Supreme Court not only changed one part of 
the tripartite test for determining obscenity from whether the entire work "is 
utterly without redeeming social value" to whether the entire work "lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"716 but also eliminated the 
hypothetical national community for determining contemporary community 
standards. 717 Moreover, as already discussed above, the Iowa supreme court 
held that "it was error to instruct on an exception to the [hunting by artificial 
light] statute which is plainly not present in its language."718 Likewise, the 
latter court held that it is improper to instruct that intoxication cannot preclude 
acquittal on a charge with specific intent as an essential element.719 Finally, 
it determined that the Iowa Bar Association's Uniform Jury Instruction 
707. ld. But see State v. Youngbear, 203 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa 1972) (§ 787.3 
(5) waiver rule does not apply "when the court has misdirected the jury in a material 
matter of law ... or has refused properly to instruct the jury .... "). 
708. 196 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1972): "Defendant has no other objections and 
makes no further exceptions to the instructions. . . ." 
· 709. 206 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Iowa 1973): ("We don't have any objections to the instruc-
tions, your honor)." 
710. 203 N.W.2d 274 (Iowa 1972). 
711. Id.at277. 
712. 196 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1972). 
713. Id. at 432. 
714. ld. 
115. 197 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1972). 
716. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 ( 1973), as discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 202-05 supra. · · 
717. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 ( 1973 ), as discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 219-22 supra. 
718. See State v. Hocker, 201 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text ac-
companying notes 160-64 supra. 
719. See State v. Sill, 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying 
notes 351-52 supra. 
September 1973] Survey of Iowa Law 137 
520.8 is an unconstitutional application of the Code section 321.281 "pre-
sumption" of intoxication arising from the presence of a specified p'ercentage 
of alcohol in the accused's blood.720 
i. Accomplice's testimony. The United States Supreme Court held in 
Cool v. United States121 that it is reversible error to instruct the jury that an 
accomplice's testimony must be believed beyond a reasonable doubt in order 
for the jury to give it the same effect as any other witness' testimony, i.e., the 
jury was to ignore this defense testimony unless jury believed it true be-
yond a reasonable doubt. The supreme court explained: 
No constitutional problem is posed when the judge instructs a jury 
to receive the prosecution's accomplice testimony 'with care and cau-
tion'. . . . But there is an essential difference between instructing a 
jury on the care with which it should scrutinize certain evidence in 
determining how much weight to accord it and instructing a jury, 
as the judge did here, that as a predicate to the consideration of 
certain evidence, it must find it true beyond a reasonable doubt. 722 
In State v. Houston, 723 the Iowa supreme court held that it is improper for 
an instruction to place the burden on the State to prove (beyond a reasonable 
doubt) that certain State witnesses were not defendant's accomplices where 
defendant had raised the issue that they had aided and abetted him in the com-
mission of the crime. Rather, the burden should have been placed on the de-
fendant to prove (by a preponderance of the evidence) that they were his ac-
complic'es (and, if so, then their testimony needed to be corroborated724). 
Thus, this error inured to defendant's benefit and defendant's conviction was 
upheld. 
ii. Emphasis on adverse evidence. It was determined in State v. 
Milliken125 that reversible error is committed when jury instructions place 
undue emphasis upon evidence adverse to one party, here, the defendant. 
"[I]nstructions reciting facts militating against one party, without a recitation 
of facts favorable to his contention, are improper and erroneous,"726 the su-
preme court pointed out. One of the instant instructions noted that if the jury 
found there was the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath at the time of his 
arrest for O.M.V.U.I. then it could "consider that fact with all the other perti-
nent facts and evidence in arriving at whether or not the Defendant was un-
der the influence of an alcoholic beverage."727 In another instruction,728 the 
720. See State v. Hutton, 207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973); State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 
216 (Iowa 1972), and State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 293-302 supra. 
721. 93 S. Ct. 354 (1972). 
722. Id. at 357. 
723. 206 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1973). See also the text accompanying notes 35-36 
supra. 
723. See IOWA CooE § 782.5 (1973). 
725. 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973). 
726. Id. at 596, quoting State v. Proost, 225 Iowa 628, 635-36, 281 N.W. 167, 170 
(1938). 
727. Id. at 595. 
728. Cf. 11 Uniform Jury Instructions 520.6. 
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jury was told that "it is not necessary for the State to prove or show how many 
drinks the defendant had or what quantity or kind of alcoholic beverage the 
Defendant consumed, or when or where he consumed it, and it is often difficult, 
if not impossible to do so,"729 but rather that the State merely need show that 
he was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. Disapproving, the su-
preme court admonished: "The evil attendant upon [these] instructions ... 
is that they tend to lead a jury to dissociate the evidence thus emphasized 
from all other evidence they are duty bound to consider."730 A proper in-
struction, the supreme court intimated, would be a general instruction "appli-
cable to all witnesses alike, 731 which would list altogether all of the facts which 
the jury should consider in reaching its decision. 
111. Reasonable doubt. The general requisites of a valid jury instruc-
tion defining reasonable doubt were spelled out in State v. McGranahan. 732 
Here, the instruction merely rearranged the words by defining reasonable 
doubt as "a doubt which is based upon reason." 733 This instruction was con-
sidered by the supreme court to be fatally defective because it contained no 
definition of reasonable doubt and thus made no reference to any standard 
to aid the jury in determining the reasonableness of any doubt they might en-
tertain. The court pointed out in passing that the Iowa Bar Association's uni-
form jury instruction on reasonable doubt734 contains at least three acceptable 
standards, but that it also is defective in another respect. A proper instruc-
tion on reasonable doubt "should limit its reference to the lack or failure of 
evidence of such a lack or failure o[f] evidence produced by the state,"135 
the supreme court declared. 
c. Propriety of Giving Certain Instructions. In several survey cases 
involving jury instruction matters, the central issue was the propriety of giv-
ing the instruction (i.e., any instruction on this point). 736 
i. Aiding and abetting. This problem was best illustrated in State 
v. Mays, 737 in which it was held reversible error to submit an issue completely 
"unsubstantiated by evidence."738 Specifically, the trial court erred in giving 
an instruction on aiding and abetting when "no evidence at all was introduced 
729. 204 N.W.2d 594, 595 (Iowa 1973). 
730. ld. at 596. 
731. ld. at 596-97. 
732. 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973). 
733. ld. at 91. 
734. Uniform Jury Instruction No. 501.11. 
735. 206 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1973). 
736. See generally State v. Sill, 199 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa 1972): "Since the case 
will be remanded for new trial [because of an erroneous instruction on voluntary intoxi-
cation] we also note there was no evidence of involuntary intoxication and no reason to 
instruct on it." 
See also State v. Cartee, 202 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Iowa 1972) (reaffirmation of prospec-
tive application only of State v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864 (Iowa 1970) doctrine that it 
is reversible error to instruct the jury, absent defendant's request or objection, that it 
should draw no inference from defendant's failure to testify). 
737. 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973). 
738. Id. at 865. 
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that anyone beside[s] defendant was involved."739 That is, there was "want 
of proof that anyone else had anything to do with the crime."740 Rejecting 
the State's claim on appeal that the instruction was not prejudicial since "un-
der the evidence, defendant was the on1y one who could possibly be convicted 
of committing the crime," the supreme court admonished: "But that is the 
very reason the instruction should not have been given. It opened up to spec-
ulation participation by others, without any proof of such participation."741 
ii. Circumstantial evidence. Defendant's objection in State v. Pet-
erson142 went to the trial court's giving of the Iowa Bar Association's uniform 
jury instruction defining both direct and circumstantial evidence, 743 with de-
fendant contending that "the State's case was based entirely on circumstantial 
evidence."744 In this prosecution for possession of burglar's tools, however, 
the supreme court determined that each of the following constituted direct evi-
dence: establishment of the character of the tools by testimony of police offi-
cers-witnesses, identification of defendant as a passenger in the car in flight 
from which these tools were thrown during a police chase, and introduction 
into evidence of burglar's tools found in the same car. 
iii. Collateral issues. It was deemed reversible error in State v. 
Dunn145 to give a jury instruction on a collateral issue. Here, defendant was 
charged with arson for the burning of one Rogers' automobile, although the 
facts smacked of collusion between defendant and Rogers to defraud Rogers' 
insurance company. Over various objections, Rogers' insurance company's 
agent (Thompson) was allowed to testify concerning statements allegedly 
made to him by Rogers on the theory that if a conspiracy between defendant 
and Rogers were established "then any hearsay statements made to Thompson 
by Rogers would be admissible."746 The jury subsequently was instructed that 
if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that such a conspiracy existed 
then they could consider Thompson's testimony concerning Rogers' alleged state-
ments. Reversing the conviction, the supreme court, pointing out that defend-
ant was charged with arson and not with conspiracy, concluded: 
We are satisfied the questioned instruction was erroneously given in 
that it compounded the confusion resulting from extended introduc-
tion of prosecutorial evidence regarding collateral issues and separate 
offenses, possibly stemming in part from absence, at times, of suffi-
ciently specific testimonial objections; it improperly allowed the jury 
to inceptionally determine whether or not there was sufficient evi-
dence of a conspiracy, apart from statements by Rogers to Thomp-
son, to justify a consideration of those statements in determining 
whet.'J.er defendant was guilty of the offense charged; in effect the 
739. ld. at 864. 
740. ld. 
741. ld. at 865. 
742. 196 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1972). 
743. Uniform Jury Instruction 501.13. 
744. 196 N.W.2d at 438. 
745. 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972). 
746. Id. at 108. 
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jury was thereby wrongfully allowed to pass under admissibility of 
evidence after the court had permitted its introduction. 747 
iv. Verdict-urging instructions. Two survey cases concerned the 
trial court's propriety in giving a verdict-urging instruction similar to the Iowa 
Bar Association's Uniform Jury Instruction 501.1. The gist of this instruction 
is to encourage the jury to reach a verdict, thus prompting each juror, in case 
of deadlock, to re-examine his views and to change his opinion if such can 
be done without violating his conscience. 
In State v. Hackett148 the original instructions included the admonitions that 
"[a]n inconclusive trial is always highly undesirable" and that jurors in the 
course of their upcoming deliberations should "not hesitate to reexamine 
[their] own views and change [their] opinions if convinced it is [sic] er-
roneous," if not done so "for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict."749 Not-
ing this instruction was part of the original charge to the jury, the supreme 
court was satisfied this type of instruction "is not subject to the abuses said 
to attend the giving of an 'Allen' [or dynamite] charge."750 
The uncertainty left in Hackett as to the supreme court's view toward the 
giving of a so-called "Allen" or "dynamite" charge751 during the jury's de-
liberation to prompt the breaking of a deadlock and thus encourage a verdict 
was subsequently dispelled in State v. Quitt. 152 Refusing to hold that the giv-
ing of an "Allen charge" to a deadlocked jury per se deprives defendant of a 
fair trial, th'e supreme court instead left it to the trial courts' "considerable dis-
cretion in determining whether it should be given."753 With each case to be de-
cided, "on its own circumstances," the test for determining whether the giv-
ing of a verdict-urging instruction forced or helped to force an agreement, or 
merely started a new train of real deliberation which ended the disagree-
ment."754 This unsatisfactory test thus means that a trial court can exercise 
his "considerable discretion" only at the peril of reversible error subsequently 
arising through a quick verdict thereafter, with jurors attempting to impeach 
the verdict with affidavits as to the co·ercive impact of an "Allen charge" on 
the subsequent deliberations. In Quitt, however, there was a total elapsed 
deliberation time of four hours between the giving of the "Allen charge" and 
the return of the verdict of guilty. The supreme court, affirming the convic-
tion, determined: "The record her·e does not suggest coercion. In fact, it 
rather demonstratively negatives it."755 
d. Propriety of Failing to Give Certain Instructions. One last category 
of jury instruction matters concerns the propriety of the trial court's failure to 
747. Id. at 110. 
748. 200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972). 
749. Id. at 496. 
750. ld. 
751. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). 
752. 204 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973). 
753. Id. at 914. 
754. Id. 
755. Id. 
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give certain instructions desirable to defendant. As the discussion below in-
dicates, 756 this facet can involve either the court's rejection of defendant's re-
quest for instructions or the court's affirmative duty to instruct sua sponte. 
i. Entrapment. Defendant's request for an instruction on the affirm-
ative defense of entrapment was properly refused in State v. McGrana-
han.757 The only evidence offered at trial relating to defendant's contention 
that he had been induced by Officer Keenley to make the illegal sale of mari-
juana was the following testimony by Officer Keenley: "Well, Mr. McGrana-
han was the first to speak. He said, 'What is it that you need?' And I said, 
'Well, what have you got?' And he answered with the word, 'Marijuana'."75S 
The supreme court pointed out that "there is no entrapment when narcotics 
agents merely afford an accused the opportunity to commit the offense."759 
Here, the agent "merely afforded the opportunity for the defendant to commit 
the crime. He did not induce the defendant to commit it."760 
ii. Evidential basis. The cardinal principle that there must be 
evidence in the record to support an instruction was unsuccessfully challenged 
in State v. Armstrong.761 First, the trial court correctly sustained the 
State's objection to a qualified hypothetical question for which there was no 
evidential support. Then it correctly refused defendant's requested instruction 
concerning that hypothesis. "This request, interlaced with mUltiple quali~ 
fying 'ifs,' stems from the same faUlty premise heretofore considered regard-
ing the hypothetical question put by defense counsel to the witness Lewis,"762 
the supreme court observed. The impropriety of defendant's request stems 
from the principle that th'e trial court's duty to instruct "is confined to 'Material 
questions of law in the case' . . . [but] only where relevant evidence was 
produced which woUld make apparent the materiality of the law claimed 
applicable thereto." 763 
m. Impeachment with prior felony convictions. A new procedural 
rule concerning impeachment of a previously-convicted defendant testifying in 
his own behalf was established in State v. Mays. 764 In trials commencing af-
ter February 21, 1973, the trial court must instruct sua sponte that "consid-
756. Although the survey cases raising issues of self defense did not specifically 
arise on refusal of requests for instructions, see text accompanying notes 353-56 supra. 
See also State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1972) (defendant in vehicular 
homicide case is not entitled to instruction ·on recklessness that "even if he was aware of 
a dangerous situation, recklessness would be shown only if he did not exercise the slight-
est care to avoid injury to others"), as discussed in text accompanying notes 198-99 supra. 
757. 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973). See also text accompanying notes 336-43 supra 
for a discussion of two cases in which entrapment instructions were given contrary to 
defendant's contentions that entrapment had been shown as a matter of law (thus re-
quiring dismissal of the charges). 
758. 206 N.W.2d at 90. 
759. Id. 
760. ld. 
761. 203 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1972). 
762. ld. at 274. 
763. ld., quoting State v. Perry, 246 Iowa 861, 866, 69 N.W.2d 412, 415 (1955). 
764. 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973). 
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eration of defendant's previous convictions must be limited to defendant's 
credibility as a witness."765 
iv. Lesser included offenses. As already discussed above, the 
Iowa supreme court has reversed State v. Everett,166 and now applies this test in 
determining whether instructions on certain lesser included offenses should be 
submitted to the jury: "[T]he evidence of the case must be considered in de-
termining whether one offense is includable within another."767 In State 
v. Hawkins, 168 the supreme court said: 
Under the facts presented in this case it would have been impossible 
for defendant to commit the offense charged without a showing of 
each element necessary to convict him of the lesser offense. Under 
the rule announced by the majority in State v. Everett, supra, this 
would not make the lesser offense includable because situations, 
though not involved or presented in the case, can be imagined in 
which the major offense might be committed by means other than 
those which would constitute a commission of the lesser offense . 
. . . We now believe and hold the dissenting opinion [in Everett] 
expresses the sounder view. 769 
The court nevertheless reiterated in Hawkins that "the evidence must jus-
tify the submission of the included offense" and thus "if there is no evidence 
from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of the included offense, 
then such included offense need not be submitted."770 Similarly, in State v. 
Osborn111 the trial court did not err in this prosecution for burglary by failing to 
give defendant's requested instruction regarding the lesser included offense of 
breaking and entering. "There is not a scintilla of evidence that the breaking 
and entering at the Rock home occurred other than in the nighttime as that 
term is ordinarily defined," 772 the supreme court determined, thus appar-
ently combining principles of evidence of the case and matters of law. 
Hawkins merely changed the rule as to whether lesser included offenses 
are submitted in a particular case, but did not change the definition of a lesser 
included offense, to wit: 
Every crime charged consists of certain specific elements, and if from 
the elements of the crime charged certain elements thereof may be 
taken, thereby leaving the necessary elements of another crime, the 
latter would be an included offense; or, to state it in another way, 
if certain elements are necessary to a criminal charge, and these ele-
ments, plus certain other elements, make the necessary elements of 
a higher crime, then the lower crime is included in the higher one. 773 
765. Id. at 867. 
766. 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968). 
767. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973 ). 
768. Id. For a discussion of the factual situation in Hawkins, see text accompany-
ing notes 178-84 supra. 
769. Id. at 557. 
770. ld., quoting State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 106 (1928). 
771. 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972). 
772. Id. at 807. For a further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 
68-71 supra. 
773. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 551 (Iowa 1973), quoting State v. Marshall, 
206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 106 (1928). 
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That Hawkins does not stand for the proposition that a crime becomes a 
lesser included offense merely because of the evidence of the case notwith-
standing the fact that the greater offense did not require certain essential ele-
ments of the lesser offense was made clear in State v. Habhab. 114 Pointing 
out that "[a] showing of possession ... was not required as the element of 
the offense [of illicit drug selling]," the supreme court conceded that the evi-
dence in the instant case "show[s] a possession of the marijuana in connec-
tion with its sale."775 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that "this does not 
in itself make possession an included offense in the sale."776 In other words, 
the existence of such evidentiary facts cannot supply an included offense "out-
side the elements of the major crime."777 Thus, even under the revised lesser 
included offense test in Hawkins, "[i]t is quite possible to commit one crime in 
the act of committing another and yet not have it an included offense. It is not 
included if its elements are not entirely included as a part of the elements of 
the major offense,"778 the court explained. 
In a related matter, the supreme court upheld the convictions in two cases 
in which certain apparently-proper lesser included offenses were not sub-
mitted to the jury. In State v. Cox,119 defendant failed to make timely objec-
tion to the trial court's failure to submit the lesser offenses, waiting instead to 
object in his motion for new trial after stating at the time of submission of the 
instructions that he had no objections to them. The supreme court repeated 
its general rule "requir[ing] submission of all offenses which are necessarily 
included in the criminal charge and upon which there is sufficient evidence to 
justify a finding of guilty,"780 but then added: "[R]eversible error will not 
appear because of failure to submit included offenses unless two elements con-
cur: (1) the claimed included offense must be necessarily included in the of-
fense charged; and (2) the record must contain evidence justifying a finding 
of such included offense rather than of a higher offense."781 In other words, 
the supreme court "separate[s] the 'abstract question of what is an included 
offense' from 'the question of when included offenses should, under the evi-
dence in the case, be submitted.' "782 The instant record so viewed, the su-
preme court concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error 
by failing to instruct on certain lesser included offenses. The precedential 
value of this case was muddied somewhat by the court's further observation: 
774. 209 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1973). For a discussion of the instant factual situation, 
see text accompanying notes 109-15 supra. 
775. Id. at 75. 
776. /d. 
777. /d. 
778. /d. 
779. 196 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1972). 
780. /d. at 433, citing State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Iowa 1968). See 
State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Iowa 1973): "This holding is consistent with 
the view expressed in State v. Pilcher," supra. 
781. ld., quoting State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 1968). 
782. Id., quoting State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 1968). 
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"This is particularly true in absence of defendant's timely request there-
for."7sa 
State v. Youngbear184 reiterates the principle that "where a defendant is 
convicted of the principal offense charged in the indictment and the jury re-
fuses to select a lesser offense submitted, failure to submit still lesser included 
offenses is not prejudicial error."785 Here, defendant was charged with and 
convicted of robbery with aggravation although the jury was also instructed 
on the next lesser offense of robbery without aggravation. However, the 
trial court refused defendant's timely request to submit instructions on the still 
lesser offenses of larceny from the person as well as of larceny. 
C. Jury Deliberations786 
1. Misconduct of Jurors 
A comprehensive discussion of the rules governing when jury miscon-
duct requires the granting of a new trial is contained in State v. Houston. 787 
Pointing out that trial courts have "broad discretion" in determining whether 
a new trial is justified under the evidence of claimed jury misconduct, the su-
preme court dictated: "To justify a new trial for jury misconduct it must ap-
pear (independently of what jurors might later say) the misconduct was cal-
culated to, and probably did, influence the verdict."788 The instant problem 
concerned the extra-legal introduction into the jury room of evidence not pro-
duced at trial-here, an experiment by jurors in turning off the lights to de-
termine nighttime visibility while looking through window glass as a means 
of "testing" the credibility of certain identification testimony at trial. Affirm-
ing the trial court's overruling of defendant's motion for a new trial, the su-
preme court reaffirmed that "[a] juror is not forbidden to consider and pass 
upon the evidence in the light of common experience and common observa-
tion. "789 . 
Similarly, no prejudice was found in State v. Jackson, 790 in which one juror 
noted during deliberation that defendant, who was being tried for attempted 
murder of X, had already been convicted of the murder of Y committed on 
the same date as the instant attack on X. The jury foreman thereupon sent a 
783. I d. See also State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Iowa 1973): "[This 
holding] is not inconsistent with that expressed in State v. Cox ... which noted a failure 
of defendant to make a timely request for an instruction on the included offense." Thus, 
it is unclear whether the two-part test for determining reversible error because of failure 
to submit lesser included offenses as stated in Cox remains viable after Hawkins. It 
would appear to, however, notwithstanding the court's singling out in Hawkins of the as-
pect of the defendant's untimely objection in Cox. 
784. 203 N.W.2d 274 (Iowa 1972). 
785. Id. at 278. 
786. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the sentencing process, 
see generally Dunahoo, supra note 364 at 1085-91. 
787. 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973). 
788. ld. at 45. 
789. Id. 
790. 195 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1972). 
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note to the presiding judge inquiring as to the nature and date of the undesig-
nated previous felony conviction which had been introduced at trial for im-
peachment purposes. The judge then recalled the jury and re-instructed them 
that defendant's previous felony conviction was not to be considered (other 
than presumably for impeachment purposes). Defendant made no other show-
ing of any resultant events and jurors' affidavits indicated that no further 
mention of the extra-legal information was made. The fact that "fully five 
hours of deliberation ensued"791 thereafter was prominently mentioned in the 
opinion. 
2. Outsiders' Contact With Jurors 
State v. Bruno192 illustrates that a new trial is not required ipso facto by 
every outsider's contact with the jurors during their deliberations. Here, the 
alleged misconduct was based solely upon the fact that the sheriff appeared to 
have spoken once to one of the jurors while un:locking the door to the jury 
room. The supreme court opined: "While the sheriff's conduct was objection-
able and avoidable, his slight encounter with the jurors [which was not re-
peated] does not appear to constitute the requisite conduct . that gives rise, 
or appears to give rise, to the kind of 'doubt or disrespect' indicating preju-
dice."793 
D. Sentencing 
The sentencing process794 continues to present major problem areas for 
Iowa trial judges. 795 
791. ld. at 690. 
792. 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973). 
793. ld. at 885. 
794. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the sentencing process, see 
generally Dunahoo, supra note 364, at 1101-16. 
795. Summarily, the other sentencing process issues not discussed elsewhere in this 
survey include: 
(a) ALLOCATION: The CoDE § 789.6 right of allocation is meant only to af-
ford defendant an opportunity to make a statement and does not require verbalization in 
the precise words of the statute. State v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1972). 
(b) AT ARRAIGNMENT: "We cannot conclude here the trial court acted im-
properly, although arraigning the defendant, accepting his plea, and imposing sentence all 
at one hearing and on the same day is not a procedure that should be followed. The 
burden is on the defendant here to establish the fact the disposition of his case with such 
dispatch is a circumstance entitling him to prevail in this proceeding." State v. Kephart, 
202 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972). 
(c) EXCESSIVENESS-Juveniles: The trial court does not abuse its discretion ;n 
selecting the most severe of the possible sentencing alternatives although CoDE § 237.72 
authorizes the court to give "special consideration" when sentencing a juvenile under the 
criminal code. State v. Davis, 195 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1972). 
(d) EXCESSNENESS--Multiplicity: Concurrent sentences of life imprisonment 
for "open-charge" murder and "felony" murder convictions, based upon the same homi-
cide, are excessive; one must be set aside. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972). 
(e) EXCESSNENESS--Severity: "Although the sentence seems quite severe in 
view of the amount of the [$7 bad] check, we cannot. say there was an abuse of dis-
cretion." State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Iowa 1972). 
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1. Defe"ed Sentencing 
The reportedly widespread practice of deferred sentencing796 was de-
clared invalid in State v. Wright. 797 As succinctly described in Justice McCor-
mick's special concurrence in which he defended deferred sentencing, 798 un-
der this technique "[s]entence in appropriate cases, after plea of guilty, is 
deferred for a specified period, usually upon condition defendant submit to 
probation. If defendant conforms to the terms of probation he is permitted 
to withdraw his guilty plea at its expiration and ask that the case be dismissed 
in the interests of justice."799 Accordingly, a probation-conforming defend-
ant ultimately will have no conviction. The supreme court's majority held: 
"The right to defer imposition of a sentence in a criminal case is not inherent 
but is regulated by statute and can only be exercised in accordance with 
the terms of the statute."800 The only applicable statutes801 were construed 
as limiting, for a reasonable time, the deferral of imposition of sentence only 
for determining motions for a new trial or in arrest of judgment or for the 
making of a pre-sentence investigation. Moreover, the probation provision802 
is applicable only after the entry of judgment of conviction and the imposition 
of sentence. State differently, Code section 247.20 "refers only to a suspended 
sentence and has no application to a deferred sentence."803 Therefore, 
Wright mandated that trial courts move forward with entry of judgment and 
sentencing following a conviction. This meant that, save for convictions for 
simple possession under Iowa's Uniform Controlled Substances Act,804 anyone 
pleading guilty or being convicted by a jury would have a conviction of rec-
ord, the probation provision notwithstanding. 
The Iowa General Assembly subsequently granted statutory authority for 
deferred sentencing, with numerous enumerated exceptions and procedural 
limitations.805 The new law became effective on August 15, 1973, and expressly 
validated all previous deferred sentences except as to "any case in which an 
appeal was pending on June 1, 1973."806 
796. See Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of 
Criminal Justice in Iowa, 51 IOWA L. REv. 598, 612 (1972). 
797. 202 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 1972) (en bane). 
798. Justice McCormick, joined by Justices Harris and Reynoldson, concurred only 
in the result in Wright, in which defendant unsuccessfully contested the trial court's 
revocation of his probation granted as part of a deferred sentence and his subsequent 
sentencing. The six-man majority said there was no authority to grant the deferred sen-
tence in the first instance, while Justices McCormick, Harris and Reynoldson took the 
position that the trial court had statutory authority (under CoDE § 789.2) as well as 
jnherent power, to grant the deferred sentence, but that the trial court was justified in 
subsequently revoking the probation, entering the judgment of conviction, and sentencing. 
799. 202 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 1973). 
800. /d. at 76. 
801. See IowA CoDE § 789.2 (1973), as construed at 202 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Iowa 
1973 ). 
802. Id. § 247.20. . 
803. 202 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Iowa 1973). 
804. See IOWA CODE§ 204.409 (1973). 
805. See Ch. 295 [1973] Iowa Acts .. 
806. ld. § 14. 
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2. Habitual Criminal 
Two survey cases dealt with various aspects of the aggravated sentenc-
ing process for a defendant shown to be a habitual criminal. 807 
In State v. Houston, 808 the supreme court held, inter alia, that the State 
need only show as to previous convictions that defendant was sentenced to a 
term of at least three years' imprisonment thus rendering irrelevant the time 
actually served. Moreover, the court held that a jury question concerning a 
prior commitment is generated "if the State can show a mittimus was issued 
ordering the sheriff to deliver defendant to prison"809 and thus it is unneces-
sary for the State to show defendant was actually incarcerated in prison. Fi-
nally, the court held that "[t]he duly authenticated copy of the mittimus 
makes a prima facie case,"810 and accordingly the State need not show that 
defendant's prior convictions were not appealed. 
In State v. Mason, 811 the supreme court held that the State can carry the 
issue of a habitual-criminal defendant's identification to the jury through in-
court identification by witnesses "who had known him and connected him with 
those [prior] proceedings."812 Accordingly, "an in-court comparison of de-
fendant's photographs and fingerprints with those taken on the other convic-
tions,"813 while being the best evidence, is not necessary. 
3. Indigent Defendants 
The application of recently-revised federal constitutional guidelines for 
the sentencing of indigent defendants to imprisonment was one of the major 
areas of concern during the survey period. 
a. Counsel. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 814 the United States Supreme 
Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be im-
prisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his 
trial."815 As a practical matter of procedure, the Court noted that "every 
judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprison-
ment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is 
represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity 
of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the 
807. See IOWA CooE § 747.1, .2 & .5 (1973). See also Davis v. Bennett, 400 F.2d 
279, 281 (8th Cir. 1968): 
The Iowa Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the habitual offender statute 
does not create a separate and distinct crime, but is merely relevant in determin-
ing the penalty to be imposed should a conviction be obtained on the 'primary' 
charge. * * * There is nothing in the [fourteenth amendment] due process clause 
which prevents the state of Iowa from making this construction. 
808. 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973). 
809. Id. at 47. 
810. Id. 
811. 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972). 
812. Id. at 296. 
813. ld. 
814. 407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
815. Id. at 37. 
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accused before the trial starts."816 Thus, the Supreme Court refused to take 
this opportunity to afford a sixth amendment right to counsel on non-felony of-
fenses,817 unlike its ru1e in Gideon v. Wainwright818 as to felonies. Rather, it 
merely precluded a trial court from exercising any statutory authority to sen-
tence a convicted indigent to imprisonment unless he had been effectively 
offered counsel-thus leaving an indigent defendant facing only a fine with 
no right to counsel. 
Argersinger signalled a change in Iowa's general practice of not affording 
appointive counsel for indigents charged with simple misdemeanors,819 al-
though the Iowa supreme court had expressly reserved judgment on the ques-
tion.820 In Henricks v. Hildreth, 821 the Iowa supreme court held that Ar-
gersinger is to be applied prospectively only (i.e., to trials started after June 
12, 1972). 
b. Default Imprisonment. In Tate v. Short,822 the United States Supreme 
Court held that automatic imprisonment of an indigent defendant merely for 
his non-wilful failure to pay in toto a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the State is to resort to alternative meth-
ods of collecting the fine (e.g., installment payments) or exacting some eco-
nomic equivalent (e.g., civil process against defendant's non-exempt prop-
erty). The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that Tate was not to be under-
stood "as precluding imprisonment as an enforcement method when alterna-
tive means are unsuccessfu1 despite the defendant's reasonable efforts to sa-
tisfy the fines by those means; the determination of the constitutionality of im-
prisonment in that circumstance must await the presentation of a concrete 
case."s2a 
In State v. Snyder,824 the Iowa supreme court held that the Tate rules 
were violated by the entry of a judgment that defendant was to be jailed if he 
failed to pay the imposed fine. Thus, defau1t imprisonment was made the 
only alternative to immediate, albeit non-wilfu1, in toto payment of the fine in-
stead of alternative methods being offered. (One such alternative expressly 
mentioned by the Iowa supreme court was installment payments). Vacating 
the sentenc·e and remanding the cause for resentencing, the supreme court re-
jected the possible argument that the default imprisonment imposed on de-
fendant was not governed by Tate since the trial court "had authority to levy 
a fine or imprisonment on a defendant convicted of violating section 
816. ld. at 40. 
817. "We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards 
the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here, petitioner 
was in fact sentenced to jail." Id. at 37. 
818. 372 u.s. 335 (1963). 
819. But see Wright v. Denato, 178 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1970) (statutory right to ap-
pointive counsel for indigents charged with both felonies and indictable misdemeanors). 
820. ld. at 342-43. 
821. 207 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 1973). 
822. 401 u.s. 395 (1971). 
823. ld. at 401. 
824. 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1972). 
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321.281."825 In other words, it makes no difference that defendant could 
originally have been sentenced to imprisonment and any subsequent default 
imprisonment would unconstitutionally arise merely because of his indigency. 
In an offshoot to Snyder, the Iowa supreme court strongly disapproved of a 
sentencing colloquy involving an indigent defendant in State v. Milliken. 826 
Sentencing defendant for first-offense O.M.V.U.I. (which is punishable by a 
term of imprisonment in the penitentiary or a fine or both) the judge noted on 
the record that there was no jail sentence possible "exc'ept possibly to coerce 
payment of a fine." 827 Noting further that defendant-pauper probably 
could not pay a reasonable fine, the judge indicated he was ·convinced de-
fendant "ought to spend some time in prison or· in jail"828 and accordingly sen-
tenced him to a penitentiary term. Reversing the instant conviction because 
of a faulty instruction, the supreme court declared that no such references are 
to be made in any phase of the sentencing process to a defendant's pauper-
ism. 
4. Pacts 
The Iowa supreme court made it clear in State v. J ackson829 that sentenc-
ing is to be done on an individualized basis and accordingly trial courts 
cannot bind themselves to a group agreement that prescribes uniform minimum 
sentences when the applicable criminal statute sets no such limits. Here, the 
judges in one judicial district had agreed to impose a minimum penalty of 
twenty days' imprisonment in the county jail for every first-offense O.M.V.U.I. 
conviction, subject to individualized consideration ·to granting of probation-
notwithstanding the fact that the applicable statute830 neither sets a minimum 
period of imprisonment nor even mandates any imprisonment. Sentencing 
"under a predetermined fixed policy cannot satisfy a statutory requirement for 
the exercise of discretion,"831 the supreme court admonished, adding that the 
sentencing judge must exercise his discretion by considering the peculiar facts 
and circumstances of each individual case in order to make "a sound, fair and 
just determination" of the proper sentence. 83 2 
5. Resentencing 
Three survey cases dealt with various issues related to resentencing pro-
cedures. 
a. Increased punishment. The Iowa supreme court held in City of 
825. Id. at 290. 
826. 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973). 
827. I d. at 598. 
828. ld. 
829. 204 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973). 
830. See IOWA CODE§ 321.281 (1973). 
831. 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973 ). 
832. Id. . 
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Cedar Rapids v. Klees838 that the federal constitutional bar on harsher punish-
ment after a retrial on remand to the same trial court (except when based on 
defendant's record of conduct in the interim between the original sentence and 
the resentence)834 is not applicable to trials de novo on appeal.835 Here, de-
fendant had been fined $25 in municipal court but given five days in jail after a 
trial de novo after conviction on appeal to district court. 
b. Multiple sentences. In Cleesen v. Brewer,836 an exception was 
carved out of the rule in Code section 745.1 automatically making a sentence for 
escape to run consecutive to the original sentence. The instant defendant 
had been sentenced to an indeterminate term of ten years' imprisonment for 
breaking and entering and was subsequently sentenced to a three-year term 
for escape, with the sentence for escape made to run consecutively to the earlier 
sentence (as required by Code section 745.1). Following vacating of the sentence 
for breaking and entering in a postconviction proceeding, defendant was re-
sentenced to a term not exceeding ten years, but the court did not specify 
whether this term was as to run concurrently with or consecutively to the 
three-year term for escape. Claiming the warden was illegally holding him for 
a total of thirteen years, defendant commenced another postconviction proceed-
ing claiming that this turn of events brought into play Code section 789.12 
which makes multiple sentences run concurrently unless specified to the con-
trary by the court in pronouncing the second sentence. Agreeing, the su-
preme court noted that after vacating of defendant's sentence for breaking 
and entering, "the only sentence in effect was the one for escape,"837 and the 
second sentence for breaking and entering was to be treated merely as the sec-
ond of multiple sentences, thus making Code section 789.12 govern. 
c. Replacement Statute. In a bizarre turn of events, the punishment in 
State v. Wiese838 was, in effect, ordered increased by the Iowa supreme court. 
Defendants successfully challenged in a postconviction relief proceeding their 
original sentences under Iowa's former Uniform Narcotics Act and they were re-
sentenced to a $2000 fine and a term of imprisonment "not to exceed two 
years." By that time, a new penalty provision was applicable under Iowa's 
Controlled Substances Act839 which expressly makes the new schedule of penal-
ties, "if they are less than those under prior law," applicable to offenses still 
being prosecuted on July 1, 1971 (the effective date of the new act). De-
fendants sought only to reduce their fines from $2000 to $1000 but not to 
change their terms of imprisonment. 
833. 201 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1972). 
834. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 ( 1969); accord State v. Pilcher, 171 
N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1969). 
835. 201 N.W.2d 920, 921 (Iowa 1972), citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 
(1972). 
836. 201 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 1972). 
837. Id. at 477. 
838. 201 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1972). This case was consolidated on appeiU with 
State v. Hatch. 
839. See Ch. 148, § 601 [1971] Iowa Acts (S.F. 148). This transitional provision 
was not codified in the 1973 Iowa Code. See IowA CoDE ch. 204 (1973). 
September 1973] Survey of Iowa Law 151 
The supreme court upheld defendant's contention that the new penalty 
provision was applicable, noting that "[a] case which has not reached valid 
final judgment is 'being prosecuted."'840 However, the supreme court then 
pointed out that defendants' offenses would constitute possession with intent 
to deliver under the new statute and defendants must be resentenced accord-
ingly even though the applicable penalty (imprisonment not to exceed five 
years) is greater. Pointing out that the trial court "has no authority to fix a 
lesser prison term,"841 the supreme court reversed and remanded for new 
sentences. 
E. Posttrial Developments 
1. Postconviction Relief 
Two survey cases involved construction of the provlSlon in Iowa's Uni-
form Postconviction Procedure Act842 that bars relitigation of any ground "fi-
nally adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived" in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence as well 
as any other proceeding taken to secure relief. That is, with the exception of the 
abovementioned qualifications, a postconviction proceeding cannot be taken 
to relitigate an issue previously raised on appeal, certiorari, habeas corpus, 
or an earlier postconviction petition.843 
Horn v. Haugh844 held that "[t]he failure to raise a defense in the original 
trial, unless excused as provided by the section, waives the issue in any 
future postconviction proceeding. " 8411 That is, the supreme court rejected de-
fendant's contention that the conditional exception "or not raised" in the non-
relitigation clause "relates only to prior postconviction proceedings and does 
not preclude assertion of matters waived in the original trial."846 Accordingly, 
the court refused to permit the use of postconviction relief as a substitute for 
the simple statutory remedy of lodging objections at trial. 
State v. Masters841 held that this non-rditigation rule does not apply when 
defendant had taken his original appeal pro se and the issues were not ade-
quately raised on that appeal. The supreme court's general conclusion on 
the earlier appeal that defendant had a fair trial "is not tantamount to a ruling 
on the merits of the errors now asserted"848 on appeal from denial of postcon-
viction relief, the supreme court determined. (The supreme court thereupon 
ruled adversely to defendant on the merits of his "relitigated" issues). 
840. 201 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1972). 
841. Id. at 738. 
842. See IOWA CoDE§ 663A.8 (1973). 
843. See also Murch v. Mottram, 93 S. Ct. 71 (1972) (federal habeas corpus does 
not lie for challenge of issue intentionally waived in State post-<:<>nviction procedure). 
844. 209 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1973). 
845. Id. at 121. 
846. Id. 
847. 199 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1972). 
848. Id. at 103. 
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2. Parole Revocation 
a. Hearings. In Morrissey v. Brewer,649 the United States Supreme Court 
declared that Iowa's no-hearing parole revocation process850 violates procedural 
due process rights of the fourteenth amendment. In fact, the Court held that a 
parolee facing revocation is entitled to two separate hearings-a preliminary 
hearing and the revocation hearing. The purpose of the preliminary hearing, 
to be held before an impartial hearing officer who need not be a judicial offi-
cer, is to determine if there are "reasonable ground[s] to believe that the 
arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of pa-
role conditions" and thus "probable cause to hold the parolee for the fi-
nal decision of the parole board on revocation."851 For this hearing, the 
parolee is entitled to notice of the hearing, its purpose, and the alleged parole 
violations. At the hearing, he is entitled to appear and present evidence as 
well as to cross-examine his accusers (subject to security considerations con-
cerning identity of confidential informants). The purpose of the more formal 
revocation hearing, to be held before a body such as the state parole board, is 
for making "a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and considera-
tion of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation."852 
Declaring that "the full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a crimi-
nal prosecution] does not apply to parole revocations," the Court nevertheless 
formulated "minimum requirements of due process" in the final parole revoca-
tion hearing, to wit: · 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure 
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard 
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) 
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the 
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing con-
frontation) ; (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders 
as to the evidence relied ori and reasons for revoking parole. 853 
These new rules were .accorded prospective application only. 854 
b. Counsel. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court expressly did not decide 
the question "whether the parolee is entitled . to the assistance of retained 
counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent."855 However, the Court 
subsequently accorded a qualified right to counsel in both ·probation revoca-
849. 408 u.s. 471 (1972). 
850. "The Code [§ 247.11] in prescribing procedure for recommitment does not 
require hearing or notice, but simply provides a parole violator may be arrested upon the 
written order of the board of parole." Gardels v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Iowa 
1971). 
851. 408 U.S. at 485-87. 
852. Id. at 488. 
853. Id. at 489. 
854. Id. at 490. 
855. Id. at 489. 
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tion proceedings and parole revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 856 
as discussed in detail below.s57 
3. Probation Revocation 
a. Hearing. The Morrissey v. Brewer rules for parole revocation pro-
ceedings were extended by the United States Supreme Court to the probation 
revocation process in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 858 Specifically, the Court held that 
"a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revoca-
tion hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer .... "8 " 9 
Being pegged on fourteenth amendment due process grounds, Gagnon over-
rules, by implication, Cole v. Holliday860 in which the Iowa supreme court held 
that no hearing is required as long as probation is not revoked "arbitrarily, 
capriciously, or without any information."861 
Prior to Gagnon, the Iowa supreme court prescribed procedural rules for 
a revocation hearing which was held, basing them upon the Morrissey guidelines 
without ever specifically stating that Iowa probation revocation hearings must 
comport with the Morrissey rules concerning parole revocation proceedings. 
(That they must was made clear subsequently in Gagnon). Specifically, the 
Iowa supreme court held in State v. Hughes: 862 (1) that the trial court "was 
not required to render an opinion or conclusions of law;" (2) that the findings 
of a court revoking probation must show "the factual basis for the revocation;" 
(3) that the revocation can be based upon an arrest for a subsequent offense 
(although there has been no prosecution); (4) that "the strict rules of evidence 
in criminal trials do not apply in revocation hearings;" (5) that revocation 
"may not rest on rumor or surmise;" (6) that hearsay is admissible "if 
the fact of the violation is established by evidence which is competent;" (7) 
that "the requisite degree of proof is a preponderance of the evidence" and 
thus grounds for revocation "need not be established beyond a reasonable 
doubt."863 The supreme court determined that it did not need to decide 
whether the parole officer's report was admissible at the hearing when the 
maker of the report was not present (to be confronted for cross examination) 
-reasoning that this report was utilized here as a charge rather than as proof 
and that revocation rested on the policeman's testimony. 
b. Counsel. In Gagnon, the Supreme Court, finally answering the question 
expressly left open in Morrissey, held that there is no absolute right to appoint-
ive counsel in parole or probation revocation hearings. "We think rather, 
that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case 
856. 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973). 
857. See text accompanying notes 863-65 infra. 
858. 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973). 
859. ld. at 1760. 
860. 171 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1969). 
861. Id. at 606. 
862. 200 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1972). 
863. Id. at 562-63. 
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basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with 
responsibility for administering the probation and parole system."864 The 
test is: 
Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in 
cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, 
the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely 
and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged vio-
lation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even 
if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there 
are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and 
make revocation inappropriate and that the reasons are complex or 
otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for 
the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should con-
sider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears 
to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.865 
As a procedural matter, the grounds for refusal of a request for counsel at ei-
ther the preliminary or final hearing "should be stated succinctly in the rec-
ord."B66 
N. SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Specific Crimes 
1) State statutes proscribing abortions during all stages of pregnancy ex-
cept when necessary to save the life of the mother are unconstitutional. (U.S. 
Sup. Ct.). 
2) Iowa's anti-abortion law is unenforceable. (3-judge fed. dist. ct.). 
3) The third part of the first amendment tripartite standard on ob-
scenity is changed from "utterly without social redeeming value" to "lacking in 
serious literary ... value." (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
4) The first amendment test for judging obscenity under contemporary 
community standards no longer requires a "national" community. (U.S. Sup. 
Ct.). 
5) There is a right to a jury trial on multiple contempt of court charges. 
(Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
6) Placing the burden on defendant in an accommodation hearing under 
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act is not unconstitutional. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
7) Simple possession is not a lesser included offense of the crime of 
delivery under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
8) Symbolic political protest is no defense to physical acts of flag dese-
cration. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
9) An anti-loitering ordinance is constitutional if it is directed with 
specificity to persons obstructing free use of public walkways. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
864. 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1763 (1973). 
865. Id. at 1764. 
866. Id. 
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10) The crime of simulated intoxication requires proof of pretending or 
feigning intoxication, i.e., an intentional act. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
B. Defenses 
1) The defense of entrapment is not available when defendant denies 
the very acts upon which the prosecution is predicated. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
2) It is constitutional to require a defendant to bring himself within 
an exculpatory provision of a statute furnishing an ·excuse for what would oth-
erwise be criminal conduct. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
C. Pretrial 
1) An application under Code section 775.5 for public funds for a pri-
vate investigator or experts must "point out with specificity the reasons such 
services are necessary." (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
2) The demand-waiver doctrine under the speedy indictment statute has 
been abolished. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
3) Retrial following two mistrials because of hung juries does not per se 
constitute double jeopardy. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
4) A State procedural rule requiring defendant to give pretrial notice of 
an alibi defense while not requiring reciprocation by the State as to alibi rebut-
tal witnesses violates federal due process. (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
5) Miranda-type warnings are not absolutely required in order to make 
a (warrantless) consent search valid. (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
6) The United States v. Wade rule of per se exclusion of evidence of a 
counselless post-indictment identification procedure does not extend to pre-
indictment identification procedures. (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
7) The sixth amendment right to counsel does not 'extend to either pre-
indictment or post-indictment identification-of-photographs procedures. (U.S. 
Sup. Ct.). 
8) An application for a change of venue must be considered in the con-
text of the entire affair and not merely the publicity centering on defendant. 
(Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
9) A demand for a speedy trial is no longer required under Code sec-
tion 795.2. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
1 0) Dismissal of the prosecution is the only remedy for violation of de-
fendant's speedy trial rights. (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
11) A trial court is required to make a personal determination of the 
validity of a proffered guilty plea, notwithstanding a prior jury's adjudication 
that defendant is competent to stand trial. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
D. Trial 
1) It is ipso facto reversible error for defendant to be tried before the 
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same jury panel which was previously dismissed and told that defendant, who 
was named, had pled guilty. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
2) The Iowa rule shall continue to be that trial courts have broad dis-
cretion in "defin[ing] the ambit of permissible cross examination in an attack 
on the credibility of a witness by questions concerning collateral acts of alleged 
misconduct"-rather than imposing no limitations upon, or entirely prohibiting, 
such examination. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
3) It is error for the trial court to sustain the State's objections to equivo-
cation and unresponsiveness of a defense witness on direct examination. 
(Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
4) "The trend is to extend, rather than to narrow, the res gestae doc-
trine." (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
5) "[E]vidential use of 'tacit admissions' by an accused ... is no 
longer permissible in criminal trials within this jurisdiction." (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
6) Whenever the State has been allowed to introduce nonexpert state 
of mind evidence, defendant must be permitted to do the same. (Iowa Sup. 
Ct.). 
7) The foundation requirements for reputation testimony are the same 
as to evidence going to credibility as they are for evidence going to probability 
or non-probability of guilt. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
8) Admissibility of certain types of constitutionally-proscribed evi-
dence (e.g., defendant's involuntary confession) requires a mistrial, rather 
than mere striking of the evidence and admonishing of the jury to disregard. 
(Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
9) It is prejudicial for the prosecutor to say in opening argument that 
he knows defendant is guilty. 
1 0) It is prejudicial in jury argument for the prosecutor to inflame the 
jury's fears, passion, and prejudice against defendant by asking the jurors to 
place themselves and their families "in a hypothetical position of peril created 
by a drunken, car operating defendant." (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
11) A trial court now must on motion of either party "question each 
juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to [during-trial pub-
licity]." (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
E. Instructions 
1) The evidence of the case must be considered in determining whether 
to submit a lesser included offense, thus overruling State v. Everett. (Iowa Sup. 
Ct.). 
2) Uniform Jury Instruction No. 501.11 (defining reasonable doubt) 
is defective in one respect, i.e., it "should limit its reference to the lack or 
failure of evidence of such a lack or failure o[f] evidence produced by the 
state." (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
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3) The last paragraph of Uniform Jury Instruction No. 520.8 (relating to 
O.M.V.U.I.) is an unconstitutional application of the Code section 321.281 
so-called "presumption" of intoxication arising from the presence of a speci-
fied percentage of alcohol in the accused's blood. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
4) The "Allen" or "dynamite" verdict-urging charge to a deadlocked 
jury does not per se deny a fair trial. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
5) Trial courts must instruct sua sponte that "consideration of defend-
ant's previous felony convictions must be limited to defendant's credibility as a 
witness." (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
F. Sentencing 
1) "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be im-
prisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his 
trial." (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
2) The abovementioned rule is to be applied prosepectively only by 
Iowa trial courts. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
3) Default imprisonment as the only alternative to immediate, albeit 
non-wilful, in toto payment of a fine denies equal protection to an indigent. 
(Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
4) Express legislative authority for deferred sentencing is granted ef-
fective August 15, 1973, following Iowa supreme court ruling that there was no 
such prior legislative authority, nor inherent power to do so. (Iowa Sup.Ct.). 
5) Sentencing must be done on an individualized basis rather than pur-
suant to sentencing pacts. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
6) The general bar on harsher punishment after a retrial on remand to 
the same trial court is not applicable to trials de novo on appeal to a higher 
trial court. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
G. Posttrial Matters 
1) The conditional exception "or not raised" in the non-relitigation clause 
in Code section 663A.8 does not permit the use of postconviction relief as a 
substitute for the requirement of lodging objections at trial. (Iowa Sup. Ct.). 
2) Iowa's no-hearing parole revocation procedure violates due process. 
(U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
3) States also must provide a two-stage hearing in their probation revo-
cation proceedings. (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
4) There is no absolute sixth amendment right to counsel in either pa-
role revocation hearings or in probation revocation hearings; instead the need 
for counsel must be determined on a case-by-case basis. (U.S. Sup. Ct.). 
5) The requisite degree of the State's proof for revocation of proba-
tion (and presumably parole) is "a preponderance of the evidence." (Iowa 
Sup. Ct.). 
